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Although it has been noted that fisheries is 90% managing people, most management 
regimes focus solely on the other 10%; the biological aspect. Furthermore, despite the growing 
popularity of recreational fishing and increased awareness of its biological effects, there exists 
even less literature on the human dimensions in this domain than in commercial fisheries. In 
New Zealand, the Marlborough Sounds recreational blue cod fishery is strictly regulated, due to 
its popularity and a top-down management regime, with limited fisher involvement. Despite 
substantial biological information on the fishery, there is only one piece of human dimensions 
research, carried out before the current management regime came into force. This thesis 
responds to calls for greater integration of human behaviour into fisheries analyses and 
management. Specifically, the aim is to explore fisher attitudes towards and compliance with 
the fishery regulations. 
The research presented here is a combination of intercept and online surveys of over 
500 fishers and is interdisciplinary in nature. Four related studies, aimed towards publication, 
provide important insights for a more inclusive management style in the future. The first 
chapter examines fisher attitudes and the factors shaping them, a poorly understood area. 
Responses reveal that although overall, fishers were dissatisfied with the current regulations, 
inexperienced and non-locally-resident fishers display more positive attitudes towards the 
regulations. The second core chapter examines regulation non-compliance, a worldwide 
fisheries problem that can undermine the effectiveness of a management regime. As rule-
breaking behaviour is often a sensitive behaviour, two indirect methods (Randomized Response 
and Item Count) are tested against direct questioning in estimating violations of three 
recreational blue cod fishing regulations. Results show mixed effectiveness for the indirect 
methods, with a significantly higher estimate of non-compliance estimate obtained for only one 
of the three regulations. The third core chapter uses structural equation modeling to examine 
the drivers of non-compliance with the size and daily limits for blue cod. Knowledge of these 
drivers is essential to increasing voluntary compliance with the regulations and these results 
demonstrate that social norms are the largest influence for both the regulations. Finally, the 
fourth core chapter examines the potential effects of the maximum size limit on the number of 
blue cod discarded as well as fisher satisfaction and compliance. A scenario approach reveals 
that either increasing or eliminating the maximum size limit could offer significant gains 
compared with the control scenario.  
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The four chapters contribute to the global literature on subjects including fisher 
attitudes, estimating sensitive behaviours, drivers of non-compliance, discards in recreational 
fisheries and natural resource management. Taken together, the results reaffirm the benefits of 
including the human dimensions in fisheries management regimes. For the Marlborough Sounds 
recreational blue cod fishery, a shift away from the current, top-down and biologically focused 
management regime is suggested. I also argue that a more inclusive management strategy may 
be the best chance for success and allow the fishery to be saved for future generations; a goal 
shared by both fishers and management. 
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1.1 The human dimensions of fisheries 
Fishing has been an important source of food and income for human populations for 
many centuries (Cowx 2002; Kaplan and McCay 2004). But despite the multiple benefits 
from fishing , the industrialisation of the last century has often led to the overexploitation of 
fisheries (Christensen 2011). Today fisheries across the world are in crisis (Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2012). They face issues including declining 
abundance, increased discards and by-catch of seabirds, marine mammals and non-target 
fish species, poor economic returns and ecosystem-level impacts (Hilborn 2007b), such as 
habitat degradation (Halpern 2003). In response to this, there is a growing recognition that 
the social and ecological aspects of fisheries management are linked (Berkes 2010) and to 
understand an ecosystem requires understanding not only what is being conserved, but also 
the perspective of who is to conserve that resource (Johannes 1978). 
In addressing this issue fisheries researchers and managers have called for greater 
integration of human behaviour research into fisheries management (Hunt et al. 2013; 
Larkin 1978; Radomski et al. 2001; Royce 1983) as it currently does not receive sufficient 
attention (Fulton et al. 2011). They argue that human dimensions research is a vital 
component of management strategies and should be included from the start (Kaplan and 
McCay 2004), thereby increasing the capacity for improved decision making by managers 
(Enck and Decker 1997). As fish populations are tightly linked to fishers’ actions, fisheries 
management should jointly addresses human (both fishers and non-fishers) behaviour in 
addition to conservation issues (Cowx et al. 2010). Human dimensions research can offer 
valuable information on fisher behaviour, perceptions, motivations, attitudes and well-being 
which can increase the level of compliance to fishery management regulations (Hunt et al. 
2013; Kaplan and McCay 2004).  
Since a fishery is essentially a “human phenomena” (McGoodwin 2006), to manage a 
fishery solely on the basis of biological, economic and ecological concerns yet disregarding 
the knowledge of the local fishers, is to risk failure (Granek et al. 2008; Jentoft and McCay 
1995; McGoodwin 2006). Furthermore, in neglecting the connections between fishers and 
fish, and focusing only on biology, fisher responses to regulations are likely to be seen as 
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externalities affecting the biologically focused management strategy (Arlinghaus et al. 
2008), despite their actions playing a key role in the success or failure. The result has been a 
lack of sufficient focus on the social dimensions of fishery (Kaplan and McCay 2004). 
Although the fishery management regulations also affect the human communities, fishery 
managers are not normally responsible for managing any social, cultural and economic 
effects that may result (Kaplan and McCay 2004).  
Some changes to the approach and direction of management strategies are thus 
urgently needed as researchers call for more “ecosystem based management”, which 
acknowledges the links between the social and biological systems (Hall-Arber et al. 2009). 
There is a pressing need to integrate biological and social sciences with the aim of providing 
insights into the dynamics of the entire social-ecological system of recreational fisheries. 
This greater incorporation of lessons from the social sciences is needed to understand the 
human constraints on reconciling resource use and conservation (Arlinghaus 2004; 
Arlinghaus and Cooke 2009) and should be central to the management process (Kaplan and 
McCay 2004).  
 In light of these considerations, this thesis comprises human behaviour research 
exploring the human dimensions aspect of the recreational blue cod fishery in the 
Marlborough Sounds, New Zealand. More specifically, it will focus on fisher attitudes and 
behaviour with an emphasis on how they relate to non-compliance with management 
regulations in this fishery. This introductory chapter will start with an overview of why 
recreational fishing is an important field of research, why non-compliance in fisheries is an 
important management concern and how fisher participation in fishery government and 
management may influence non-compliance. The Marlborough Sounds blue cod fishery, its 
history and present management approach will be reviewed to provide background 
information. Finally, the four studies that comprise this thesis will be introduced. 
1.2 Introduction to recreational fishing 
Recreational fishing can be defined as the “fishing of aquatic animals that do not 
constitute the individual’s primary resource to meet nutritional needs and are not generally 
sold or otherwise traded on export, domestic or black markets” (EIFAC (European Inland 
Fisheries Advisory Commission) 2008 p.21). Most of the research on fisher attitudes, 
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behaviour and compliance has focused on the commercial sector. For example, despite 
numerous studies on compliance in commercial (Hønneland 2000; Sutinen et al. 1990) and 
artisanal (small-scale subsistence or commercial fishing with little technology) (Gelcich et al. 
2009; Viteri and Chávez 2007) fisheries, there appears to be none in recreational fisheries. 
Similarly, recreational fisher attitude studies (e.g., Page and Radomski 2006; Sauer et al. 
1997) comprise the minority of the literature. Nonetheless, recreational fishing is both 
widespread and growing in popularity in many countries (Arlinghaus and Cooke 2009). 
There has also been growing concern over the potentially significant ecological effects of 
recreational fishing (Coleman et al. 2004; Cooke and Cowx 2004; Post et al. 2002). 
Today, recreational fishing is a popular leisure activity in which approximately 10.6% 
of the world’s population participates (Arlinghaus and Cooke 2009), with an estimated range 
of 220 (World Bank 2012) to 700 million (Cooke and Cowx 2004) people. It is an important 
activity in 76% of the world’s exclusive economic zones; and although recreational fishing is 
more wide-spread in high-income countries (Mora et al. 2011), the sector is growing in both 
popularity and economic importance in less developed regions (Arlinghaus and Cooke 2009; 
Coleman et al. 2004). Recreational fishing also generates relevant economic activity through 
the demand of goods and services to support the activity, with the economic benefits 
reviewed by Arlinghaus and Cooke (2009) and Weithman (1999). As an example, in South 
Australia the 31% of the population that fish at least once a year spend $350 million 
annually on recreational fishing (South Australian Recreational Fishing Industry Review 
Committee (SARFIRC) 2001).  
The recreational take of fish is usually underestimated or neglected (Christensen 
2011), despite landings (the amount of fish harvested) potentially equalling or exceeding 
commercial take for popular species (Coleman et al. 2004). Annual exploitation rates 
(proportion of biomass taken through fishing) of over 50% have been reported in multiple 
recreational fisheries (Lewin et al 2006) with a rainbow trout fishery in Canada showing a 
maximum exploitation rate of 72 to 81% (Cox and Post 2002). Furthermore, as there are 
often more non-commercial than commercial fishers for certain species and/or areas, 
recreational users can have an equivalent or larger effect than commercial users (Eliason 
1999). This has shown to be the case for certain fish species in areas such as California 
(Schroder and Love 2002) and Australia (McPhee et al. 2002). Cooke and Cowx (2004) even 
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estimated that at the beginning of the 21st century, the total worldwide recreational take 
was 14% higher than that of commercial fisheries. Similarly, in some instances recreational 
fisheries can also be far more extensive spatially even though less intensive per unit area 
(Mora et al. 2011). Finally, even after the halt of commercial fishing some fish species’ 
populations fail to recover until recreational fishing is also stopped (Denny and Babcock 
2004; Denny et al. 2003; Shears and Usmar 2006).  
As the potential ecological effects from recreational fishing have been thoroughly 
reviewed elsewhere (Coleman et al. 2004; Cooke and Cowx 2006; Lewin et al. 2006), only a 
brief overview of some of these concerns is provided. Compared with commercial fishing, 
recreational fishing can have many of the same biological effects. However, it is more 
concentrated with a focus on the higher trophic levels that leads to changes in the structure, 
function and productivity of the entire ecosystem  (Botsford et al. 1997; Friedlander and 
DeMartini 2002; Jackson et al. 2001; Myers and Worm 2003; Pauly et al. 2005; Vitousek et 
al. 1997). Ecological effects such as truncation of the size and age structure of the fish, 
lowered biomass and alterations to the community composition (Jouvenel and Pollard 2001; 
Westera et al. 2003; Young et al. 1999) may occur and selective exploitation of larger fish 
may result in lower reproductive success through evolutionary pressure (Jørgensen et al. 
2007). Fish may also be targeted, intentionally or accidentally, during the reproductive 
period having negative consequences on individual fish fitness and the reproductive success 
of the species (Cooke et al. 2002). Another area of concern is that potentially billions of fish 
worldwide are caught and then released with the assumption that they will survive 
(Arlinghaus et al. 2007; Cooke and Cowx 2004). However, given that post-release mortality 
rates range from close to zero to over 90% (Bartholomew and Bohnsack 2005), this 
assumption may not always be valid. Finally, even though there are no examples of 
recreational fishing alone leading to the extinction of a species (Arlinghaus et al. 2002), the 
collapse of several fisheries in Canada could be attributed to recreational fishing (Post et al. 
2002) and there is still the possibility of significant population declines or other effects such 
as changes to the sex ratio (Lewin et al. 2006).  
In New Zealand, many people regard fishing and gathering seafood as a vital part of 
their way of life (Ministry of Fisheries 2010c). Indeed, recreational fishing was the sixth most 
popular sport or recreational activity in 2007/2008, with ~19.5% of the population 
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participating (Sport and Recreation New Zealand 2009) and an estimated 25,000 tonnes of 
fish taken (Ministry of Fisheries 2014a); compared with 413,000 tonnes commercially 
(Seafood New Zealand 2014). Although recreational fishers have common property access 
rights to New Zealand waters, this does not guarantee unrestricted utilization. The Fisheries 
Act (New Zealand Parliament 1996) can be used to prohibit or restrict access rights 
(Flothmann et al. 2010). Even if access rights are secured, there are usually multiple 
regulations that fishers must follow: input-based regulations like bait restrictions or number 
of hooks, and/or output-based regulations such as quantity and size of different species 
fishers may keep. There may also be voluntary suggested best practices designed to 
minimise the mortality of discarded fish. These practices may include using a large hook, 
wearing wet gloves or using a wet rag to handle the fish and pinching or removing the barb 
on the hook (Ministry of Fisheries 2009). Even though recreational fishing regulations should 
not interfere with the recreational fishers’ livelihoods in a strict economic sense, regulations 
that affect a ‘way of life’ (often for generations) can prove just as controversial (Taylor and 
Buckenham 2003).  
1.3 A new management approach? 
The increasing numbers of recreational fishers coupled with a greater awareness of 
both the scale and potential biological effects of this activity has led to calls for more 
effective management strategies (Arlinghaus and Cooke 2009). Historically, central 
government agencies have been primarily responsible for managing the world’s fisheries 
(Berkes 2010), but their continued depletion has demonstrated the frequent failings of this 
approach (Arlinghaus and Mehner 2005). In the majority of cases governments have either 
failed to halt population declines (Froese and Proelß 2010) or exacerbated the depletion 
(e.g., Nussman et al. 2005). The former was the case in Canada with the infamous cod 
collapse (Finlayson and McCay 1998; Hutchings and Myers 1994); when the government 
ignored warnings that Northern Cod stocks were overestimated. By the time quotas were 
reduced it was too late and in 1994 the fishery was at less than 5% of the 1990 level (Mason 
2002). A review of the status of 90 marine stocks (Hutchings 2000) showed that for many of 
the fisheries (including cod, haddock and flatfishes) there was little or no recovery even 
after 15 years and that 41% of the stocks had continued to decline. A conventional top-
down approach to management, in which the government controls the process, may also be 
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viewed as insensitive to both the fishers and their communities (Burton 2003; Grafton and 
Lane 1998). Fishers are usually not quick to accept government intervention, especially 
when it does not “make sense in the way they see their problem, know their industry, and 
have learned to understand nature” (Jentoft et al. 1998 p. 434). Fishers often demand a 
‘real’ voice in the management because they have little confidence in the government’s 
management ability (Jentoft and McCay 1995; Nielsen and Vedsmand 1997) and, in 
commercial and artisanal fisheries, depend on the resource for their livelihood. 
 The goal of a management strategy should be not only to conserve the fish stock, 
but to also fulfil the normative obligations of equity, fairness and trust to the stakeholders 
(Jentoft 2000). However, under the top-down approach, fisher input and agreement is often 
not asked for nor considered (Jentoft et al. 2010). Case studies of fisheries where the 
management system is failing are normally characterized by debated scientific advice 
(between fishers, managers and/or scientists), inadequate communication between user 
groups, and high levels of non-compliance with the imposed regulations (Rice and Connolly 
2007). This has led to a “near universal” call for the top-down approach of fisheries 
management to be reviewed (e.g., Jentoft et al. 1998; Sharp 1997; Townsend 1995) and 
increasing interest in community-based management of fisheries (Berkes 1989; Schlager and 
Ostrom 1992). Indeed, most researchers now contend that stakeholder involvement is a 
critical component of successful management (Fulton et al. 2011) and that governments can 
and should involve fishers in a meaningful way (Plinkerton 1989). 
Greater fisher involvement can enable fisheries managers to make use of fishers 
often-detailed knowledge of the fishery including: the time and place fish species are usually 
caught, stock structure, spawning grounds and juvenile habitat, catch rate and details of 
spatial or other changes in fishing effort and practices (Johannes and Neis 2007), seasonal 
fluctuations in species abundance, distribution of different ecosystems and resource use 
(Smith 1994 as cited in Wells and White, 1995). Involving fishers enables the inclusion of this 
information when designing management strategies and can help ensure a more 
ecologically sound management approach (Jentoft et al. 1998). As regulation effectiveness is 
one of the factors that can influence compliance behaviour (Hønneland 2000), governments 
would do well to make use of such knowledge (Mackinson 1998).  
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There are also further advantages to increasing fisher participation, including: 
promoting community ecosystem development, helping equalize fisheries allocations, 
decreasing excessive investments by fishers in new technology, and reducing conflicts 
between the government, scientists and fishers (McGoodwin 2006; Plinkerton 1989). It can 
also help address one of the biggest challenges in fisheries management, the 
implementation and enforcement of regulations (Rosenberg 2007). Successful fisheries 
management necessitates a high level of compliance with the regulations, which usually 
does not hold true (Muth and Bowe 1998; Sullivan 2002); potentially undermining the 
effectiveness of management strategies (Sullivan 2002). For example, a minimum size limit 
is designed to protect juvenile fish. However, if fishers still take this size fish then 
recruitment (fish reaching a certain size or reproductive stage) into the fishery is 
compromised with not enough young fish entering the population. A participatory and 
legitimate policy making process offers the highest likelihood of a sustainable fishery (Mora 
et al. 2011) as high levels of voluntary compliance can counteract low levels of enforcement 
(Castilla and Defeo 2005). Experience suggests that fishers are more likely to follow 
regulations that they have assisted in designing (Jentoft 1989) as compliance and 
participation are frequently linked (Smith et al. 1997). 
However, fisher participation alone does not guarantee the success or legitimacy of a 
management regime and not all forms of participation will be viewed as legitimate (Wilson 
and McCay 1998). For example, governments can choose to consult with user groups, but 
may still decide to disregard the advice or recommendations received. Sometimes the 
consultation is used only as a symbolic gesture to appease fishers (Jentoft and McCay 1995; 
Wilson and McCay 1998) or to legitimize a new regulation (Silver and Campbell 2005). There 
is also the quandary of which stakeholder groups are represented, how well their members 
are represented and who decides which groups are involved (Jentoft 1989). A co-
management approach (where fishers share responsibility with the government for 
managing the fishery) may fail because of social (e.g., too much disagreement among 
stakeholders) and institutional (e.g., lack of management of commitment) factors, not 
because of the principle behind the approach (Jentoft et al. 1998). Reasons for failure can 
include difficulties with participating stakeholders reaching agreement or inadequate 
representation (Costanza et al. 1998). 
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1.4 The problem of regulation non-compliance 
 Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is one of the leading causes of fisheries 
management failures worldwide (Boonstra and Bach Dang 2010; Sutinen et al. 1990). It is 
also an important area of fisher behaviour to understand as even low levels of non-
compliance can undermine the effectiveness of the management regime (Sethi and Hilborn 
2008) and there is a pressing need for more information on rule-breaking behaviour 
(Wellsmith 2011). However, regulation non-compliance can be a sensitive subject (Gavin et 
al. 2009; Solomon et al. 2007). The number of violators caught is usually only a small 
proportion (Elffers et al. 2003) of the actual number and other estimation methods such as 
logbooks and permits may not always be accurate as they are easily modified (Gavin et al. 
2009). Recreational fisheries also present further difficulties due to the large areas fished 
and number of participants, a lack of reporting obligations and a wide range of fishing 
practices (McCluskey and Lewison 2008). Without access to accurate non-compliance 
estimates, evaluating the effectiveness of a regulation and prioritising management 
responses to non-compliance is challenging. Although a greater consideration of fisher 
attitudes can offer insights into which regulations may be frequently violated (Kuperan and 
Sutinen 1998; Viteri and Chávez 2007), new methods for obtaining estimates of non-
compliance are needed. Several indirect techniques have been developed and some even 
tested in fisheries (Blank and Gavin 2009; St John et al. 2010); but the overall results on their 
effectiveness are mixed.  
More information on fisher attitudes and behaviours relating to non-compliance is 
urgently needed in order to move beyond the usual response of increasing enforcement 
and/or penalties (fines, loss of license). This approach risks further alienating fishers and is 
also expensive, in terms of both human and financial resources (Keane et al. 2008). Targeted 
interventions to address the issue of non-compliance are also not possible without a greater 
understanding of fisher attitudes. Nonetheless, understanding the drivers of regulation non-
compliance is not straightforward as there are a multitude of potential factors (e.g., 
regulation knowledge, probability of detection, the behaviour of other fishers) as well as 




Historically a fisher’s compliance decision was viewed as a calculated evaluation of 
the potential benefits and risks (Al-Subhi et al. 2013; Kuperan and Sutinen 1998). Yet recent 
studies have demonstrated that numerous factors besides self-interest (e.g., moral norm, 
participation in the management process) govern fisher behaviour (Gezelius and Hauck 
2011; King and Sutinen 2010). Understanding why fishers comply with a regulation is 
important if the fisheries management wishes to encourage fishers to voluntarily comply 
with the regulations instead of being ‘forced to’ out of fear of discovery and/or sanctions. 
Chapter four provides a detailed account of compliance theory, which has been well 
researched in commercial fisheries, even though there are only a few studies in recreational 
fisheries (e.g., Page and Radomski 2006).  
1.5 Thesis aim and objectives 
To help answer these questions, research is needed on recreational fishers, their 
actions and subsequent outcomes. Understanding and predicting the behaviour of fishers is 
another important area of enquiry since “fisheries management is 10% biological resource 
management and 90% people management” (Fulton and Adelman 2003 pg. 4). The present 
research seeks to help fill this gap by exploring the human dimensions aspect of the current 
blue cod management regime in the Marlborough Sounds, New Zealand. Specifically, this 
case study explored fisher attitudes towards and compliance with several of the regulations 
governing recreational blue cod fishing.  The study objectives and results have implications 
for a more participatory management regime, although that type of management model 
was not a focus of this thesis research. Instead, the results of the studies draw conclusions 
supporting the calls for a shift towards greater fisher participation, as detailed in section 1.3. 
The four study objectives are: 
(1) Explore how factors such as fishing experience, region of residency, effect of 
regulations on fishing habits and participation in the management process influence 
fisher knowledge of and satisfaction with regulations. 
(2) Compare the effectiveness of the randomized response technique, item count 
technique and direct questioning in estimating non-compliance with the daily and 




(3) Test alterative models of drivers of non-compliance with the two main regulations 
for blue cod and identify the largest influences on a fisher’s compliance behaviour. 
(4) Evaluate the potential for improving compliance with the size limit through 
minimizing discards and maximising fisher satisfaction. 
1.6 Thesis case study 
In New Zealand, there has been very little research into the human dimensions 
aspect of fisheries, despite its importance as a commercial and recreational activity (Sport 
and Recreation New Zealand 2009). In particular, the Marlborough Sounds recreational blue 
cod (Parapercis colias) fishery provides a timely case study in this area of inquiry. As with 
most important New Zealand fisheries, there exists substantial biological data (e.g., Beentjes 
and Carbines 2005a; Blackwell 1998, 2009) on the species including abundance, movement 
patterns, habitat, age and growth. Many of these biological studies have been carried out in 
the Marlborough Sounds (Beentjes and Carbines 2012; Blackwell 2002; Cole 1999; Davidson 
2001).  
However, there appears to be only one human dimensions-related piece of research 
(Batstone et al. 2009). Carried out by a private research institution, the report aimed to 
characterise the Marlborough Sounds recreational fishers. In addition to gathering socio-
demographic information, their study also looked their values (i.e., what constitutes a good 
fishing trip) and motivations (i.e., to catch fish for a meal) for fishing in the Sounds. Relevant 
findings included that the most important motivations for fishing were: for relaxation, to 
share experiences with other people, to be outdoors and for family recreation. Similarly, 
fishers were most likely to agree with statements such as: “I would rather catch one or two 
big fish then ten small fish”, “a fishing trip can be worthwhile even if no fish are caught”, but 
had mixed opinions on “the more fish I catch, the happier I am” and disagreed that a 
“worthwhile fishing trip is one in which many fish were caught” (Batstone et al. 2009 p. 22).  
The following section will explain why the Marlborough Sounds blue fishery was 
selected for this research, as well as provide an introduction to the Marlborough Sounds 
region and the blue cod. This fishery is an excellent opportunity to undertake social science 
research for the following reasons: 
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(1) As well as being an important commercially fished species (Ministry of Fisheries 
2014a), blue cod is one of the most popular recreational fisheries (Ministry of Fisheries 
2011b), making effective management crucial.  
(2) The Marlborough Sounds blue cod fishery in particular suffers from an extremely 
high level of recreational fishing pressure (Cole et al. 2000) and is therefore tightly regulated 
with a complex suite of regulations. However, high amounts of anger and frustration from 
fishers surround the current management approach (Bell 2014b; Moore 2012). 
(3) A severe decline in the blue cod population caused the fishery to be temporarily 
closed in 2008. Such closures are usually an acknowledgement that the management has 
failed (Gell and Roberts 2003; Roberts 1997; Worm et al. 2006). Although the Marlborough 
blue cod fishery has since been reopened, it can be argued that a change in management 
strategy is needed to prevent a recurrence. 
(4) The government has signalled its intention to review the management strategy 
later in 2014 after the results of a stock survey are available (Bell 2014b). However, basing 
the review solely on biological information risks ignoring an important component of the 
fishery (fisher behaviour) and may not be sufficient to ensure its future.  
(5) A more participatory approach to management will have a greater chance at 
success when the spatial extent of fishing effort and fish distribution are limited (Jentoft et 
al. 1998), criteria which the Marlborough Sounds recreational blue cod fishery meets as the 
management area is clearly defined by the area’s geology. 
1.6.1 Blue cod 
The blue cod (Parapercis colias) is a bottom-dwelling fish species endemic to New 
Zealand. They can grow over 50cm in length, weigh up to  four kg (Carbines 2004) and live 
for 20 to 30 years (the maximum recorded is 32) (Paul 2000). Blue cod was a significant 
species in the traditional Māori catch of pre-European times and is still taken under 
customary allowance (Carbines 2000). The species has also been commercially fished since 
1900 (Rapson 1956) with annual landings between 1000 and 1500 tonnes (t) from 1930-
1970 (Carbines 1999a). But in the 1970s, landings declined between 500 and 600t before 
increasing again in the mid-1980s (Paul 2000). More recently, in 2012/2013 ~2200t were 
caught, out of the 2681t Total Allowable Catch (TAC) (Ministry of Fisheries 2014a). Blue cod 
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are also highly sought-after by amateur fishers: it is the second most commonly landed 
recreational fish species in New Zealand and the most common on the South Island 
(Ministry of Fisheries 2001).  
This slow-growing fish (Blackwell 1998) normally inhabits reef edge habitats (Cole et 
al. 2003), light foul (reef edges, shingle/gravel, and biogenic structures) or sand close to 
rocky outcrops shallower than 150m (Paul 2000). Blue cod are voracious and opportunistic 
carnivores, feeding on invertebrates and other fish (including juvenile blue cod) (Jiang and 
Carbines 2002; Paul 2000). Male blue cod grow faster and to a larger size than females 
(Carbines 1998b), with a range of factors influencing fish growth; including sex, habitat 
quality and fishing pressure relative to location. Size-at-maturity also varies with location. 
For example, in the Marlborough Sounds maturity is reached at 21-25cm at an age of three 
to four years (Rapson 1956); but in Southland it is at 28cm and six years for females and 
26cm and four years for males (Carbines 2004). Reproduction occurs annually with an 
extended spawning period during late winter and spring (Rapson 1956).  
Blue cod are protogynous hermaphrodites; they begin their lifecycle as a female and 
at some point are triggered (internally or externally) to change sex to male. Generally the 
sex change starts after 30cm but the removal of large males from the population (i.e., from 
fishing) can accelerate this natural change (Beentjes and Carbines 2005b). Males usually 
dominate areas experiencing higher fishing pressure, such as the Marlborough Sounds, by a 
2:1 ratio. In comparison, two relatively less fished areas in New Zealand have both larger 
and more abundant blue cod, along with a more balanced sex ratio, even favouring females 
at times (Beentjes and Carbines 2005b). The average size and abundance of blue cod 
populations also declines with increased fishing intensity (Beentjes and Carbines 2012). For 
example, blue cod present in the Long Island Marine Reserve in the Marlborough Sounds 
were on average four cm longer than those in adjacent, fished areas (Cole et al. 2000). This 
can also affect the reproductive potential of the population as larger fish produce more 
batches of eggs (Crossland 1977; Zeldis and Francis 1998). Blue cod are also highly territorial 
with most remaining in the same area (100 m to one km) for most of their life (Carbines 
2004; Carbines and McKenzie 2004; Cole et al. 2000; Mace and Johnston 1983).  
Even though commercial potting or lining does not catch juvenile blue cod, they are 
still vulnerable to trawlers (Carbines 1999a) and recreational fishers, especially those that 
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do not use large enough hooks. Habitat modification (oyster dredging, trawling) (e.g. 
Carbines et al. 2004; Jiang and Carbines 2002) can also affect blue cod. Jiang and Carbines 
(2002) showed that blue cod in areas recently dredged by the oyster fishery or in areas that 
showed little sign of recovery had a less varied diet than blue cod living in more complex, 
recovering habitat. Another study on blue cod habitat changes (Carbines et al. 2004) found 
that more complex habitats were also home to a greater abundance of fish that were also 
20% larger on average. Dredging for both scallops and oysters occurs in the Marlborough 
Sounds on a commercial scale (Keeley et al. 2009; Ministry for Primary Industries 2014), 
potentially negatively affecting the blue cod fishery.  
The blue cod is not unique in being negatively affected by habitat degradation but its 
biological characteristics put this species under increased risk of overexploitation. The blue 
cod’s slow growth, small range and hermaphroditic nature mean they are subject to 
localised depletion, especially from heavy fishing pressure (Bradford 1998; Teirney et al. 
1997). This has been the case in the Marlborough Sounds (Blackwell 2002), where there is 
intense fishing pressure over a relatively short time period. The extended spawning season 
also makes it challenging to implement seasonal closures during this critical time. Overall, 
these biological characteristics mean blue cod is likely to need more active management 
than other recreationally-fished species, even in the same area. This in turn increases the 
information requirements, both biological and social, needed for effective and 
comprehensive management of the fishery. 
1.6.2 Marlborough Sounds blue cod fishery 
The Marlborough Sounds is a deep series of drowned river valleys situated at the 
northeast end of the South Island, New Zealand (Carbines 2000) (Fig. 1.1)  covering over 
500,000 ha (Marlborough District Council 2014). The area comprises two major sounds: 
Queen Charlotte Sound bounded to the east by Arapawa Island, and Pelorus Sound 
bounded to the west by D’Urville Island. Both Sounds have complex coastlines and provide a 
variety of habitats from sheltered reefs to exposed rocky coasts and offshore islands 




Figure 1.1: Map showing the location of the Marlborough Sounds, New Zealand. 
 
Although the Marlborough Sounds is part of blue cod quota management area 
BCO7/Challenger Area (Fig. 1.2), it has different, stricter recreational limits for blue cod than 
the rest of this area. Within New Zealand, this fishery is also unique in that recreational 
fishers, as opposed to commercial fishers, catch the majority of the blue cod. Out of the 343 
tonnes Total Allowable Catch for the Sounds blue cod fishery in 2010, only 70t was for 





Figure 1.2: Location of the Challenger East Management Area (dark blue) and Marlborough Sounds (small light blue area).  
 
Commercial fishing of blue cod in the Marlborough Sounds is confined to a small but 
regionally significant fishery in the outer Marlborough Sounds; there has not been any 
commercial fishing in the inner Sounds for 50 to 60 years (Blackwell 2002; Henderson 2009). 
This is a voluntary agreement rather than a formal exclusion, with commercial fishers 
agreeing to leave this area for recreational fishers. Despite the lack of commercial fishers, 
the fishing pressure from recreational fishers can be intense, especially in January (Cole et 
al. 2000). The warm climate, sheltered and accessible nature of the Marlborough Sounds, 
coupled with excellent fishing opportunities, has made it a popular destination for both 
holidays and fishing. A 2009 report (Batstone et al. 2009) estimated the number of fishers at 
over 9000 for summer 2008/2009. There has also been expansion of the three local marinas, 
new holiday homes and a 40% increase in trailer registration in the region and nearby 
between 1993 and 2003 (Ministry of Fisheries 2008a). Furthermore, recent years have also 
seen technological advancements: the boats are larger and more sophisticated with GPS 
and fish finders (Ministry of Fisheries 2008a). These changes have led to increased pressure 




Catch per unit effort (CPUE) data from 1995/1996 showed proportionally lower 
numbers in the inner Marlborough Sounds and proportionally higher in the outer Sounds 
(Blackwell 1998). Furthermore, a continued decrease from the extreme inner to extreme 
outer Pelorus Sound indicated localised depletion from higher fishing pressure closer to the 
land (Blackwell 1998). A 1998/1999 stock survey showed that the outer Sounds had 
significantly higher numbers of male blue cod than the inner Sounds, presumably because 
the larger male fish are more likely to be taken by recreational fishers (Blackwell 1998; 
Carbines 2000). 
1.6.3 Management history 
As far back as a 1973 to 1976 survey, the decreasing size of Marlborough Sounds 
blue cod was apparent, compared with 1938/1939 data (Beentjes and Carbines 2005b). 
Because of the concentrated fishing pressure and its previously discussed implications, the 
Sounds regulations have been regularly modified in order to sustain the blue cod population 
(Appendix 1). In 1986 the Minimum Legal Size (MLS) for blue cod caught in the Marlborough 
Sounds was 30cm, with each person allowed to keep 12 a day (Daily Bag Limit or DBL), a 
decrease from 20 the year before.   
More changes came in 1993 when the MLS was increased to 33cm and the DBL 
dropped to 10. However, recreational fishers voiced concerns about the number of 
undersized blue cod discarded, while trying to catch a legal-sized fish, and their survival rate 
(believing these small fish had a high mortality rate). In response to these concerns, further 
changes were made just a year later with the MLS decreased to 28cm and the DBL dropped 
to six (Carbines 1999b). The new limits lasted almost ten years. But 2003 National Institute 
of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) data showed the Sounds blue cod population 
had declined by 50% between 1995-1996 and 2001 (Blackwell 2006). An increase in the MLS 
(to 30cm) and DBL reduction (to three) followed the release of this data.  
Nonetheless, a 2007 study by NIWA (Blackwell 2009) showed that these reductions had 
failed to both stop the decline and start the population’s recovery. In particular, the data 
showed a 57% decline in juvenile blue cod since 2004. Furthermore, the data pointed to a 
complete lack of blue cod of any size within the Inner Queen Charlotte Sound. In response 
to this, in March 2008 the Ministry of Fisheries opened consultation on a variety of 
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measures aimed at halting the blue cod population decline in the Marlborough Sounds. 
These included (Ministry of Fisheries 2008c): 
 Temporary closures of parts of the Sounds to all hook and line fishing for at least 
three years 
 Further reduction of the daily bag limit from three to two blue cod per person per 
day, the introduction a daily boat limit of six blue cod and restricting fishers to only 
one daily bag limit, even on multi-day trips 
 Requiring fishers to land all blue cod whole or gutted so fish can be easily measured 
by fisheries officers 
 A requirement for fishers to retain all blue cod at or above the minimum legal size of 
30cm, to a maximum of two fish per person/day, and then move to target other 
species or stop fishing (to prevent high-grading) 
 Strengthening and formalising voluntary agreements with commercial fishers to 
prevent targeting of blue cod in large areas of the Queen Charlotte and Pelorus 
Sounds 
 
Other measures proposed by the local stakeholder group SoundFish were (Ministry of 
Fisheries 2008d): 
 Limiting all hook and line fishers to one hook per line and use of only large hooks 
(6/0) or greater to avoid catching juvenile blue cod 
 Setlining to use large hooks of size 10/0 or greater 
 Amending the boundaries of the Marlborough Sounds to include Croisilles Harbour 
to the west and Port Underwood to the east (to prevent depletion in nearby popular 
fishing areas) 
 
In their initial position paper (Ministry of Fisheries 2008c) the Ministry noted that the 
previous regulatory measures had all failed to reduce the recreational fishing pressure on 
blue cod to sustainable levels. This suggested that stronger measures were necessary, 
leaving few options besides the proposed temporary area closures. The next month over 
300 recreational fishers attend two public meetings organised by a local fishing 
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organization. Attendees challenged the results of the NIWA studies, with many fishers 
saying there were plenty of large blue cod. Fishers also questioned the rushed nature of the 
consultation, with less than six weeks between the announcement and the close of 
submissions (Option 4 2008) and that paper copies of the proposal were not readily 
available (Ministry of Fisheries 2008d).  
In all, over 1000 submissions were received on the subject. Common issues raised by 
fishers included: inadequate consultation, a need to lower the discard rate (rather than 
limiting the take), lack of acknowledgement of the potentially significant levels of predation 
by shags and seals, and ignoring local knowledge on this subject. From the numerous 
stakeholders, the proposal was mainly met with strong negative reactions. Although some 
submitters agreed that ‘urgent’ or ‘drastic’ action was needed, there was opposition to most 
of the suggested measures including reducing the bag limit (not necessary as there were 
plenty of cod, previous reductions had not been effective), the boat limit (six was too low 
and unfair to many fishers as they would not be allowed their DBL) and temporary closures 
(blue cod not in serious enough trouble to stop fishing for other species, a good idea but 
rotational closures would be better) (Ministry of Fisheries 2008d). Several groups also 
mentioned that implementation of these proposals should be matched by a reduction in the 
fishery’s commercial catch.  
Finally, there was concern over the Ministry’s approach to targeting only recreational 
fishing. Individual stakeholders and organisations noted that terrestrial activities, such as 
land use changes resulting in sedimentation, nutrient-runoff, erosion and pollution, as well 
as aquaculture operations in the Sounds (salmon and mussel) could have a significant effect 
on blue cod habitat (Ministry of Fisheries 2008d). Although acknowledged in the position 
paper, no steps were taken to address these causes as the Ministry viewed them as having a 
negligible effect, especially compared with recreational fishing. Despite the strong 
opposition to the proposal, on 3 July 2008, the Minister of Fisheries announced the closure 
of the Marlborough Sounds blue cod fishery for the next four years: October 2008-October 
2012. This ban prohibited recreational fishers from taking blue cod from anywhere within 
the enclosed Marlborough Sounds Area. Fishing for other species was still allowed but any 
blue cod caught had to be returned to the water immediately (Ministry of Fisheries 2008b).  
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Less than a year later, in May 2009, the new Minister of Fisheries (from another 
political party) announced the ban would end “sooner rather than later”. The 
announcement was met with relief by local fishers and business owners (Orman 2009) as 
the ban was extremely unpopular. The Minister set up the Blue Cod Management Group 
(BCMG) and charged the group with drafting a management plan for the Marlborough 
Sounds blue cod fishery that would allow it to reopen ahead of the initial four-year closure. 
This group was comprised of six members of the Marlborough/Nelson community 
representing the interests of recreational fishers. In late August 2010 the group’s draft plan 
for managing the Sounds blue cod population was released for public consultation (Blue Cod 
Management Group 2010). The three goals of their plan were: (1) Rebuild localised blue cod 
populations in depleted areas, (2) Prevent further depletion of localised populations, and (3) 
Provide for amateur use of fishery without compromising long-term sustainability. 
Specifically, their plan put forth eleven recommendations:  
1. Restrict fishers to two hooks per line, 
2. Set the DBL to two blue cod per person per day, 
3. Implement a maximum daily boat limit of ten blue cod for all vessels,  
4. Allow accumulation of only two daily bag limits for blue cod, 
5. Increase the MLS to 33cm, 
6. Introduce a maximum legal size (MaxLS) of 45 cm to protect large fish—a 12 cm ‘slot’ 
in total, 
7. Close the Marlborough Sounds to recreational blue cod fishing 1 September to 30 
January each year (during spawning), 
8. Establish a no-take zone for finfish around Maud Island (a scientific reserve) to 
provide a protected spawning ground, 
9. Require all amateur fishers targeting/taking blue cod to possess a fishing permit, 
10. All blue cod must be kept whole or gutted in order to facilitate easy measurement by 
compliance staff, 
11. Extend the Marlborough Sounds boundaries. 
Once again there was varied support for the different recommendations. The majority of 
submissions expressed support for the decreased daily bag limit (Ministry of Fisheries 
2010a) but charter boat operators warned that adoption of these proposals, especially the 
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DBL of two, would force them to go out of business (Howie 2010). Although two thirds of 
submissions were supportive of the idea of the seasonal closure, many expressed concern 
over the timing as many fishers can only visit during the December-January summer 
holidays (Ministry of Fisheries 2010a). In April 2011 the fishery reopened with a suite of new 
regulations: 
 BCMG recommendations #1, 2, 5, 8 and 10 were adopted as recommended. 
 No accumulation of the DBL is allowed (#4). 
 The MaxLS, #6, was set at 35cm—a 5cm ‘slot’ in total, as the science suggested the 
majority of blue cod fell into the 25 to 35cm range. 
 Recommendations numbers 3, 9 and 11 were not adopted in any form. 
 Number 7, the closed season, was changed to 1 September to 19 December every 
year as to not exclude fishers who can only visit during the December-January 
holidays. 
These regulations are valid for the whole Marlborough Sounds fishery zone (Fig. 1.2) 
(Ministry of Fisheries 2011a). Additionally, the two fish limit applies to the possession of 
blue cod inside the Marlborough Sounds, regardless of where they were caught, as there is 
no available test to determine the origin of the fish (Ministry of Fisheries 2008a). This 
regulation is normally referred to as the ‘transit rule’. In addition to these legal 
requirements, a Code of Practice (Appendix 2) was also developed to educate fishers on 
how their fishing practices could help ensure the survival of any discarded fish. Similarly, a 
“Which Hook” poster (Appendix 3) was also prepared in order to encourage fishers to use 
the best type and size of hook to catch their preferred species of fish.  
Even though these regulations have been viewed as an improvement on the ban, 
they still have not been without complaint (Nicoll 2012a). The largest source of frustration is 
over the 30 to 35cm ‘slot rule’ as many fishers struggle to catch two cod that are small 
enough to keep and have to throw back more than ten fish in order to get one within the 
slot (Moore 2012). The fate of these discarded fish is what worries and frustrates many 
fishers (Thomas, unpublished field notes) as if not properly caught and handled, many of 
these fish will die upon being returned to the water (Bartholomew and Bohnsack 2005; 
Carbines 1999b; Powell et al. 2011). Additionally, shags and barracouta often prey on the 
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discarded fish (Ministry of Fisheries 2008d). Because of these concerns, many fishers view 
the slot rule as doing more harm than good (Thomas et al. 2014b). Despite these 
frustrations, the current Minister of Fisheries has announced the regulations would not be 
reviewed until results of a 2014 stock assessment are available, possibly not until 2015. The 
Minister has stressed a need to continue making decisions on the best science available to 
him (Moore 2012), currently the results of the 2010 blue cod survey. The most recent 
biological data show that the adult blue cod biomass in the areas closed to fishing had 
increased since 2007 but that pre-recruit (blue cod <30cm) biomass in most of these same 
areas has remained at low levels or continued to decline (Beentjes and Carbines 2012).  
In light of these fisher concerns and the continued decline of the blue cod 
population, a more participatory approach that includes the human dimensions is worth 
consideration. The four studies comprising this thesis can supplement the forthcoming 
biological data and assist, if desired, in employing a more integrated management approach. 
Specifically, the results will provide robust measures of fisher attitudes and behaviour that 
can be used to assess effectiveness of rules. As the success of the current management 
approach is somewhat constrained by compliance with the regulations, more information 
on fisher attitudes and behaviour would be beneficial as they can be key factors in fishers 
compliance decisions. Finally, surveying fishers on their views on the management regime 
could help alleviate some frustrations with the current approach, and their lack of 
involvement, by providing a forum to express their views on the regulations.  
1.7 Thesis structure 
This thesis provides an insight into several of the human dimensions aspects of the 
current Marlborough Sounds blue cod management regime. It explores several facets of 
fishers’ attitudes and behaviour, complementing the already available and forthcoming 
body of biological information on this fishery. The bulk of the thesis is covered in four core 
chapters. Each chapter is presented as a stand-alone study, either published or to be 
published as a journal article. As there are multiple authors for the papers, clarification on 
the role of the authors is needed: I was responsible for the designing the studies, data 
collection and analysis, and manuscript writing. My supervisors, Taciano Milfont and 
Michael Gavin, provided advice and comments on the chapter drafts. 
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 Chapter two, recently published in Marine Policy (Thomas et al. 2014b): This chapter 
focuses on two of the regulations unique to this fishery, the requirement to keep 
blue cod whole or gutted, while at sea, and the transit rule. In particular this study 
examines fisher knowledge of and satisfaction with these two regulations as these 
factors can influence compliance decisions (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Martin 
1995). The influence of fishing experience and region of residency on these variables 
is explored along with other factors such as influence of the regulations on fishing 
habits and participation in the management process.  
 Chapter three, recently published in Biological Conservation (Thomas et al. 2014a): 
Non-compliance with regulations can negatively affect the success of a fisheries 
management strategy (Gigliotti and Taylor 1990; Sethi and Hilborn 2008). However, 
estimating non-compliance can be challenging due to the sensitive nature of the 
subject (Gavin et al. 2009) and the nature of recreational fishing (e.g., no permits) 
only increases this challenge (McCluskey and Lewison 2008). Indirect techniques 
such as randomized response and item count have shown potential in providing 
higher and more accurate estimates of non-compliance than traditional direct 
questioning. Chapter three compares these three methods in estimating non-
compliance with the two main blue cod regulations, the daily and size limits, and the 
nearby marine reserve. 
 Chapter four: The estimates of rule violations from chapter three, although 
important, are still only a first step in addressing the problem of regulation non-
compliance. There are increasing calls for more research into the drivers of non-
compliance (Robbins et al. 2006) as identifying these can be used to increase 
voluntary compliance with the regulations. Chapter four utilises the estimates of 
non-compliance from the previous chapter to examine what instrumental (e.g., 
probability of detection) or normative (e.g., guilt) factors are the largest drivers 
behind non-compliance with the daily and size limits for blue cod in the Marlborough 
Sounds. This is done via structural equation modeling using a range of factors from 
several disciplines. 
 Chapter five, under review for ICES Journal of Marine Science: Not all caught fish are 
kept and even low mortality rates of the discarded fish have the potential to 
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undermine the effectiveness of the regulations and affect the sustainability of the 
fishery (Coggins et al. 2007; Douglas et al. 2010). The final study in the thesis uses a 
scenario approach in a between-group experimental design to evaluate three 
different size limits, the current and two alternatives (fisher-suggested), in terms of 
both fisher satisfaction and minimizing the amount of fish discards. The aim was to 
determine how compliance with the size limit could be increased, while addressing 
the need to maintain a more balanced sex ratio, through minimising discard and 
increasing fisher satisfaction. 
 Chapter six: Finally, the concluding chapter brings together all four studies and 
reviews the contribution of the human dimensions research to the Marlborough 
Sounds blue cod fishery. It also discusses practical applications of the results and 





















2 What determines fishers’ knowledge of and 
attitudes towards regulations?  
2.1 Introduction 
There is growing recognition that social and ecological factors are linked, ultimately 
determining the resilience of fisheries (Ludwig et al. 1993; Silver and Campbell 2005). In 
particular, fishers’ knowledge of, and positive attitudes towards the regulations, are critical 
for fisheries management and conservation efforts (Fisher 1997). Awareness of regulations 
can significantly influence fishers’ decisions to comply (Martin 1995; Schill and Kline 1995), 
as the effectiveness of a rule is limited by an individual’s knowledge and understanding of it 
(Keane et al. 2011). For example, Pierce and Tomcko (1998) suggested that much of the 29% 
non-compliance rate for five Minnesota lakes was due to a lack of awareness of the 
applicable regulations, while Page and Radomski (2006) found that fishers less aware of the 
regulations were more likely to be non-compliant among multiple fisheries. Fisher attitudes 
can also affect compliance behaviour, with even low levels of non-compliance potentially 
undermining the management regime’s effectiveness (Gigliotti and Taylor 1990; Sethi and 
Hilborn 2008). Negative attitudes may also reflect fishers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of 
key regulations, which can affect the probability of non-compliant behaviour (Kuperan and 
Sutinen 1998; Viteri and Chávez 2007). In support of this, Page et al. (2004) observed that 
fishers’ negative attitudes towards regulations were strongly associated with non-
compliance.   
Despite their importance, the key factors shaping fishers’ knowledge of regulations 
and attitudes are often poorly understood and frequently not taken into consideration. 
Knowledge and attitudes are shaped by a complex web of variables, including local fishing 
experience, area of residency, satisfaction with the fishery resource, how regulations 
influence fishing practices and involvement in the management process. For example, more 
experienced fishers tend to exhibit greater regulation knowledge as do fishers living near 
the regulated area as they have had more exposure to the rules (Page and Radomski 2006; 
Schill and Kline 1995). Fishers that are satisfied with the fishing may be more likely to hold 
positive views on the regulations (Richardson et al. 2005), as are those that are the least 
affected by them (Pita et al. 2013). In addition, many studies have suggested that greater 
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fisher participation in the management process can greatly increase regulation knowledge 
and agreement (Jentoft and McCay 1995; Jentoft et al. 1998; van Hoof 2010).  
2.2 Study aims 
This study investigated the degree to which five factors influence fisher knowledge 
of and satisfaction with the regulations of the blue cod fishery in New Zealand’s 
Marlborough Sounds: residency, fishing experience, regulation influence on fishing 
practices, satisfaction with the fishery, and perceptions on participation in the management 
process. Although the Ministry of Fisheries has commissioned multiple reports on the 
scientific state of the fishery (Beentjes and Carbines 2012; Blackwell 1998, 2002; Carbines 
2000), there has yet to be any research on the social dimensions of the current 
management regime, as well as limited research on this subject in New Zealand in general. 
This is despite widespread calls to learn how fishers view the regulations (Eggert and 
Ellegård 2003). 
Within the fisheries literature, previous studies on fisher attitudes have mostly 
focused on commercial fisheries (Foster and Vincent 2010; Pita et al. 2013; Richardson et al. 
2005). Similarly, although the effects of participation in the management process have been 
widely studied in commercial fisheries (Pita et al. 2010; Viteri and Chávez 2007), there 
appears to be a lack of research in the context of recreational fisheries. Prior investigations 
into fishers’ knowledge of regulations in recreational fisheries have been carried out in the 
United States (Page and Radomski 2006; Pierce and Tomcko 1998; Schill and Kline 1995) or 
South Africa (Brouwer et al. 1997; Sauer et al. 1997). The South African studies investigated 
both regulation knowledge and satisfaction by region, but did not test for significant 
differences or explore the factors shaping knowledge and attitudes. The relationship 
between regulation and knowledge was the focus of the United States studies with only one 
of them (Page and Radomski 2006) examining the influence of socio-demographic variables 
on that knowledge. There has also been comparatively little research into how regulation 
influence on fishing practices and satisfaction with the fishery may affect fisher attitudes. 
Previous studies have produced contradictory results regarding the role of different 
factors in influencing fisher knowledge and attitudes towards regulations. For example, 
while several studies found both residency and fishing experience to be a significant 
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influence on regulation awareness in recreational fisheries (e.g., Page and Radomski 2006; 
Schill and Kline 1995), Pita et al. (2013) found neither to be significant (in a commercial 
fishery) but showed that the least affected fishers were the most positive. Similarly, 
Richardson et al. (2005) found experience did not significantly influence fishers’ attitudes, 
whereas Peterson and Carothers (2013) concluded that experience affected attitudes 
towards changing fishing practices. Another study found that fishers with greater 
psychological, social and monetary investments in the fishery are likely to voice the 
strongest opinions in response to management changes (Bryan 2000) supporting the 
influence of residency. While there is a general consensus that stakeholder participation in 
the management process is a common feature in management regimes that are succeeding 
(Fulton et al. 2011), the nature of the participation may influence how it is viewed and its 
effectiveness in increasing both knowledge and satisfaction (Pita et al. 2010). Even when 
fishers are involved in the management process, the degree of participation may vary. At 
one end of the spectrum there is true co-management but in other cases while the fishers 
are consulted, the final decision-making power rests solely with the government (Jentoft 
and McCay 1995). Furthermore, groups of fishers may disagree on the most effective way to 
sustain the fishery (Jentoft and McCay 1995), so limited consultation risks some fishers 
feeling uninvolved.  
2.3 Material and methods  
2.3.1 Survey design and purpose 
Following piloting of the survey instrument in October 2012 a nine-question 
intercept survey (Appendix 8) focusing on the transit and filleting rules was designed. The 
first question asked fishers to rate their overall satisfaction with the suite of regulations 
governing recreational blue cod fishing in the Marlborough Sounds. Respondents then rated 
their satisfaction with blue cod fishing for both 2011 (the year the fishery reopened) and 
2012 (the year prior to this study). Responses to these initial questions were on a 5-point 
Likert scale from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). 
For the transit and filleting rules, fishers were first asked whether they correctly 
knew these rules—“If you go fishing in the Cook Strait are you allowed to bring back more 
than two blue cod per person/day?” (Transit rule) and “Is the filleting of blue cod at sea 
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allowed?” (Filleting rule)—by answering yes, no (the correct answer for both), or do not 
know. If an incorrect answer was given, the fisher was informed of the correct answer 
before proceeding. Following the knowledge question a fisher’s attitude towards the rule 
was assessed by asking whether or not they agreed with it (“yes” or “no”). 
Respondents were also asked how much influence the blue cod regulations had on 
their fishing in the Marlborough Sounds, which was rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 
(no influence) to 5 (strong influence). Fishers were then asked if they had previously heard 
of the Blue Cod Management Group and, if yes, an open-ended question of what they 
thought the group’s purpose was or what the group had achieved in the past was also 
answered. Finally, respondents were asked how many years they had been fishing in the 
Marlborough Sounds and which region they lived in. The 14 options for area of residence 
were taken from the New Zealand census. Apart from these questions, any additional 
information offered, either to qualify a response or in general, was written down. Fishers 
were asked for clarification if any comments were unclear but otherwise the interviewer 
recorded everything while assuring fishers that their concerns were being taken seriously in 
this research.  
2.3.2 Data collection 
Potential respondents were approached and invited to take part in a short face-to-
face survey on blue cod fishing. Fishers were approached at the three marinas in the 
Marlborough Sounds (Waikawa, Picton and Havelock), as well as Waikawa Bay (Fig. 2.1). 
Waikawa Marina is the second largest marina in New Zealand (600 berths) and the main 
launching point for the Queen Charlotte Sound. Picton Marina is smaller (232 berths) but 
has a larger proportion of commercial and charter boats in the berths than Waikawa. 
Havelock Marina (340 berths), located in the small township of Havelock, is the main launch 
location for the Pelorus and Kenepuru Sounds. Waikawa Bay is a small, enclosed bay in the 
Queen Charlotte Sound and popular recreation area with a beach, swimming, picnic areas, 
barbeques and a launching ramp. Launching from this site costs only $5, compared with $15 




Figure 2.1: Map showing the location of the four study sites in the Marlborough Sounds (shaded) 
 
Face-to-face surveys were carried out over six weeks in January and February 2013, 
during the time of the highest fishing effort in the Marlborough Sounds. The survey took 
place every day when fishers were expected to be out (i.e., not when it was raining heavily 
or too windy). Fishers using the launching ramps at each site were surveyed only upon 
return in order to avoid asking them twice in a day. If it was not obvious they had been 
fishing (i.e., the presence of fishing rods), it was asked if they went fishing in the 
Marlborough Sounds. In order to avoid response bias, only one person from each fishing 
boat was surveyed, usually the husband (in the case of families) or the person nominated by 
the rest of the fishing party.  
2.3.3 Data analysis 
Region of residence was divided into two groups: Marlborough or all of the other 13 
regions. Based on distribution years of fishing experience in the Sounds was divided into five 
groups (i.e., 1-9 years, 10-19 years, 20-29 years, 30-39 years or 40+ years) in order to allow 
comparisons between groups. For ANOVA post-hoc, Gabriel’s procedure was used as sample 
sizes were slightly different across groups (Field 2009). To minimise Type 1 error, a 
Bonferroni correction of 10 was applied to post-hoc tests for experience, with the new 
criterion for significance α=0.005. When the Chi Square requirement of cells with an 
expected count of at least five was not met, a Fisher’s exact test was used instead. 




The responses were manually coded for the question on the Blue Cod Management 
Group’s role and then the coding confirmed with a member of the BCMG. The response 
‘manage the blue cod fishing stock’ was viewed as too easily determined from the group 
name and did not necessarily indicate knowledge of the group’s role. Acceptable answers 
included one or more of the following: working and/or consulting with the Ministry, 
developed the rules (although not strictly true), published a brochure on ‘suggested best 
practices’, a lobby group, or a group representing fishers. All additional comments were 
analysed using NVivo and coded for eleven themes: regulations, transit rule, filleting rule, 
daily limit, slot rule, discards, ban, closed season, influence, responsibility, and enforcement. 
If a comment related to multiple themes, it was coded under all those applicable.  
2.4 Results 
Out of the 313 fishers approached, 311 agreed to participate in the intercept survey 
(99% response rate). 89% were male and 56% resident in the Marlborough area and had an 
average of 21.6 (SD = 16) years local fishing experience. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the 
overall results by the two considered socio-demographic groups, with post-hoc results 














Table 2.1: Summary of statistical test results for between group differences of fishers’ attitude, knowledge and influencing 
factors. 
 Local fishing experience Region of residency 
Overall regulation 
satisfaction 























































* p < .05 ; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
2.4.1 Overall satisfaction with the blue cod regulations 
Fishers reported a negative level of satisfaction with the blue cod regulations (M = 
2.47, SD = 1.39), as the mean score was significantly lower than the middle (neither satisfied 
nor dissatisfied) of the response scale (t(310) = -6.78, p < .001, d = 0.39). Qualitative 
comments made by the fishers during the survey also supported this finding. To illustrate, 
some fishers expressed feelings of frustration and anger by calling the rules “poorly 
conceived”, “completely stupid” and “shocking and ridiculous”. The size limit was 
particularly contentious even though it was not specifically asked about; with many of the 
fishers citing the size limit as the reason behind their low satisfaction with the regulations. 
Post-hoc comparisons (Fig. 2.2) indicated that local fishing experience influenced 
differences in satisfaction level between two groups: the most experienced fishers (M = 
1.78, SD = 1.25) were significantly less satisfied with the regulations than the least 
experienced fishers (M = 2.99, SD = 1.35, p < .001). Additionally, fishers living in the 
Marlborough Region had a lower level of satisfaction (M = 2.19, SD = 1.31) than those 





Figure 2.2: Fisher satisfaction with the blue cod fishing regulations by: (a) local fishing experience and (b) residency. 
 
2.4.2 Regulation influence on fishing habits 
Fishers reported that overall the blue cod regulations did influence (M = 2.38, SD = 
1.49) their fishing habits, t (309) = 4.53, p < 0.001, d = 0.42) and Marlborough-based fishers 
(M = 2.53, SD = 1.55) perceived a greater influence than fishers from other regions (M = 
2.19, SD = 1.39). Additionally, fishers with fewer than 10 years of experience (M = 2.07, SD = 
a 
b 
Different letters indicate significant differences between levels of satisfaction 
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1.46) viewed the blue cod regulations as having less of an influence than fishers with 40 or 
more years of experience (M = 2.98, SD = 1.47). 
In answering this question, many fishers stated that the transit rule had a strong, 
negative influence on their fishing experience. Since the reopening of the Sounds, it no 
longer made sense for them to spend the time and petrol to go outside the Sounds to fish 
when they were still bound by the same limits as fishers within the Marlborough Sounds. 
Conversely, other fishers reported that the rules had little influence on their fishing habits, 
as they owned a holiday home, which was their primary reason for visiting the Sounds. 
Some of these fishers stated that they now went fishing for blue cod elsewhere in New 
Zealand where the regulations were less restrictive. 
2.4.3 Satisfaction with the blue cod fishing in 2011 and 2012 
There was no statistically significant difference in satisfaction across the two years (t 
(223) = -0.51, p = 0.610) so satisfaction ratings for both years were combined for further 
analyses. Overall, the fishers were marginally satisfied (M = 3.20, SD = 1.15) with the blue 
cod fishing itself in 2011/2012 (t (223) = 2.65, p = 0.009, d = 0.18); as many fishers 
commented that they were able to usually take home their limit of blue cod. Region of 
residency was the only socio-demographic variable influencing satisfaction with the blue cod 
fishing in 2011/2012. Marlborough-based fishers were less satisfied (M = 3.06, SD = 1.20) 
than non-Marlborough fishers (M = 3.46, SD = 0.99) with the blue cod fishing across both 
years. 
2.4.4 Transit rule 
Significantly more fishers correctly answered the question on transit rule knowledge 
(60%) than incorrectly (23%) or did not know (17%), X2(2) = 104.65, p < 0.001. Post-hoc 
analyses revealed that fishers having less than 10 years of experience were more likely (Std. 
Residual = 3.1) to answer ‘don’t know’ than fishers with more experience. Significantly more 
fishers (66%) disagreed with the transit rule than agreed with it (34%), X2(1) = 28.85, p< 
0.001. However, results revealed that only region of residency significantly influenced 
transit rule agreement. Marlborough-based fishers were less likely to agree with the transit 
rule (75%, Std. Residual = -2.0) than non-Marlborough fishers (54%, Std. Residual = 2.3).  
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Many of the fishers who did not know about the rule commented that they did not 
go fishing outside the Marlborough Sounds area. While some of the fishers recognised the 
necessity of the transit rule in assisting with enforcement, larger issues with the rule 
seemed to outweigh this consideration. Specifically, many fishers viewed the transit rule as 
unfair to Sounds fishers, as Wellington-based boats fishing in the Cook Strait were allowed 
to take back larger sizes and numbers of blue cod as there is no equivalent rule for them. 
Based on these concerns fishers referred to the transit rule as “daft”, “ridiculous”, or “a 
joke”. 
2.4.5 Filleting rule 
In response to the question on knowledge of the filleting rule, 92% correctly 
answered “no”, compared with “yes “(5%) or “did not know” (3%), X2(2) = 475.96, p < 0.001. 
In particular, non-Marlborough fishers were more likely to answer ‘don’t know’ (Std. 
Residual = 2.2). More fishers agreed with the filleting rule (71%) than disagreed with it (X2(1) 
= 55.54, p < 0.001). Comments by the fishers revealed that most of them recognised the 
filleting rule as “the only way” for effective enforcement of the size limit and several 
commented it was “fair enough”.  Moreover, it was mainly viewed as no more than a minor 
inconvenience as it did not significantly affect their fishing habits.  
2.4.6 Blue Cod Management Group (BCMG) 
The fishers were evenly split on whether or not they had previously heard of the Blue 
Cod Management Group (X2(2) = 0.03, p = 0.865). Of the 154 fishers responding they had 
previously heard of the Group, only 49 (34%) provided accurate details on the BCMG’s role 
(X2(1) = 145.88, p < 0.001).  
Among the fishers who had heard of the BCMG, correct knowledge of the group’s role 
had no influence on awareness of (X2(2) = 3.12, p = 0.210) or agreement with (X2(1) = 0.48), 
p = 0.491) the transit rule. Similarly, there were no statistically significant differences for 
awareness of (X2(2) = 2.01, p = 0.366) or agreement with the filleting rule (X2(1) = 0.42, p = 
0.516). Finally, overall satisfaction with the blue cod regulations was also not influenced by 
knowledge of the group (X2(4) = 6.22, p = 0.183). Conversations with the fishers revealed 
that many of them perceived the BCMG is nothing more than a token gesture by the 
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Ministry in response to calls for greater fisher involvement and that the new regulations 
were pre-determined. 
2.4.7 Modeling fishers’ overall satisfaction 
Finally, five structural equation models were formed to examine the main predictors 
of fisher’s overall satisfaction with the blue cod regulations (Table 2.2). As previous analyses 
had revealed no significant differences among groups for agreement with the filleting rule 
or knowledge of the BCMG, these two variables were excluded from the models. The first 
model considered the two socio-demographic variables previously analysed, residency and 
local fishing experience. Model 2 consisted of the other two predicting factors, influence on 
fishing habits and satisfaction with the fishing itself. The third model added transit rule 
agreement to the first model (residency and local fishing experience), while model 4 
included transit rule agreement in addition to influence on fishing habits and satisfaction 
with the fishing. The final model included all five predictor variables. For this analysis local 
fishing experience was included as the original continuous variable.  
An information-theoretic approach with the Akaike information criteria (AIC) was 
used in model evaluation to compare the fit and parsimony of the different models 
(Burnham and Anderson 2002). Out of the five models considered, the first model could be 
considered the best fit as it had the lowest AIC and the ∆AIC was more than 4 for the next 
best option (model 2), which explained the same amount of variance (0.10). Model 1 also 
had the highest CFI (0.94) of the five models. Of the two variables considered in this model 
both were significant, with experience a larger predictor of overall satisfaction (β = -0.24, 
p<.001) than residency (β = -0.21, p<.001). Fishers who had limited local fishing experience 
and were not residents of the Marlborough Area expressed greater overall satisfaction with 








Table 2.2: Summary of structural equation models for variables predicting fishers' overall satisfaction with the blue cod 
regulations. 
 X2 df X2/df CFI RMSEA AIC ∆AIC R2 
Model 1 2.85 1 2.85 0.94 0.08 18.85 - .10 
Model 2  7.63 1 7.63 0.79 0.15 23.63 4.78 .10 
Model 3 7.80 2 3.90 0.91 0.10 31.80 12.95 .13 
Model 4 10.86 3 3.62 0.85 0.09 32.86 14.01 .16 
Model 5 18.40 7 2.63 0.89 0.07 58.40 39.55 .20 
Note. Variables included in which model are as follows: Model 1 = residency, local fishing experience; Model 2 = influence on fishi ng 
habits, fishing satisfaction; Model 3 = residency, local fishing experience, transit rule agreement; and Model 4 = influence on fishing habits, 
fishing satisfaction, transit rule agreement; and Model 5 = residency, local fishing experience, influence on fishing habits,  fishing 
satisfaction, transit rule agreement. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
Overall fishers appear to have a high level of knowledge of the regulations. The 
lower level of awareness of the transit rule (60% vs. 92% for the filleting rule) is partly due 
to it not being relevant unless fishing outside the Marlborough Sounds. As the transit rule 
does not apply during the closed season this complexity is also a factor, as more complex 
regulations are likely to lead to lower levels of knowledge (Sullivan 2002). Given that a large 
percentage of fishers do not know this rule, non-compliance because of lack of knowledge 
may be an issue. In contrast, the high level of awareness of the filleting rule could be due to 
it being a simple regulation (Schill and Kline 1995) that applies to all fishers. The finding that 
more experienced fishers display higher levels of knowledge is consistent with previous 
studies (Oh and Ditton 2006; Salz and Loomis 2005), as is increased knowledge among local 
fishers (Page and Radomski 2006; Schill and Kline 1995).  
The results show that overall the current management approach has created 
widespread discontentment and low levels of satisfaction among recreational fishers. But in 
line with previous studies showing that attitudes are not always consistent between 
regulations (Sullivan 2002), fisher attitudes were almost completely opposite between the 
two specific rules studied; with 66% of fishers disagreeing with the transit rule but 71% of 
them agreeing with the filleting rule. Based on fishers’ comments it appears that perceived 
fairness and influence on fishing habits largely explained this difference, which is consistent 
with previous findings (Pita et al. 2013). Marlborough residents in particular viewed the 
transit rule as unfair and also complained about how it affected their fishing habits. 
Conversely, most fishers did not seem bothered by the filleting rule and believed it was 
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reasonable. This suggests that it would be worthwhile for managers to explore attitudes 
towards each regulation separately as despite overall dissatisfaction, a high level of 
agreement with some regulations is still possible.  
Research on fisher attitudes is also changing from considering fishers as one 
homogeneous group towards acknowledging the heterogeneity among the fishers, and 
subsequently differences in their knowledge, attitudes and behaviours (Hunt et al. 2013). 
Fishery managers are increasingly attempting to consider these differences when evaluating 
management schemes (Radomski et al. 2001). In this regard, the influence of residency and 
local fishing experience provides some important insights as both of these variables 
negatively influenced regulation satisfaction. Older fishers are more likely to have 
experienced more generous regulations to compare with the current ones. For example, the 
daily bag limit for blue cod has dropped from 20 in 1985 to the two fish limit today and 
there was only a minimum size limit in place (as opposed to the current minimum and 
maximum size limit) until 2011. Given these increasingly strict regulations, it should not be 
surprising that more experienced fishers have more negative attitudes than less 
experienced fishers. These fishers are also normally set in their fishing habits and more 
likely to view changes or new rules in a negative light; as demonstrated by the comments of 
a very experienced (50 years) fisher, who disagrees with the filleting rule because he has 
“done it for years”.  
Local fishers may struggle to see improvements in the fishery since they go fishing 
more often and changes to the blue cod stock are likely to be gradual. This also means the 
rules will have a greater influence on these fishers as they can afford to be more particular 
about their fishing. Furthermore, people who are visiting the Sounds primarily for fishing are 
a minority, as most list being outdoors, family recreation, and relaxation as more important 
reasons for their visits (Batstone et al. 2009). Therefore, these non-resident fishers are not 
as affected by the rules, as there are other parts to the experience they can still enjoy. This 
was demonstrated by comments by many fishers that the primary reason they visited the 
Sounds was because they owned a holiday home, and being able to fish was an additional 
bonus. From a management perspective, these findings suggest that more experienced and 
local fishers may initially be more hesitant to accept new regulations, and may require more 
focus in terms of communication and management effort. These results are also related to 
48 
 
the idea of psychological distance (Evans et al. 2014) suggesting the proximity to an issue 
might influence attitudes towards the specific issue. 
As the Blue Cod Management Group is currently the only official forum for fisher 
input, it is worrisome that half of the fishers had not previously heard of it. The further 
confusion surrounding the nature of the BCMG’s role also highlights the need for work in 
increasing awareness of the management and government structures. The finding that 
knowledge of the BCMG’s role did not significantly influence fisher attitudes is contrary to 
some previous research (Fulton et al. 2011) but does fit with Pita et al. (Pita et al. 2010) 
cautioning that the nature of the participation may be key. There are varying degrees of 
participation and government may choose to not listen to the recommendations and treat 
consultation as a merely symbolic gesture aimed at releasing the frustration of user groups 
(Jentoft and McCay 1995). Based on some of the comments relating to the BCMG, this may 
be the case for the Marlborough Sounds blue cod fishery. Conversely, it has also been noted 
that fishers with more negative attitudes regarding the management regime tend to believe 
they have not been consulted or involved in the process (Pita et al. 2010), so the low 
responses to the BCMG questions may also reflect the low level of overall satisfaction with 
the regulations. 
Although the selected regression model for overall satisfaction was significant, it did 
not explain a large amount of the variation in fisher attitudes (10%). This is not entirely 
surprising, as there are other variables that may have a significant influence, such as 
regulation effectiveness and fairness (Tyler 1990). Given the large number of negative, 
unprompted comments on the size limit, including agreement with this regulation is likely to 
significantly increase the explanatory value and fit of the model. But even without the 
additional predictors, the importance of considering residency and local fishing experience 
when designing regulations is once again highlighted. Consultation should ensure fishers of 
different levels of experience are represented, along with those from other areas. Similarly, 
any formal fisher groups involved in the management process would also benefit from a 
more diverse makeup. 
Many fishers expressed their frustration with refusals of the Ministry of Fisheries to 
consider their feedback on the new regulations. Instead, the Ministry has expressed their 
commitment to managing the blue cod fishery on the basis of the best scientific information 
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available (Moore 2012). However, increasing calls for more inclusive/bottom-up 
management strategies mean the knowledge requirements on fisher attitudes and 
behaviour are also increased. This information includes a greater understanding of how 
different groups of fishers are affected by a regulation and how they would respond (Fulton 
et al. 2011). The present study contributes to the former by showing that although 
residency and local fishing experience are important influences on fisher attitudes, less 
commonly studied factors such as influence on fishing habits and satisfaction with the 
fishing should also be considered. The variation among groups also suggests a variety of 
approaches will be needed as concerns and priorities will differ; presenting further 
challenges for a more participatory management regime. 
The results presented have management implications and offer suggestions for 
designing cost-effective measures to increase the effectiveness of the current management 
program. Since knowledge of the blue cod regulations appears to be fairly high overall, 
blanket efforts to improve fisher knowledge are unlikely to make a significant difference to 
compliance levels. Instead, a more effective approach would be to see what groups of 
fishers are most likely to not know specific regulations, and design education programmes 
to specifically target these fishers. While positive attitudes are not essential for successfully 
managing a fishery, they can help improve compliance and thus reduce enforcement 
expenses (McClanahan et al. 2005). This study suggests that exploration of fisher attitudes 
towards the regulations and the factors that shape them can offer information that could 
greatly assist fisheries managers in successfully managing the fishery. Furthermore, rather 
than the normal response of imposing additional or revised rules, stricter enforcement or 
increasing the severity of sanctions (Jentoft 2004), fisheries managers should investigate the 
human dimensions aspects for other options.  
The negative attitudes expressed by the fishers and the lack of influence of 
knowledge of the BCMG also suggest that fisher participation may need to be rethought. If 
participation in the management process is to positively influence satisfaction as hoped, it 
must not end once the new regulations are in place. Instead, fisheries managers should 
continue to ensure fisher participation, both actual and perceived, in order to promote 
satisfaction. Assessing fisher knowledge of and attitudes towards the specific regulations, as 




Richardson et al. (2005) said “there is an urgent need to understand fishers’ 
attitudes and the influences that act upon them, as this may further understanding of 
current behaviour as well as helping to predict likely responses to new management 
strategy” (p. 214). To that end, this study is the first to examine how the new suite of blue 
cod fishing regulations in the Marlborough Sounds affects the fishers. The results show that 
when reviewing regulations, fisher knowledge of and attitudes towards the proposed 
changes should be carefully considered. Yet the results do reveal difficulties in designing 
regulations that are accepted by all fishers, as factors such as experience and region of 
residence can significantly affect both knowledge and attitudes. The wide range displayed 
by the fishers in this study also has important management implications. This suggests that 
when involving fishers in the process, care must be taken to ensure a wide range of 
demographics is represented. Without this representation, management bodies are more 
likely to lack the knowledge of how proposed regulation changes would affect certain 
groups. Research into fisher knowledge and attitudes, and how it varies between socio-
demographic groups, can offer important insights into successfully designing regulations 
accepted by a majority of fishers. This can help bring about higher levels of voluntary 














3 Estimating non-compliance among recreational 
fishers: Insights into factors affecting the 
usefulness of the Randomized Response and 
Item Count Techniques  
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Measuring and monitoring non-compliance 
Non-compliance with conservation regulations has become a significant problem 
worldwide (Eliason 1999; Gavin et al. 2009). It threatens conservation efforts (Bose and 
Crees-Morris 2009), contributes to over-exploitation of natural resources, hinders the 
recovery of both biological populations and ecosystems (Agnew et al. 2009), lowers genetic 
diversity (Whitehouse and Harley 2001), disrupts ecosystem stability and productivity 
(Gubbay 1995), and has wider consequences for food supplies (Brashares et al. 2004) and 
the human communities that depend on them (Pratt et al. 2004).  
Fisheries are not immune to this threat (Sumaila et al. 2006), as 80% of the world’s 
marine fish stocks are either fully exploited or overexploited (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations 2012). Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 
is a major contributor to fisheries’ collapses worldwide (United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) 2006), and IUU is often cited as one of the principal causes behind the failure of 
fisheries management programmes (Boonstra and Bach Dang 2010; Sutinen et al. 1990). 
This non-compliance is due, at least in part, to the common property nature of the resource 
and the expense of monitoring and enforcing regulations (Anderson 1989), which are often 
numerous and constantly changing (Jentoft 2004). 
Historically, governments and conservation organisations have been hindered by a 
lack of knowledge on the full extent of illegal resource use, as the number of people caught 
breaking the law is estimated to be only a small percentage of violators (Elffers et al. 2003). 
This discrepancy is important as effective management will be difficult without knowledge 
of the true amount of non-compliance (Smith et al. 1989). This has resulted in calls to 
prioritise better data collection on wildlife crimes (Wellsmith 2011), particularly on the 
proportion of non-compliance and to quantify how much of the resource is being lost (Smith 
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and Anderson 2004). However, determining the extent of non-compliance in a fishery 
presents both practical and methodological challenges (Hønneland 1999) due to limited 
data and monitoring (Gallic and Cox 2006; Riddle 2006). Recreational fishing also presents 
further challenges due to its spatial and temporal variation, the wide range of gear and 
practices used, and the lack of reporting obligations (McCluskey and Lewison 2008).  
Information on non-compliance is often unlikely to be freely given by resource users 
as they may fear repercussions and/or prosecutions (Gavin et al. 2009; Keane et al. 2008; 
Solomon et al. 2007). Admission can also lead to either psychological consequences (e.g., 
guilt, shame or embarrassment) or to other consequences such as discovery and sanctions 
(Lee and Renzetti 1990). In turn, asking about sensitive issues, such as IUU fishing, in surveys 
has been shown to result in high non-response rates (Tourangeau and Yan 2007). Even with 
completely anonymous self-administered surveys and guarantees of anonymity, individuals 
would still need a high level of confidence in the confidentiality of the research to admit to 
the sensitive behaviour (Metzger and Dalton 1991).  
Other methods of estimating non-compliance such as field observations (Ainsworth 
and Pitcher 2005), observer programs (Gubbay 1995) and logbooks (Hatcher and Gordon 
2005) suffer from drawbacks that limit their usefulness (e.g., Gavin et al. 2009; Witmer 
2005). More recently, attention has turned to alternative ways of asking sensitive questions 
on self-administered surveys. Examples include randomized response (Warner 1965), item 
count (Miller 1984), nominative (Miller 1985) and three-card (Droitcour and Larson 2001) 
techniques. These techniques guarantee anonymity and also minimise the respondent’s 
feeling of risk/level of threat associated with revealing sensitive or potentially incriminating 
information; thereby increasing both the response rate and reliability when including 
sensitive subjects on questionnaires or during interviews (Lee 1993). Moreover, these 
indirect methods do not reveal sensitive behaviour at the individual level, but still allow for 
interpretation at the aggregate level (Fox and Tracy 1986). Previous studies (Lensvelt-
Mulders et al. 2005b) have shown the potential for these methods to elicit higher estimates 
of sensitive behaviours than the traditional model of direct questioning.  
Here we test the effectiveness of two indirect questioning methods, the Randomized 
Response Technique (RRT) (Warner 1965) and Item Count Technique (ICT) (Miller 1984), at 
providing more accurate estimates of recreational fishery regulation violations when 
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compared with traditional direct questioning. Since the introduction of these methods 
numerous studies have shown that both can provide significantly higher estimates of illegal 
resource use than direct questioning (i.e. when the individual is directly asked if they have 
broken a law) (e.g., Krebs et al. 2011; Solomon et al. 2007). Randomized response has been 
successfully used in the marine environment to examine non-compliance with trout fishing 
in the USA (Schill and Kline 1995), abalone (Haliotis rufescens) collection in California (Blank 
and Gavin 2009), and fly-fishing in Wales (St John et al. 2010). However, the Item Count 
Technique has yet to be tested in the field of natural resource management, despite the 
pressing need to quantify wildlife crimes (Wellsmith 2011).  
Although both RRT and ICT have the advantage of their indirect approach, this is also 
a disadvantage because it introduces another source of random error into the responses, 
resulting in a larger standard error which requires a larger sample size to obtain statistically 
significant results (Himmelfarb 2008). Additionally, recent studies (e.g., Tsuchiya et al. 2007) 
have called for further research into the characteristics, such as data collection method, 
method version, research subject and sensitivity, of both RRT and ICT and modifications that 
may influence their usefulness. To that end the present research offers useful insights into 
how to maximise the potential of these two indirect techniques.  
3.1.2 Randomized Response Technique (RRT) 
The Randomized Response Technique, developed by Stanley Warner (Warner 1965) 
has been shown to provide higher estimates than direct questioning in multiple fields 
including social security fraud (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005a), abortion (Abernathy et al. 
1970) and illegal resource use in a National Park (Solomon et al. 2007). Although RRT still 
usually underestimates the proportion of the population participating in the sensitive 
behaviour, it often has a smaller deviation from the known proportion than direct 
questioning, making it a more accurate method (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b). RRT 
underestimation of the occurrence of a sensitive behaviour may be due to a number of 
possibilities, including respondents either not following the instructions or still refusing to 
answer the question truthfully (van der Heijden et al. 2000), respondents not fully 
understanding how their privacy is being protected or suspecting a trick (Clark and 
Desharnais 1998), or respondents taking this method less seriously than direct questioning 
and not answering honestly. It has been suggested that this last possibility is especially true 
54 
 
for ‘innocent’ respondents (Fox and Tracy 1980), although a study on Dutch social security 
fraud found no basis for this view (Landsheer et al. 1999).  
This study used the paired-alternative version of the RRT, also known as the ‘two 
unrelated questions model’ (Fox and Tracy 1986). The respondent begins by performing a 
randomizing event, such as flipping a coin. She then randomly chooses one of two 
questions, either the sensitive question of interest or a question regarding the randomizing 
event (e.g., “did you see the head of the coin?”). The answer is recorded as either “yes” or 
“no” without revealing the question selected. The researcher can then use the probabilities 
of choosing the sensitive question and the outcome of the randomising event (e.g., 50% 
chance of seeing head of coin), along with the number of “yes” responses to estimate the 
number of individuals who have performed the sensitive behaviour. Because responses can 
never be directly linked to the respondent or sensitive question, the method encourages 
higher response rates and more truthful answering. 
3.1.3 Item Count Technique (ICT) 
First proposed by Miller (1984) and first formally tested by Dalton et al. (1994), ICT 
has mainly been used in the social sciences to investigate socially desirable attitudes, such 
as voter turnout (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010b) and attitude towards immigration (Janus 
2010), as well as estimating sensitive topics such as sexually risky behaviour (LaBrie and 
Earleywine 2000), sexual assault (Krebs et al. 2011) and shoplifting (Tsuchiya et al. 2007). A 
meta-analytical review found that ICT provided significantly higher estimates than direct 
questioning in 30 out of the 48 cases (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010b). 
ICT involves drafting a short list of three to five innocuous items given to half of the 
respondents. Although the items do not have to be related to the survey topic, doing so can 
be advantageous as it often makes more sense to research participants (Chaudhuri and 
Christofides 2007). Respondents are asked to report only the total number of items that 
apply to them. Because only a number is reported, the researcher has no way of knowing 
which specific items applied. The other half of the respondents receives a list with the same 
set of items, along with an additional item about the sensitive topic, and is again instructed 
to provide only a total number. The difference in means of the total number of items 
reported from the two lists provides an estimate of the proportion of respondents engaging 
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in the sensitive behaviour. The assumption underlying this method is that true random 
sampling gives two study groups that are on average statistically equivalent. Thus, any 
difference in the means between the two groups can be directly attributed to the sensitive 
item (Dalton et al. 1994).  
However, concerns about sample size and the associated standard error have led to 
a modification by Droitcour et al. (1991), which is used in this study. This alternative version 
of ICT uses four lists: 
List 1: short list of innocuous items (A). 
List 2: A+1 sensitive item. 
List 3: a different short list of innocuous items (B). 
List 4: B+1 sensitive item. 
The first half of the sample receives lists 1 and 4 while the second half receives lists 2 
and 3, so that all respondents reply to a list containing the sensitive item. Two estimates are 
then calculated, one based on the difference between A lists (i.e., Lists 1 and 2), and one on 
the difference between B lists (i.e., Lists 3 and 4). These two estimates are then averaged to 
obtain an overall estimate of the occurrence of the sensitive behaviour.  This ICT version is 
commonly known as the two-list version, as each participant responds to two lists. 
3.1.4 RRT vs. ICT 
To date there have been just two studies comparing the efficiency of RRT vs. ICT (Coutts 
and Jann 2011; Wimbush and Dalton 1997) and neither was applied in a natural resource 
context/setting. Wimbush and Dalton (1997) explored employee theft at four levels ($5.00-
$9.99, $10.00-$24.99, $25.00-$49.99 and >$50.00) using self-administered questionnaires, 
and found mixed results. Although RRT provided higher estimates than direct questioning 
for the three lower levels of theft (which also had the highest estimates), ICT produced 
higher estimates than direct questioning for all four levels (with the fourth level 
corresponding to the lowest estimate under direct questioning). But when RRT and ICT 
estimates were compared, no significant difference was observed for any theft level.  
More recently, Coutts and Jann (2011) compared RRT and ICT in an online study of 2075 
participants recruited through a German access panel. They found that ICT provided higher 
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estimates than RRT for five of the six common sensitive and/or illegal behaviours 
investigated in their study (keeping too much change, using public transportation without 
paying, shoplifting, using marijuana, driving even though the blood alcohol level was almost 
certainly over the legal limit and infidelity). However, only two of the higher estimates were 
significant (marijuana use and infidelity) and several of the RRT estimates were negative 
(due to the version used). Finally, when compared to direct questioning ICT provided a 
significantly higher estimate for just one of the behaviours, marijuana use.  
Overall, ICT may be preferred over RRT for two reasons. The first is simplicity as RRT 
requires the use of a randomizing device, but ICT involves only providing a total number of 
items. In turn, ICT is often perceived as easier to conduct and understand (Glynn 2010). The 
second reason is trust with recent studies (Coutts and Jann 2011; Lavender and Anderson 
2009) hypothesizing that greater trust in ICT derives from the need to only provide a 
number and not respond to specific items on the list. It is thus easier for respondents to 
understand why ICT affords privacy (Imai 2011; Lavender and Anderson 2009). The lack of a 
randomizing device may also help increase respondents’ trust, as with RRT respondents 
need to believe the device outcome is truly random (Coutts and Jann 2011). The one 
drawback to ICT, when compared to RRT, is the standard error. Coutts and Jann (2011) 
found that ICT had a standard error approximately three times higher than all five RRT 
versions tested. This relative inefficiency is an argument for the use of the two-list version of 
ICT as it cuts the standard error in half.  
Even though two previous RRT studies (Coutts and Jann 2011; Holbrook and Krosnick 
2010a) also used an online survey, the version of RRT used led to ‘impossible’ estimates (i.e., 
either less than 0% or greater than 100%). This result was one of the reasons that led Coutts 
and Jann (2011) to conclude that ICT was preferable to RRT. Under the paired-alternative 
version of the RRT used in the study, neither of these types of estimates is possible. 
Consequently, RRT cannot be dismissed as less effective than ICT on that basis.  
Most importantly, in the previous comparison studies between RRT and ICT, the 
methods were tested on different sample populations. Comparing methods with different 
sample sets may lead to erroneous conclusions about preferred methods; as differences in 
sample populations, instead of differences in the method used, may be responsible for the 
observed differences in estimated rates of non-compliance. To our knowledge this study is 
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the first to test ICT in natural resource management and test the two methods online using 
the paired-alternative version of the RRT and the two-list version of ICT. It is also the first to 
compare the methods using the same sample populations. The comparisons yield important 
conclusions regarding the preferred methods for the study of non-compliance in 
conservation. 
3.2 Material and Methods 
3.2.1 Study Area  
The Marlborough Sounds recreational blue cod fishery has been previously described 
in section 1.6.3. Additionally, the study detailed in this chapter also includes an additional 
location within the larger study area. The community-established Long Island Marine 
reserve is a strictly no-take zone in the Queen Charlotte Sound (Figure 3.1, boxed). The large 
area of the Marlborough Sounds makes effective enforcement challenging and location of 
the marine reserve in the Outer Sounds further adds to this management concern, yet 
monitoring of species within the reserve shows no evidence of illegal take (Davidson et al. 
2009) and there were no recorded violations in 2012 (Grose 2014). A singular violation of 
any of blue cod regulations or the marine reserve is considered a serious non-commercial 
offense (New Zealand Parliament 1971) and carries an infringement fee of $250-$500 
(Bright 2012). Under certain circumstances, such as a large-scale violation, prosecution can 
occur whereby any property used in the violation (e.g., boat) is forfeit to the Crown upon 





Figure 3.1: Map showing the location of the Long Island Marine Reserve (boxed) in the Marlborough Sounds. 
3.2.2 Survey Design  
We piloted the survey on 84 recreational fishers in the Marlborough Sounds in 
October 2012 with the instructions and wording for the RRT and ICT questions modified 
based on observations from this stage. The final survey was carried out online using the 
survey platform Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Online surveys are increasingly utilised in 
conducting research in a variety of fields (Couper et al. 2007), including testing RRT 
(Holbrook and Krosnick 2010a), ICT (Krebs et al. 2011) and a previous comparison study 
(Coutts and Jann 2011). Internet surveys offer several advantages to traditional methods 
such as mail and telephone surveys: low cost, increased timeliness, direct data entry and 
greater geographic reach (de Leeuw 2008; Groves et al. 2009; Smyth and Pearson 2011; Sue 
and Ritter 2012). Other benefits include easier use of contingency questions and complex 
skip patterns (Dillman et al. 2009).  
We used the online format for five reasons. First, it allowed us to cover a large 
geographic area with minimal cost, an important feature as fishers come from all over New 
Zealand and even overseas to fish in the Sounds. Second, as saltwater fishing in New 
Zealand does not require a license, there was no sampling frame available for a mail-based 
survey. Third, using a web-based survey also allowed easy use of screening questions. This 
meant respondents who did not fish in the Queen Charlotte Sound, the location of the 
marine reserve, were not asked the sensitive questions on this subject. A fourth beneficial 
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feature of the online format was the ability to minimise non-response by requiring 
respondents to answer a question before moving on to the next one, especially useful 
because of the sensitive nature of some questions. Finally, respondents were likely to view 
this format as less intrusive and more private than in-person surveys as there is no 
interviewer present, providing a greater feeling of anonymity (de Leeuw 2008).  
The initial contact with most survey participants was through face-to-face intercept 
surveys carried out over six weeks in January-February 2013 (summer) at four boat launch 
locations (the three area marinas in the Marlborough Sounds and a nearby bay) in the 
Marlborough Sounds as part of a larger study (Thomas et al. 2014b). Based on these initial 
contacts, 311 email addresses of fishers were collected and all were valid. Potential 
respondents were emailed the survey link approximately one week after intercept, a 
reminder approximately two weeks after being sent the initial link, and a final reminder 
about a week before the close of the survey. Recruitment also took place via email to fishers 
previously interviewed, newspaper, radio, magazine and flyers in order to enlarge the 
sample size and minimise sampling biases.  
Informed consent was used in this study, with the first page asking for participants’ 
agreement to take part in the research. Respondents were assured that all responses would 
remain confidential and that no responses could be traced back to an individual and were 
therefore anonymous. The survey started with several general questions on fishing in the 
Marlborough Sounds to introduce the study, which are not reported here. Next we asked if 
the respondent had fished in the Queen Charlotte Sound, which is the location of the Long 
Island Marine Reserve. Fishers who answered “yes” received all the remaining questions, 
but those who responded “no” were not shown the RRT and ICT questions on the Long 
Island Marine Reserve, as this sensitive behaviour would not be applicable to them.  
3.2.2.1 Participants 
Respondents were asked about non-compliance with three different blue-cod 
related fishing regulations in the Marlborough Sounds (detailed below). Although the 
questions referred to 2012, respondents were instructed to answer for the most recent year 
they had been fishing in the Sounds if they had not been in 2012. In this way all fishers were 
able to participate in the survey. However, for the present study we only used data from 
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those fishers who had fished in the Sounds in 2012. While 418 fishers completed the survey 
through the direct questions, only 320 indicated that they had been fishing in the 
Marlborough Sounds in 2012. Of those respondents, only 217 had been fishing in the Queen 
Charlotte Sound and answered the questions on the marine reserve. 
The final sample was thus comprised of 320 fishers, with 82% male and 45% from 
the Marlborough region. Fisher age ranged from 22 to 88 years (M = 54, SD = 12), while 
Sounds fishing experience ranged from one to 70 years (M = 28, SD = 17). It is important to 
note potential biases with the sampling protocol used. Respondents previously convicted of 
non-compliance with one of the three regulations could have been included in the sample 
but we did not ask this question. Fishers who did not use one of the boat ramps surveyed, 
or used the ramps on a different day, had less of a chance of taking part in the survey. The 
sample was also not random so results may be biased towards more interested 
respondents. Given these potential sampling biases, readers should be cautious when 
generalising the results of the present study. 
3.2.2.2 Sensitive Behaviours 
We gathered data on three sensitive questions: 
1) While fishing in the Marlborough Sounds in 2012 did you keep a blue cod that was 
less than 30cm or more than 35cm in length? 
As blue cod are protogynous hermaphrodites (Carbines 1998a; Ministry of Fisheries 
2008d), the maximum size limit was introduced to protect the larger female fish by leaving 
large males in the population to suppress a sex-change. Non-compliance with the maximum 
size could therefore negatively affect the sex ratio as well as the population’s reproductive 
potential as larger fish have been shown to produce more batches of eggs (Crossland 1977; 
Zeldis and Francis 1998). Violations of the minimum length can also be detrimental. For 
example, Gigliotti and Taylor (1990) showed that for the northern pike (Esox lucius), a 10% 
rate of non-compliance decreased the number of legal-sized fish caught by 10%, while 20% 
non-compliance resulted in a 19% decrease. 
2) While fishing in the Marlborough Sounds in 2012 did you keep more than two blue 
cod per person in a day? 
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 When the fishery reopened, the daily bag limit was put at two in an effort to allow 
blue cod populations to increase by keeping recreational catch at sustainable levels 
(Ministry of Fisheries 2010a). Non-compliance with the daily limit would interfere with the 
rebuilding and maintaining of the blue cod populations at healthy levels, putting the future 
health of the fishery at risk.  
3) In 2012 did you go fishing in the Long Island Marine Reserve?  
Established by the local community in April 1993, the Long Island Marine Reserve has 
been effective in allowing the blue cod population to recover from recreational fishing 
pressure. Within seven years of its establishment, blue cod were 125% more abundant in 
the reserve than in nearby fished areas (Davidson 2001). Furthermore, from April 2004 to 
2009, large blue cod (>330mm) represented only 1.6% of the fish caught at control (fished) 
sites, compared with 29.4% at the reserve sites (Davidson et al. 2009).  
3.2.2.3 Question Format and Instructions 
We included a short introduction to the section emphasising that in addition to the 
anonymous and confidential nature of the survey, the questions were asked in a way that 
guaranteed additional privacy. 
The following steps were used for the three RRT questions:  
1) An introductory statement: “In order to keep your answer a secret, you will 
randomly be asked one of two questions: either (a) the result of a coin toss or (b) about 
fishing in the Marlborough Sounds. There is no way anyone can know either the result of 
the coin toss or which question you answered. This means you can be completely honest 
with your answers.” 
2) Next, the respondent was directed to click on a link to open a new tab 
(www.coin.co.nz/coin-tosser.htm) and to flip the virtual coin only once. They were asked to 
remember the result of the coin toss and then return to the survey. While a previous study 
used an electronic coin (Coutts and Jann 2011), we used a third party website as we 
hypothesised that participants would be more trusting of this mode. 
3) The survey platform randomly selected one of two questions to show the 
respondent, either the coin toss result or the rule-breaking behaviour (provided above), 
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which was not recorded. This selected question was answered on the next screen under a 
new question (“Now please answer the above question by selecting yes or no”). 
4) Finally, steps two and three were repeated for each of the three sensitive 
behaviours: keeping undersized or oversized blue cod, keeping more than the daily limit for 
blue cod, and fishing in the Long Island Marine Reserve.  
For ICT, the process was as follows: 
1) The respondent was provided with the following instructions: “Below are a 
number of fishing related activities that you may have done in 2012. Please carefully read 
the individual activities and note, in your head, how many you have done at least once. Even 
if you have done that activity more than once, it only counts as ‘1’. The activities apply to all 
locations unless otherwise specified. 
When you are done, please answer at the bottom of each list only the TOTAL NUMBER of 
activities that you have done for each list.” 
2) Once again, the survey platform randomly selected which lists (Appendix 5) were 
to be answered. In this case, either the odd (1, 3, 5) or even (2, 4, 6) lists were displayed to 
the respondents. The four non-sensitive items differed for every list while lists 1 and 2 
included the size limit, 3 and 4 the daily limit, and 5 and 6 the marine reserve. An example of 
a list including a sensitive behaviour is: 
 Shared your catch with someone. 
 Was a member of a fishing club. 
 Kept a blue cod less than 30cm or more than 35cm in length while in the 
Marlborough Sounds. 
 Watched a fishing show on TV. 
 Caught a trophy fish. 
3) The respondent answered by selecting a number from 0-4 or 0-5, depending on 
the list, as offering only these choices limited confusion with the technique.  
Participants responded to four evaluative statements on both RRT and ICT using a 
five-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree). These questions were: ‘I 
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understood why my answer would not be known’, ‘I felt comfortable answering honestly’, ‘I 
found this method confusing’, and ‘I believed my privacy was protected with this method’.  
Finally, respondents were asked directly if they had engaged in each of the three 
rule-breaking behaviours towards the end of the survey. This meant all respondents 
provided answers under all three methods tested. Formulas used for data analysis were 
taken from Tracy and Fox (1981) for RRT and Droitcour et al. (1991) for ICT. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Estimates of non-compliance 
While estimates differed between the three behaviours, all methods found the size 
limit regulation to be the most often violated, followed by the daily limit and finally the 
marine reserve (Figure 3.2). Based on the findings, we estimated that the size limit 
regulation was violated by the greatest proportion of fishers, with over 30% non-
compliance, whereas non-compliance with the daily limit was estimated at > 10%. In 
contrast, non-compliance with the marine reserve was estimated as close to zero. 
RRT provided a significantly higher estimate (42%) than ICT (14%) or direct 
questioning (29%) for size limit violations (z = 3.29, p = 0.0010; z = 2.15, p = 0.0320; 
respectively). For the daily limit the RRT estimate of 21% was not significantly higher than 
either ICT (11%) or direct questioning (12%) (z = 1.26, p = 0.2078; z = 1.60, p = 0.1092; 
respectively). Non-compliance with the marine reserve was estimated at 6% under RRT, but 
again this was not significantly different than estimates using ICT (4%, z = 0.19, p = 0.8472) 
or direct questioning (0%, z = 0.87, p = 0.3828). While there were no significant differences 
between ICT and direct questioning for the daily limit or marine reserve (z = -0.25, p = 
0.8065; z = 0.49, p = 0.6219 respectively), direct questioning actually provided a significantly 




Figure 3.2: A comparison of non-compliance estimates from three methods, Randomized Response Technique (RRT), Item 
Count Technique (ICT) and direct questioning (DQ). 
 
3.3.2 Method evaluation 
Responses (N=320) to the four evaluative questions were not normally distributed, 
so the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to test if median responses significantly differed 
from the scale middle point (3=neither agree nor disagree). Respondents understood why 
their answer would not be known for both RRT (Mdn = 4, t = 6.38, p < 0.001) and ICT (Mdn = 
4, t = 8.55, p < 0.001). They also felt comfortable answering honestly under both techniques 
(Mdn = 4, t = 14.850, p < 0.001; Mdn = 4, t = 14.817, p < 0.001, respectively) and felt their 
privacy was protected with both methods (Mdn = 4, t = 10.36, p < 0.001; Mdn = 4 t = 10.56, 
p < 0.001 respectively). However, while the fishers were neutral on RRT being confusing 
(Mdn = 3, t = 1.82, p = 0.069), they disagreed that ICT was confusing (Mdn = 3, t = -2.906, p = 
0.004) as the response distribution was skewed towards the lower end of the scale.  
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test was also used to test for significant differences in 
evaluations between the methods. Only two of the four evaluation questions showed 
significant differences between RRT and ICT scores. Respondents believed it was easier to 
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understand why their answer would remain unknown with ICT (Z = 2.990, p = 0.003, r = -
0.17) and also found ICT less confusing than RRT (Z = -5.364, p < 0.001, r = -0.30). 
3.4 Discussion 
The present study compared the effectiveness of two indirect techniques, 
Randomized Response (RRT) and Item Count (ICT), in providing more accurate estimates of 
recreational fishery regulation violations than direct questioning (DQ). We compared these 
three questioning methods for three sensitive behaviours (size limit, daily limit and fishing in 
a marine reserve) in the same sample population in the context of the blue cod fishery in 
the Marlborough Sounds, New Zealand. Consistent with previous studies, we found that 
none of the methods provided the highest estimate of non-compliance for all regulations. 
Instead, factors such behaviour sensitivity and frequency appeared to influence the 
effectiveness of indirect techniques when compared to direct questioning. 
3.4.1 Methods comparison 
Of the non-compliance estimates for the three sensitive behaviours, only the size 
limit revealed significant differences between the three methods with RRT giving a higher 
estimate than ICT and DQ. Surprisingly, DQ actually provided a higher estimate than ICT for 
this behaviour. While the poor performance of ICT (compared with either of the other two 
methods) is inconsistent with some previous comparisons (e.g., Janus 2010; Wimbush and 
Dalton 1997), RRT’s higher estimation than DQ is in line with earlier research (e.g., 
Abernathy et al. 1970; De Jong et al. 2010; Solomon et al. 2007).  
The lack of significant differences between the methods for two of the sensitive 
behaviours (daily limit and marine reserve) shows several considerations to using these 
indirect methods. First, when violation rates are low, such as fishing in the marine reserve, 
no additional gains are likely from the use of either indirect technique, mainly due to large 
variances (Droitcour et al. 1991). Second, and in line with previous findings (Coutts and Jann 
2011), both indirect methods have a much larger standard error than that associated with 
direct questioning (0.05-0.07 vs. 0.02); although using the two-list version of ICT appears to 




Moreover, it seems that indirect methods are most useful when respondents 
perceive the questions as sensitive, associating some risk with honest answering (Lensvelt-
Mulders et al. 2005b), and the effectiveness increases with perceived sensitivity (Wimbush 
and Dalton 1997). The lack of significant differences between RRT and ICT for honest 
responding and privacy protection reveals the role of question sensitivity. Since respondents 
viewed both indirect methods the same in terms of answering honestly and protecting their 
privacy, the lack of estimate differences for two of the questions is partly due to variances in 
the perceived sensitivity of the behaviours. The high estimates for two of the behaviours via 
direct questioning further suggest that question sensitivity can help determine when the 
use of an indirect method is likely to increase honest answering.  
The version of RRT or ICT used can also influence how well they perform. To 
illustrate, the RRT version used, paired-alternative, confers a higher degree of privacy 
protection than the forced choice version used in some previous RRT vs. ICT studies (Coutts 
and Jann 2011; Holbrook and Krosnick 2010a). It gives respondents a 50% chance of 
answering the innocuous question, higher than other RRT versions. Of the previous studies 
that found that respondents believed ICT offered more privacy protection than RRT, Coutts 
and Jann (2011) used several forced choice RRT versions online; while Lavender and 
Anderson (2009) used an in-person survey format as well as a forced choice version. 
Consequently, using the paired-alternative version of RRT negated this apparent advantage 
of ICT, as confirmed by a lack of difference in respondents’ evaluation of privacy protection 
under both methods. 
Besides question sensitivity, our results might also reflect the online mode of the 
survey. As mentioned, the use of the same sample population and survey mode enhanced 
the comparison of the different methods. At the same time, the online format may have 
offered greater perceived anonymity than the in person or telephone questionnaires used 
by studies that found ICT to provide higher estimates than direct questioning (Janus 2010; 
LaBrie and Earleywine 2000; Wimbush and Dalton 1997). The use of an internet-based 
survey appears to have allowed for increased reporting of the sensitive behaviours under 
direct questioning, resulting in little additional benefit from the use of an indirect technique. 
Our findings are more in line with Holbrook and Krosnick (2010b) and Krebs et al. (2011), 
who found no significant differences between ICT and direct questioning estimates when 
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using anonymous, self-administered web-based surveys. However, in our study direct 
questioning actually offered a significantly higher estimate than ICT for the size limit.  
Despite RRT successfully providing higher estimates than either ICT or direct 
questioning for one of the sensitive behaviours, results of the respondents’ method 
evaluation suggest that there are still further improvements to be made. Specifically, 
changes could be made to increase the respondents’ understanding of and reduce confusion 
with how RRT protects their anonymity. For example, including a video demonstrating the 
method using role reversal (e.g., Solomon et al. 2007) may help clear up some confusion. 
Another critical area for further research is the influence of the survey mode on the 
perceived sensitivity of the questions, as discussed above. Future studies should seek to 
directly measure sensitivity across different survey modes in order to determine how the 
method of delivery affects the willingness of respondents to provide honest answers under 
both direct and indirect methods. Further research into the effectiveness of the different 
techniques under a variety of geographical, cultural and political contexts could also offer 
important insights. 
3.4.2 Conservation implications 
It is reassuring to see that non-compliance with the Long Island Marine Reserve is 
almost non-existent as this bodes well for the continued recovery of those local blue cod 
populations. The low level of violations shows that fishers are not opposed to all restrictions 
on blue cod fishing. More exploration into why so few people fish in the marine reserve, 
despite the presence of larger and more abundant blue cod, could offer valuable insights 
into increasing compliance with the size and daily limits for blue cod. Marine reserve 
boundaries are also more difficult to mark than terrestrial protected areas (Sethi and 
Hilborn 2008) so it may not be apparent if a fisher is in violation without carefully checking 
GPS coordinates. Overall the lack of fishing in the Long Island Marine Reserve may be that 
its community-led establishment confers a higher degree of legitimacy than the government 
imposed daily and size limits (Jentoft and McCay 1995; Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Nielsen 
2003), but this would need to be explored in further research. 
However, the amount of estimated non-compliance with the two main blue cod 
regulations is distressing and is potentially compromising the long-term sustainability of the 
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fishery. This is especially true for the size limit with the 42% non-compliance rate still 
probably an underestimate, as some respondents will not answer honestly even under an 
indirect method (van der Heijden et al. 2000). These results have important consequences 
for the recovery of the fishery less than three years after reopening. Considering that 
studies have shown that even small levels of non-compliance can undermine the 
effectiveness of regulations (Gigliotti and Taylor 1990; Sethi and Hilborn 2008), 20 or 30% 
non-compliance could have detrimental consequences for the fishery’s health. For example, 
with an estimated 9000 fishers in 2009 (Batstone et al. 2009), even a small proportion of 
fishers exceeding the daily limit could significantly affect the blue cod harvest level in the 
Sounds. Under a worst case scenario, the large amount of violations with both the size and 
daily limits may prevent the blue cod fishery from recovering and thus lead the Ministry of 
Fisheries to increase the length of the seasonal closure or completely close the fishery again. 
Estimates from this study could be used to help prioritise management actions, as 
enforcement efforts are expensive and impractical given the large area of the Sounds and 
numerous holiday homes and boat ramps. This study suggests that the size limit regulation 
needs the most and earliest attention given the scale of non-compliance. The Ministry has 
previously noted that in order for regulations to be effective, support from the fishers is 
needed (Ministry of Fisheries 2008d). The non-compliance estimates suggest that fishers’ 
buy-in with the size regulations is low, possibly contributing to the high level of violations. 
However, this study did not differentiate between keeping undersized and oversized blue 
cod, an important next step for future research.  
3.5 Conclusions 
Although this study was the first to test ICT in the field of natural resource management, 
this technique was not effective in providing higher estimates than direct questioning. This 
paper also responds to calls for greater investigation into the influence of survey mode and 
method version (Tsuchiya et al. 2007). Our results show that the combination of a web-
based survey and the paired-alternative version of RRT helped provide higher non-
compliance estimates than ICT for one of the regulations, contrary to several previous 
studies (Coutts and Jann 2011; Wimbush and Dalton 1997). We hypothesize that the 
effectiveness of indirect methods, such as RRT and ICT, largely depends on the perceived 
sensitivity and frequency of the behaviour in question. If sensitive and/or frequent enough 
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then we would see a difference between methods for that particular behaviour, such as the 
size limit. Below these thresholds there is no additional benefit to using an indirect 
questioning technique, thus we would expect to see no differences across methods. The 
survey mode is a third factor to take into consideration, as it appears to influence the 
minimum sensitivity and/ or frequency required for use of indirect methods, with an online 
survey raising these levels. Most importantly, this study was the first to test all methods on 
the same sample population, eliminating any potentially confounding socio-demographic 
factors.  
Ideally non-compliance information could be gathered from known offenders, but as this 
is not usually possible the present research demonstrates that under certain conditions 
indirect questioning is an effective way to obtain this important information. Survey mode, 
behaviour sensitivity and frequency should be taken into account to determine if an indirect 
method is actually needed, as direct questioning may suffice for internet-based surveys or 
non-sensitive topics. If an indirect method is likely to increase honest answering, we suggest 



















































4 Social norms drive compliance with recreational 
fishery regulations 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the leading causes of fisheries management failures is non-compliance with 
regulations (Boonstra and Bach Dang 2010; Sutinen et al. 1990). Even low levels (10%) of 
violations can negatively affect populations (Gigliotti and Taylor 1990; Sethi and Hilborn 
2008), undermining regulation efficiency, cost effectiveness and the legitimacy of the 
management regime (Bose and Crees-Morris 2009; Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003). Knowing 
why fishers break the rules is therefore a pressing management problem (Jagers et al. 
2012). Yet in order to effectively and efficiently address non-compliance, fishery managers 
must first understand the primary drivers of the rule-breaking behaviour (Gavin et al. 2009; 
Kuperan and Sutinen 1998) through expanded social science inquiry (Robbins et al. 2006).  
An understanding of the factors influencing behavioural restraint can improve the 
management of natural resources (Abbot and Mace 1999) by lowering non-compliance 
(Kritzer 2004) and providing solid advice to policy makers (Johannesen 2005) on how they 
can bring about the desired behavioural changes (Keane et al. 2008; Viteri and Chávez 
2007). Compliance levels are often positively influenced by enforcement levels (Abbot and 
Mace 1999; Leader-Williams et al. 1990); which are frequently limited by a lack of resources 
(Keane et al. 2008), especially in developing countries (Holmern et al. 2007). Since 
behavioural restraint can also occur voluntarily (Brechin et al. 2002), there is a critical need 
to increase compliance without solely relying on expensive enforcement (Kuperan and 
Sutinen 1998; Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland 1993; Stern 2008). Grabosky and 
Braithwaite (1986) even argue that fisheries managers are most likely to secure compliance 
if enforcement is kept to a minimum while relying on voluntary compliance most of the 
time.  
However, compliance decisions are usually motivated by a complex mix of factors, 
including enforcement, moral norms, legitimacy and the behaviour of others (Kuperan and 
Sutinen 1998), as choosing to break a rule is rarely a simple decision (Jagers et al. 2012).  
To date, no studies have explored more than a single influence on a fisher’s compliance 
behaviour in a recreational fishery. This lack of knowledge is despite a growing awareness 
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(Cooke and Cowx 2004) of the effects from recreational fishing on fish populations (Denny 
and Babcock 2004; Eliason 1999; Post et al. 2002; Schroder and Love 2002; Shears and 
Usmar 2006). In this study I examine the drivers of non-compliance with two recreational 
fishing regulations in the Marlborough Sounds, New Zealand. Structural equation modeling 
was utilised to test seven alternative models against each other to best predict regulation 
non-compliance. To my knowledge, this is the first time that such a modeling approach has 
been used in the fisheries compliance literature. Furthermore, the use of psychological 
models to understand the drivers of non-compliance in fisheries appears to be lacking 
despite the success of the models in predicting behaviour in other disciplines (Armitage and 
Conner 2001). Importantly, the research also contributes to the fields of natural resource 
management and psychology by providing a practical test of the predictive value of the 
models.   
4.2 Theoretical framework 
 
The problem of enforcement and compliance in fisheries has been recognised since 
the 1950s, but a study by Sutinen and Anderson (1985) was the first comprehensive attempt 
at understanding this issue. Although non-compliance was originally viewed as a calculated 
decision based on risk evaluation (instrumental model), more recent studies have argued 
that external influences on individuals are more prevailing (normative model). These two 
opposing models dominate the compliance literature. 
An instrumental view of compliance after Becker (1968) was the first model tested. 
Under this model, fishers were believed to act as rational agents (Nielsen and Mathiesen 
2003) and non-compliance is perceived to be the outcome of the expected net gain from 
breaking the law, the risk of detection, the probability of conviction, and the severity of 
punishment (King and Sutinen 2010). If the expected illegal gain is greater than the three 
combined risks, the individual is predicted to violate. Under this model, a lack of compliance 
is perceived to be the result of inadequate enforcement (Sutinen et al. 1990). Furthermore, 
this instrumental view assumes fishers are unwilling to voluntarily comply with restrictions, 
but must be compelled to follow them (May 2004).  
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The second alternative model tested was the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 
1991), a well-known framework for modeling behaviour (Armitage and Conner 2001). In this 
study TPB represents the simplest version of a normative model of compliance. 
According to this model, behavioural intentions are the most proximal determinant of 
behaviour, and an individual’s intention to perform a particular behaviour is in turn 
predicted by three socio-cognitive factors: attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioural control (an individual’s estimate of their ability to perform a specified 
behaviour). However, intention was not included as a factor due to the potentially sensitive 
nature of non-compliance; so the study modelled behaviour directly. The six variables 
included in these two models were combined into a third model representing both the 
instrumental and basic normative views of compliance.  
 For the third model, the instrumental model was combined with the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour for a total of six variables. This model represents a combination of the 
two opposing models of compliance: both the instrumental and normative views. The aim of 
including this model was to test the explanatory power of these two models when they are 
combined, rather than their variables tested against each other. 
Four normative factors (outcome fairness and effectiveness, involvement in decision-
making process and meaningful rule) were used as measures of the management regime’s 
legitimacy and tested together as the fourth model. Fishers may also violate because they 
view the rules as unfair and/or do not trust the management body as a rule-maker (Jagers et 
al. 2012). This so-called legitimacy is usually tied to a specific political authority system 
(Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003). Higher levels of compliance can thus be achieved through 
enhanced legitimacy (Bavinck 1996; Ostrom 2000) which is often linked to formal 
participation in the management process (Jentoft and Mikalsen 2004; Read et al. 2011). 
Outcome fairness can be defined as who gets more of the resource under the regulation 
and outcome efficiency is how well the regulation objectives are achieved (Tyler 1990). 
Although procedural fairness and effectiveness are included in Tyler’s (1990) model of 
legitimacy, fishers interviewed in a pilot study did not mention these factors, nor did any 
news articles, so they were not included in the model.  
A framework of pro-environmental behaviour by Bamberg and Möser (2007) that 
combines the self-interest model of planned behaviour with pro-social motives driving pro-
environmental behaviour was the fifth model tested. These authors conducted a meta-
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analysis of 46 studies and proposed eight psycho-social factors that influence pro-
environmental behaviour: the TPB factors plus problem awareness, attribution, guilt, and 
moral norm. These authors conducted a meta-analysis of 46 studies and proposed eight 
psycho-social factors that influence behaviour: problem awareness, attribution, social norm, 
guilt, perceived behavioural control, attitude, moral norm and intention (see Figure 4.1). 
Compliance with the fishery regulations can be seen as a form of pro-environmental 
behaviour. In following the daily limit for blue cod, fishers are forgoing maximising their take 
to leave fish for others and the future. For compliance with the size limit, fishers must leave 
the larger blue cod that they would normally take (and even target). By choosing to comply 
with the regulations the fishers decide to not act entirely in their self-interest and maximise 






Figure 4.1: Model of pro-environmental behaviour from Bamberg and Möser (2007) 
 
For the sixth model, a modified version of this pro-environmental framework was 
utilised. Whereas in the original Bamberg and Möser (2007) model the social norm 
influenced an individual’s behaviour indirectly, the modified version added a direct path 
from the social norm to compliance. Previous studies (Armitage and Conner 2001; White et 
al. 2009) have demonstrated that social norms can directly influence behaviour.  Social 
norms have previously been shown to be influential in commercial fisheries (e.g., Nielson 
and Mathiesen 2003) so this model was used to test for a direct effect on compliance. 
75 
 
Finally, a seventh and fully inclusive model was formed. This model contained all 15 
variables from the other six models and one new variable, regulation knowledge. Other 
compliance research (e.g., St John et al. 2011) strongly supports this inclusion; as without 
correct regulation knowledge non-compliance may be widespread. Besides instrumental 
and psycho-social factors, there are also other important drivers of non-compliance. 
Regulation knowledge can also be an important driver of non-compliance (Page and 
Radomski 2006; St John et al. 2011). If a regulation is unclear then effective enforcement is 
undermined (Akella and Cannon 2004). Similarly, if the rules are not widely known, then it is 
difficult for the behaviour to change (Keane et al. 2011). This final model therefore includes 
both the self-interest and pro-environmental behaviour variables while also including the 
legitimacy variables (the fourth model) suggested to be important influences in small-scale 
fisheries (Hauck 2008).  
 
4.2.1 Understanding compliance in recreational fisheries 
Despite the absence of a universal model for compliance in fisheries, it is generally 
agreed that non-compliance cannot be understood based on only one factor (Hønneland 
1999). A framework more complex than just economics and enforcement is needed 
(Gezelius 2006; Hatcher et al. 2000; Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Nielsen 2003), especially for 
recreational fisheries where economic gain would not be a concern. However, the 
aforementioned research has only examined compliance in commercial or artisanal 
fisheries. To date, no studies have explored the drivers of compliance in a recreational 
fishery, at least beyond the role of regulation knowledge (Page and Radomski 2006).  
As there are often more non-commercial than commercial fishers, for certain species 
and/or areas, recreational users can actually have an equivalent or larger effect than 
commercial users (Eliason 1999), which has shown to be the case for some individual fish 
species (Schroder and Love 2002). For example, the collapse of several fisheries in Canada 
could be attributed to recreational pressure (Post et al. 2002). Additionally, even after the 
halt of commercial fishing, some species’ populations fail to recover until recreational 
fishing is also stopped (Denny and Babcock 2004; Denny et al. 2003; Shears and Usmar 
2006). Thus, it is worthwhile to explore the drivers of non-compliance in recreational 
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fisheries, especially as compliance in small-scale fisheries needs to be understood within a 
different framework: achieving social justice, legitimacy and deterrence (Hauck 2011).   
4.3 Materials and methods 
4.3.1 Study fishery 
The reader is referred to section 1.6.3 for a detailed description of the Marlborough 
Sounds recreational blue cod fishery. The non-compliance rates (>30% for the size limit and 
>10% for the daily limit) from chapter three suggest it could be worthwhile to explore why 
fishers are violating these two regulations. 
4.3.2 Survey Design 
The framework of pro-environmental behaviour proposed by Bamberg and Möser 
(2007) was used as the starting point for the questionnaire design. However, intention was 
not included as a factor due to the potentially sensitive nature of the behaviours in 
question; so this study modelled behaviour directly. In addition to these seven factors, nine 
other factors were also included based on the literature and other behavioural and 
compliance models reviewed above. This resulted in seven alternative models to be tested 



























Table 4.1: Summary of the seven compliance models tested and the factors included in each model. 
Model Factors  
Instrumental (Becker 
1968) 
probability of detection, probability of conviction and penalty if 
convicted 
Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen 
1991) 
attitude, social norm (descriptive and injunctive) and perceived 
behavioural control 
Instrumental and 
Theory of Planned 
Behaviour 
combined 
probability of detection, probability of conviction, penalty if convicted, 
attitude, social norm (descriptive and injunctive)  and perceived 
behavioural control 
Legitimacy (Nielsen 
and Mathiesen 2003; Tyler 
1990; Viteri and Chávez 
2007) 





factors from the Theory of Planned Behaviour plus problem 
awareness, attribution, guilt, moral norm (see figure 4.1 ) 
Modified Bamberg 
and Möser  
factors from the Bamberg and Möser model plus addition of direct 
path from social norm to non-compliance, based on the Theory of 
Planned Behavior 
Fully Inclusive factors from the modified Bamberg and Möser model plus probability 
of detection, probability of conviction, penalty if convicted, 
meaningful rule, involvement in decision-making process, regulation 
fairness and effectiveness, regulation knowledge 
 
The first model tested was the instrumental model of compliance (Becker 1968) as 
previously described. Deterrence factors (probability of detection, probability of conviction 
and penalty if convicted) have been examined in commercial fisheries but here I explore 
their relevance in a recreational fishery. Specifically, probability of detection was measured 
as perceived enforcement rather than the actual (observed) probability of detection. A 
respondent’s perception of enforcement is a more effective measure of the deterrence 
value as an individual will act on their perception of the odds of being detected (Akella and 
Cannon 2004). The second alternative model tested was the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(Ajzen 1991), also described earlier in this chapter. The six variables included in these two 
models were combined into a third model to be tested, representing a combination of the 
instrumental and basic normative views of compliance. Four additional factors from the 
enriched model (outcome fairness and effectiveness, involvement in decision-making 
process and meaningful rule) were used as measures of the management regime’s 
legitimacy and tested together as the fourth model. Although procedural fairness and 
effectiveness are included in Tyler’s (1990) model of legitimacy, fishers interviewed in a pilot 
78 
 
study did not mention these factors, nor did any news articles, so they were not included in 
the current study.  
The framework of pro-environmental behaviour by Bamberg and Möser (2007), 
described in a previous section, was the fifth model tested. For the sixth model, a modified 
version of this framework was utilised. Whereas in the original Bamberg and Möser (2007) 
model the social norm influenced an individual’s behaviour indirectly (through attitude, 
perceived behavioural control and moral norm), the modified version added a direct path 
from the social norm to compliance. Previous studies (Armitage and Conner 2001; White et 
al. 2009) of the Theory of Planned Behaviour have demonstrated that social norms can 
directly influence pro-environmental behaviour. Finally, a seventh and fully inclusive model 
was formed. This model contained all 15 variables from the other six models and with the 
addition of one new variable, regulation knowledge. Other compliance studies (e.g., Nkonya 
et al. 2008; St John et al. 2011) strongly support this inclusion; as without correct regulation 
knowledge non-compliance may be widespread.  
Previous fisheries compliance studies that have considered normative factors have 
only included only the injunctive social norm, or an individual’s perception of what others 
believe to be the appropriate conduct. Yet the descriptive social norm, or what an individual 
believes others are doing, can actually have a very strong influence on an individual’s 
behaviour (Cialdini 2007). Thus, injunctive and descriptive social norms were measured 
separately and included in the relevant models as two factors determining the overall social 
norm. In total, 16 factors were tested (Appendix 9) and even though the majority of the 
potential compliance factors have previously been tested in fisheries, this study was the first 
to test the influence of problem awareness, attribution, guilt and attitude. 
Piloting for the survey was conducted with eight fishers several months prior to data 
collection and their feedback was incorporated into the final questionnaire design. The final 
survey was carried out online using the survey platform Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com).  
4.3.3 Data collection 
Participant recruitment was described in the previous chapter (section 3.2.2) as the 
current study was part of the same online study. In order to introduce the study, the 
questionnaire started with several general questions on fishing in the Marlborough Sounds 
which are not reported here. This was followed by three questions asking participants to 
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provide the correct daily limit, minimum and maximum sizes for blue cod. The next three 
sections focused on the potential drivers of non-compliance. All but one of the 16 factors 
were measured using three or four statements, as this is the optimal number of indicators 
for a latent variable construct (Hall et al. 1999), and at least one statement per factor was 
reverse scored to minimize bias. For the majority of questions agreement was measured 
using a 5-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree). 
The probability of conviction was assessed using a single question with five choices ranging 
from very high to very low.  
Fishers first responded to statements covering the five factors that applied to both 
regulations: meaningful rule, involvement in decision-making process, problem awareness, 
attribution and probability of detection. The next section introduced the daily limit (two 
blue cod per person/per day) and instructed the respondent to answer the next set of 
questions which included the remaining 11 factors that were regulation-specific. In the 
subsequent section, the same set of statements was used for the size limit (30 to 35cm), 
with minimal wording changes to refer to the different regulation. Previous studies 
(Curcione 1992; Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003) have shown that compliance is not necessarily 
constant across a fishery and a violation of one or more regulations may be actually 
considered socially and morally acceptable; making it important to evaluate each regulation 
separately.  
Finally, towards the end of the survey participants were directly asked whether they 
had violated either of the regulations in 2012. Respondents were instructed to answer for 
the most recent year they had been fishing in the Sounds if they had not been in 2012. In 
this way all fishers were allowed to participate in the full survey. However, for the present 
study I only analysed data from those fishers who had fished in the Sounds in 2012. There 
was also a chance for respondents to comment on anything regarding blue cod fishing in the 
Sounds as the last question; providing an opportunity to elaborate on answers to previous 
questions and/or give examples to help illustrate their views. 
It should be noted that there are concerns around the use of direct questioning to 
gather information on illegal resource use (Gavin et al. 2009), including non-compliance 
with fisheries regulations. Although an online format allows for greater anonymity and more 
honest answering (de Leeuw 2008), an indirect method may be useful for obtaining more 
accurate violation estimates. Indeed, the results of chapter three (Thomas et al. 2014a) 
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validate this concern, albeit with mixed results. The estimate of non-compliance with the 
daily limit was not significantly different between direct or indirect questioning (see chapter 
two), making it a non-issue for this study. However, for the size limit, direct questioning did 
not perform as well as an indirect method (randomized response technique) with a 
significantly lower estimate of non-compliance (29% vs. 42%).  
Despite this finding, direct questioning estimates were still used in this study for 
reasons besides the lack of methodology to further analyse the indirect questioning data. 
Firstly, the percentage answering “yes” under direct questioning is high enough to 
effectively model the drivers of non-compliance. The dishonest answering would not 
invalidate the model but lower the predictive value as it introduces a source of error. The 
fishers in question would have responded to the Likert-type questions honestly and but 
then answered “no” on the compliance question even though they had broken that 
regulation. So although their other answers would fit the pattern of non-compliance, the 
result would not match up with the expected behaviour; introducing uncertainty in the 
model. Secondly, some respondents will not answer honestly regardless of method (van der 
Heijden et al. 2000), meaning underestimation of an unknown amount will still occur.  
4.3.4 Data analysis 
 The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test and Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-ranks test were 
used as data were not normally distributed for all factors (Field 2009). Structural equation 
modeling was performed using MPlus. Due to the categorical nature of the outcome 
variables, WLSMV (weighted least square means and variance-adjusted) was used for the 
estimator. This method, which uses probit regression, has been found to provide the best 
results for modeling categorical data (Brown 2006; Byrne 2012) and does not assume data 
are normally distributed (Brown 2006).  
4.4 Results 
The final sample was comprised of 320 fishers, with 82% male and 45% from the 
Marlborough region. Fisher age ranged from 22 to 88 years (M = 54, SD = 12), while Sounds 
fishing experience ranged from one to 70 years (M = 28, SD = 17). Eighty-nine percent of 
respondents owned a boat and 37% owned a holiday home in the Sounds. For the questions 
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testing regulation knowledge, 91% of fishers chose the correct daily limit (two), 89% the 
correct minimum size (30cm) and 94% the correct maximum size (35cm).  
4.4.1 Measurement models 
Prior to testing the full models, the 16 constructs were tested separately for both 
validity (confirmatory factor analysis, CFA) and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) to determine 
the best-fitting measurement models. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to ensure the 
statements satisfactorily measured the underlying and unobserved latent construct. When 
assessing model fit, both comparative and absolute model fit indices were used with the 
following cut-offs: chi-squared test/degrees of freedom (x2/df) ≤ 3, comparative fix index 
(CFI) ≥ .95, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) ≤ 0.06, and standardized root 
mean square residual (SRMR) ≤ .08 (Hu and Bentler 1999). As a measure of reliability, 
Cronbach’s alpha was also calculated and used alongside the CFA results to determine if 
items needed to be removed from the measurement models. A Cronbach’s alpha value of 
0.70 or greater generally indicates reliability (Field 2009). 
As there is no overall cut-off for a ‘valid’ factor loading (Byrne 2012), all items with 
low factor loading were analysed separately. These items were removed if the path was not 
significant, or if removal increased the model fit and/or Cronbach’s alpha to an acceptable 
level. For daily limit attitude, two paths were not significant but one was retained in order to 
keep three items. Models with only three items (e.g., attribution, probability of detection) 
were initially not identified during CFA as there were no degrees of freedom. In order to 
identify the model two steps were taken: 1) the highest loading item was fixed to one and 2) 
the item with the second-highest loading was fixed to the original loading value. In this way 
the model had one degree of freedom and could be identified. 
After elimination of the low-scoring and non-significant items, all final measurement 
models met the previously-stated thresholds for CFI and SRMR; although not all x2/df and 
RMSEA scores did (Appendix 10). Fourteen (out of 25) models had a Cronbach’s alpha score 
of 0.7 or greater, indicating good internal reliability (Field 2009). Of the remaining eleven 
constructs, all but three (penalty for daily and size limit and attitude for size limit) were 
above 0.5 which may suffice (Field 2009). As the final CFA results demonstrated good model 
fit for each construct, we chose to keep all the potential drivers in the final models. 
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Cronbach’s alpha can sometimes be increased by adding items to measure. 
However, with four starting statements for each construct additional items was not a viable 
option for this survey. Also, for the injunctive social norm, it is also worth noting that three 
of the four statements asked about other fishers while the fourth asked about family and 
friends. It is likely this contributed to the lower alphas (0.54 and 0.64) for this particular 
construct.  
4.4.2 Compliance factors 
The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was used to determine if the factor medians 
significantly differed from the neutral midpoint of three (Figures 4.2 and 4.3). The results 
showed that the level of disagreement or agreement given by the fishers was statistically 
significant for every factor except the effectiveness and fairness of the daily limit. While 
overall fishers accepted the suite of blue cod regulations as meaningful, and were neutral or 
positive towards all aspects of the daily limit, they recorded negative scores towards several 
aspects of the size limit (fairness, effectiveness and attitude) and involvement in the 
decision-making process. The negative view of fisher involvement was brought up often in 
the open-ended question on blue cod fishing (at the end of the survey) with fishers 
complaining that the BCMG recommendations were ‘ignored’ and that the consultation 
process was a “sick joke’” and “a shambles”. Similarly, the majority of fisher comments on 
this final question concerned the size limit with the number of fish discarded and their 
mortality raised as a major concern. Respondents described the size limit using phrases such 
as: “total stupidity”, “wasteful and inefficient” and “unfair and discriminatory”. 
Comparing the factor means for the daily limit and size limit, the level of agreement or 
disagreement differed for all but three factors: regulation knowledge probability of 
conviction and penalty if convicted; with differences reflecting a more negative attitude 
















A higher score indicates a more positive attitude. All medians were significantly different from the neutral 
midpoint of 3 (Wilcoxon signed rank, p<.05). N=320. 
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4.4.3 Structural equation models and model selection 
 After confirming the best-fitting measurement models, structural equation modeling 
was then carried out to determine how these factors influenced a fisher’s compliance 
behaviour. The results of the structural equation model testing are presented in Table 1. For 
all tested models non-significant paths and factors were removed but no additional paths 
were added except for the inclusive model (model 7).  
 
Table 4.2: Summary of model fit indices for the seven structural equation models to explain fishers' compliance with the 
daily and size limits for blue cod. 
 
        Model                                            Model fit indices 
Regulation x2 df x2/df RMSEA CFI TLI R2 
1. Instrumental Daily Limit 2.55 1 2.55 .03(0-.12) .92 .88 .08 
Size Limit 0.12 1 .12 .00(.00-.02) 1.0 2.39 .03 
2. TPB Daily Limit 58.97 5 11.79 .19(.14-.23) .55 .19 .39 
Size Limit 142.57 4 35.64 .33(.29-.38) .46 -.21 .50 
3. Instrumental + 
TPB 
Daily Limit 98.27 13 7.56 .14(.12-.17) .43 .20 .44 
Size Limit 218.82 13 16.83 .22(.20-.25) .33 .08 .52 
4. Legitimacy Daily Limit 16.01 7 2.29 .06(.02-.11) .72 .60 .11 
Size Limit 10.8 5 2.16 .06(.00-.11) .97 .95 .09 
5. Bamberg & 
Möser 
Daily Limit 66.36 22 3.02 .08(.06-.10) .91 .86 .29 




Daily Limit 2.10 1 2.10 .06(.00-.17) .99 .96 .37 
Size Limit 12.62 6 2.10 .06(.00-.10) .99 .96 .56 
7. Full Inclusive Daily Limit 143.48 48 2.99 .08(.06-.10) .83 .76 .29 
Size Limit 162.63 54 3.01 .08(.07-.09) .91 .87 .56 
a) regulation knowledge, b) probability of conviction, c) penalty if convicted, d) fairness, e) effectiveness, f) descriptive social 
norm, g) injunctive social norm, h) guilt, i) perceived behavioural control, j) attitude and k) moral norm. A higher score 
indicates a more positive attitude. * indicates the median is significantly different from the neutral midpoint of 3 (Wilcoxon 
signed rank, p<.05). N=320. 
 
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation, CFI = comparative fit index and TLI = Tucker-Lewis Fit Index. Shading 
indicates the best-fitting model for that regulation. 
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The reported measures of model fit and the r-squared value were used to determine 
the model that best explained the data. The measures of model fit included three previously 
used for CFA as well as the TLI (Tucker-Lewis Fit Index). TLI is a non-normalized index of 
model fit but includes a penalty for overly complex models and is interpreted in the same 
way as CFI where a good model fit value is ≥ .95 (Byrne 2012).  
For the daily limit regulation, the modified Bamberg and Möser model was the best 
fitting model and also explained four times the amount of variance (37% vs. 8%) compared 
with the next best-fitting model (instrumental). Therefore, the modified Bamberg and 
Möser was selected as the best determinant of a fisher’s decision to comply with the daily 
limit. Under this model social norm was the only driver (β=.61) of daily limit compliance 
(Figure 4.4). Descriptive norms (β=.73) had a stronger contribution to the overall social norm 
construct compared to injunctive norms (β=.53). A stronger social norm increased the 
probability of a fisher complying with the regulation. All other variables were removed due 
to a lack of significant paths. 
 
 





For the size limit regulation, three alternative models had comparable fit: 
instrumental, legitimacy and the modified Bamberg and Möser. However, the instrumental 
model explained only 3% of the variance. Although the RMSEA for the modified Bamberg 
and Möser model suggests only a moderate fit, CFI and TLI were the highest of any of the 
tested models. Importantly, the model also explained more than five times the variance of 
Numerical values on arrows are standardized regression coefficients (β) and values in the top right of ovals 
representing the constructs are coefficients of determination (R2). Note: R2 value for the social norm was unable to 




the legitimacy-based model (56% vs. 9%) and can be regarded as the best-fitting model for 
the size limit.  
Examining this model (Figure 4.5), social norms have the largest influence (β=.66) on 
a fisher’s decision to comply with the size limit regulation. As the social norm increased, the 
probability of a fisher complying with the size also increased. For size limit injunctive norms 
(β=.78) had a stronger contribution to the overall social norm construct compared with 
descriptive norms (β=.67). A fisher’s attitude had a smaller (β=.19) direct influence, with a 
more positive attitude increasing the probability of compliance. Moreover, problem 













4.5.1 Drivers of non-compliance 
This study focused on identifying fishers’ reasons for non-compliance with the daily 
and size limits for recreational blue cod fishing in the Marlborough Sounds, New Zealand. 
Numerical values on arrows are standardized regression coefficients (β) and values in the top right of ovals 






Whereas both instrumental factors and normative factors have been shown to be relevant 
in commercial and artisanal fisheries (Hatcher and Gordon 2005; Hønneland 2000; King and 
Sutinen 2010; Kuperan and Sutinen 1998), their influence in a recreational fishery was 
previously unstudied. More importantly, seven alternative models, including instrumental, 
normative and psycho-social factors, were tested against each other for their ability to 
explain a fisher’s compliance decision.  
The current study appears to be the first to use this model testing approach in 
fisheries research as previous studies tested different factors rather than multiple 
behavioural models. A key advantage of structural equation modeling is providing 
information on relationships between the drivers, including both direct and indirect effects, 
for a more complete understanding. Utilisation of this method provides a robust approach 
to determining the effectiveness of the multiple and potentially opposing models to predict 
compliance behaviour. SEM also allows for the model constructs (in this case the potential 
drivers) to be tested as latent variables. 
Overall fishers believed that they were unlikely to be caught and were more negative 
towards the size limit than the daily limit. For both regulations, the best-fitting compliance 
model contained no instrumental factors and showed that the overriding influence on a 
fisher’s compliance with either regulation was social norms; what other fishers and family 
and friends thought of their decision to comply. This finding contrasts with non-compliance 
in most commercial fisheries which tend to emphasise instrumental factors (King and 
Sutinen 2010; Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003) rather than normative factors. Although, social 
norms have proven influential in artisanal fisheries in Malaysia (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998) 
and commercial fisheries Sweden (Jagers et al. 2012) as well as in other conservation-
related intentions in countries including Argentina (Mastrangelo et al. 2014) and China 
(Chen et al. 2009). In terms of an overall management strategy to reduce non-compliance, 
promoting voluntary compliance is likely to be the most effective approach. Increasing 
enforcement efforts could actually make the situation worse given the median scores for 
factors such as involvement in the management process and regulation fairness were lower 
than neutral. The results of this study offer insights into ways in which the Ministry of 
Fisheries could increase voluntary compliance among fishers. 
The best-fitting models explained more than half of the variance in an individual’s 
compliance decision with the size limit (56%) and more than a third (37%) of it for the daily 
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limit. Although these results, especially the size limit, are strong considering the subject is an 
illegal and potentially sensitive behaviour, there is still a large proportion of the variance 
unaccounted for and suggests the need for an adaptive management strategy to reduce 
uncertainty. One likely source of the remaining variation would be a number of violations 
being unplanned as opportunistic behaviour can influence compliance decisions (Nielsen 
2003). For example, if a fisher was approaching the end of the trip and had yet to catch a 
legal-sized cod, he may be tempted to keep the next two, regardless of size, in order to not 
return empty-handed. Similarly, social pressure from someone else on the fishing trip to 
keep an extra or over-sized blue cod could also result in an unexpected violation.  
Additionally, as noted in the methods section, this study utilized compliance 
estimates from direct questioning which has been shown to underestimate the extent of 
non-compliance for the size limit (Thomas et al. 2014a). Finally, the Cronbach’s alpha for 
both injunctive social norms and size limit attitude was lower than the usual cut-off value of 
0.7. A higher reliability for these construct could increase the predictive ability of the best-
fitting model. Under an adaptive management strategy, the results of the behavioural 
interventions targeting the social norms would be evaluated. The low reliability may hinder 
the effectiveness of these interventions as there may be a mismatch between the measured 
injunctive social norm and the one intended to be tested. Further exploration into the 
drivers of compliance could seek to improve measurement of the injunctive norm construct, 
potentially by separating other fishers’ views from those of family and friends. 
4.5.2 Management implications 
Behavioural interventions to encourage compliance with the regulations would be 
effective given the importance of social norms in influencing fisher’s compliance behaviour. 
As illegal acts are more likely if individual can rationalize them as being acceptable (Smith 
and Anderson 2004), the strong influence of a descriptive social norm is important; 
especially for the size limit with over 40% of fishers in violation of this regulation. 
Furthermore, the social reputation of a fisher who violates will not be affected if a large 
proportion of their peers do the same (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998). However, behavioural 
interventions targeting the descriptive social norm need to be done in a positive way 
emphasizing that the majority of fishers ‘do the right thing’ and comply with the regulations. 
A focus on the prevalence of the negative behaviour has previously been shown to backfire 
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(Cialdini 2007; Cialdini 2003). For example, a newspaper article in 2012 (Nicoll 2012b) 
focused on how during a two week period one in five fishers broke the size limit. Hearing 
that so many of their peers violate this regulation may increase the incentive for a fisher to 
do the same as they are made aware of the frequency of the behaviour and change theirs to 
‘fit in’. 
To help address the descriptive social norm, the Ministry could provide a press 
release, widely distributed through different media, highlighting high levels of compliance in 
helping the fishery to recover. The use of control and experimental groups would provide a 
means to test the effectiveness of this intervention in changing the descriptive social norm.  
Fishers in both groups could be asked about what they believe other fishers do, and then 
expose one group to press releases and or/articles on the extent of compliance. After 
exposure to this information, fishers would be asked the same questions on other fishers’ 
actions to test for any changes. As undesirable behaviours are often overestimated (Borsari 
and Carey 2003), changing fisher’s perceptions of this action could be effective in changing 
the descriptive norm. Modification of the press release for publication in fishing magazines 
would also be beneficial to reaching a wide number of fishers as in 2009, fishing magazines 
were the most-used source for obtaining fishing information while newspapers were second 
and the Ministry’s website third (Batstone et al. 2009). Although this may have changed, it 
still underlines the importance of distributing information through channels other than the 
official website.  
The injunctive norm should also be the target of different behavioural interventions 
and I suggest consideration of the ‘block leaders’ approach. Under this method information 
is disseminated by volunteers, with the expectation that it will be most effective if coming 
from someone more similar and in the same social network (Abrahamse and Steg 2013). 
Thus fishers not in compliance with the regulations may be more likely to change their 
behaviour if the intervention comes from someone similar and in the same network (i.e., 
another fisher) instead of the Ministry. This is likely to be especially true given the 
prevalence of negative attitudes towards the Ministry and the regulations (Thomas et al. 
2014b). The Ministry could work with influential members of the fishing communities, such 
as long-time fishers and leaders of fishing clubs, to employ tactics to target the injunctive 
social norm.  
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Letters to the editor in the local newspaper (already common) would be a potential 
behavioural intervention and take relatively little time for the fishers involved. Stern (2000) 
showed that norms are more important if there is a moral obligation attached to the desired 
action, so these writings could emphasize how compliance with the regulations is the best 
course of action as there is a collective responsibility to sustain the fishery for the future (a 
goal previously expressed by many fishers). Better dissemination of information, especially 
in non-scientific terms, to fishers regarding the benefits of the size limit to the fishery could 
also be effective; as during the intercept survey several inquired as to the purpose of the 
maximum size.  
Another important point is the possible influential distinction between the types of 
norm and regulation. The results depicted in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 suggest that descriptive 
norms (what fishers believe others are doing) are more important for fostering compliance 
for daily limit regulation, while injunctive norms (fishers’ perception of what others believe 
to be the appropriate conduct) is more important for size limit. Descriptive norms have 
been demonstrated to be more effective when the injunctive norm surrounding a specific 
behaviour is mixed (Jacobson, Mortensen and Cialdini 2011), which is likely to be the case 
for the size limit.  
An individual’s self-regulation capacity can also help determine which social norm 
should be targeted. Injunctive social norms are less effective when the self-regulating 
capacity is low (Jacobson et al. 2011) such as towards the end of work. On this basis, 
behavioural interventions during intercepts (at sea or on land) would best target the 
descriptive social norm. Fishers are likely to have lower self-regulating capacity during this 
time as they are in the middle of fishing and less likely to have the willpower/desire to make 
decisions that put their immediate self interest in conflict with long-term interpersonal 
goals. Furthermore, behavioural interventions are likely to differ in their effectiveness 
between groups (Abrahamse and Steg 2013). Individuals use social descriptive norms to 
guide their behaviour especially when the situation is new or ambiguous (Jacobson, 
Mortensen and Cialdini 2011). Inexperienced fishers and/or fishers new to the Marlborough 
Sounds may thus be more responsive to behavioural interventions emphasizing that the 
majority of fishers comply with the daily and size limits. 
After establishing social norms as the largest determinant of a fisher’s compliance 
decision, the next step is to identify their influencing factors. The four factors comprising 
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legitimacy (outcome fairness and effectiveness, meaningful rule and participation) have 
been shown to be influential in other small-scale fisheries (Hauck 2011). They are also likely 
to be important in the Marlborough Sounds (partially through social norms), based on factor 
scores, interviews and comments, and were a significant influence on the social norm in the 
fully inclusive model. Ideally these normative factors that affect social views on a regulation 
should be addressed during the planning stages (Thomassin et al. 2010) as it would be easier 
than changing attitudes after regulation implementation. Greater consideration of fisher 
attitudes and increased involvement in the management process has also demonstrated 
benefits in enhancing legitimacy in other fisheries (Pita et al. 2010; Richardson et al. 2005; 
Viteri and Chávez 2007).  
A study in Newfoundland and Norway (Gezelius 2004) showed how attitudes 
towards non-compliance can vary; finding that fishers usually turned a blind eye towards 
violations for food, whereas violations for profit were met with social disapproval. A similar 
situation is suggested for the Marlborough Sounds where exceeding the daily limit is most 
likely done out of greed; but a violation of the size limit is rationalized due to concerns over 
the mortality of the discarded blue cod undermining the regulation’s effectiveness. If a fish 
outside the size limit is injured, the dilemma is likely to be even stronger. As in other 
fisheries (e.g., Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003) fishers do not see the point of discarding a dead 
or mortally-injured fish. In response to the open question on blue cod fishing one fisher 
admitted to keeping blue cod outside of the limit, but only because the fish were badly 
injured or gut-hooked and bleeding and were going to die. The data suggest fisher concerns 
surrounding the size limit result in some ambiguity over the decision to comply, resulting in 
a lower level of guilt, weaker moral and injunctive social norms and finally a higher level of 
non-compliance with the size limit.  
Despite social norms acting as the largest influence on a fisher’s compliance decision 
for both regulations, the significant differences between most of the factor medians 
demonstrate benefits to examining each regulation separately. It is also important to note 
that this study did not differentiate between undersized and oversized blue cod, due to the 
length of the survey. As minimum size limits are one of the most common fisheries 
management tools (Radomski et al. 2001) that apply to most recreationally caught fish 
species within New Zealand (Ministry of Fisheries 2014b), most non-compliance is likely to 
be taking over-sized blue cod. However, further research could be carried out to test this 
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assumption and determine if the drivers of compliance differ between undersized and 
oversized blue cod. Finally, further investigation into why fishers have agreed or disagreed 
with the specific drivers evaluated could provide important insights into variables that are 
likely to influence the social norm.  
The results of this study, especially the influence of social norms, can help fisheries 
managers design effective and targeted behavioural interventions, thus saving time and 
resources. Timely intervention is needed as it can prove impossible to rebuild moral norms 
once eroded (Nielsen 2003) and this may be true for social norms as well. Ensuring a highly 
transparent and inclusive review of the regulations later in 2014 would be an important step 
towards optimizing voluntary compliance and increasing the legitimacy of the management 
regime; although other actions and behavioural interventions can take place sooner. Under 
a deterrence-based management strategy fishers comply with the regulations for fear of the 
consequences, but the failure of this strategy failure is inevitable (Karper and Lopes 2014). 
Between this and the importance of social norms in the Marlborough Sounds blue cod 
























5 Managing the impact of fishery regulations on 
discard rates, compliance and fisher satisfaction 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Fishery management often aims to protect fish stocks from overfishing by 
maintaining sustainable harvest levels while maximising catch rates (Tetzlaff et al. 2013). 
The most frequently used regulations for achieving these objectives in recreational fisheries 
are limiting the total catch per day or per trip (i.e., bag or harvest limits) and restricting the 
size of fish allowed to be kept; i.e., minimum and/or maximum size limits (Radomski et al. 
2001). However, not all caught fish are kept, and these catch-and-release discards occur 
because of regulations or voluntarily. Regulatory discards refer to fish that must be 
discarded because they exceed quota or trip limits, are caught as non-commercial or 
incidental by-catch, out-of-season, or do not meet the minimum/maximum size limit for 
that species (Hill and Wassenberg 1990). The voluntary practice of discarding legally 
landable fish in the hopes of catching a larger and/or more valuable fish is referred to as 
“high-grading” (Kristofersson and Rickertsen 2009) and has been recorded in many fisheries 
(Anderson 1994), including recreational ones (e.g., Bochenek et al. 2012).  
In many marine recreational fisheries, both regulatory and voluntary catch-and-
release rates are increasing (Tetzlaff et al. 2013). For example, in Eastern North America 
over 90% of some fish species caught are released because they cannot be legally retained  
(SEDAR (Southeast Data 2009) and in several European countries over half of the fish caught 
in marine recreational fisheries are released (Ferter et al. 2013). Regulations designed to 
conserve fish stocks can also unintentionally encourage catch-and-release discarding and 
high-grading (Copes 1986; Jensen and Vestergaard 2002) by limiting a fisher’s catch. In turn, 
fishers may attempt to maximize their overall catch by discarding the smaller fish caught 
(Woodward and Griffin 2003). The success of length-based limits as a management strategy 
depends on the released fish surviving, recovering quickly and not experiencing long-term 
sub-lethal impairments (Broadhurst et al. 2005; Muoneke and Childress 1994; Waters and 
Huntsman 1986).  
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Clearly the survival of released fish is uncertain, and post-release mortality is the 
largest source of uncertainty in estimating total fishing mortality (Davis 2002). Even low 
post-release mortality rates have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of fishery 
management regulations, affect the sustainability of the fishery (Coggins et al. 2007; 
Douglas et al. 2010) and prevent stock recovery (Morandeau et al. 2014). Post-release 
mortality has been found to reduce both size and abundance (Wydoski 1977 as cited in 
Cooke and Wilde, 2007) and can also have sub-lethal physiological, behavioural and fitness 
impairments (Cooke et al. 2002). For example, handling a fish can cause the disruption or 
removal of the external mucous layer covering the fish body, which may in turn increase the 
risk of pathogenic infections, especially those associated with fungi (Cooke and Wilde 2007). 
Some studies (Clapp and Clark, 1989; Diodati and Richards, 1996) have found a negative 
influence of catch-and-release on fish health such as a slower growth rate (but see Pope and 
Wilde, 2004). Moreover, fish continually exposed to stress from catch-and-release may have 
weakened immune systems, be more susceptible to disease (Muoneke and Childress 1994), 
and have altered reproductive output quality, quantity and timing (Davie and Kopf 2006).  
Post-release predation by seabirds is another potential source of post-release 
mortality. In commercial fisheries, fish discards provide an easy source of food for seabirds 
to exploit (Votier et al. 2004) leading to increased populations (Arcos and Oro 2002; Furness 
1984, 2003; Furness et al. 2007; Oro et al. 2004) and modified feeding habits and diets 
(Blaber and Wassenberg 1989). Modified seabird biology can result (Mañosa et al. 2004; Oro 
et al. 2004; Oro et al. 1996; Tavecchia et al. 2007), including increasing the short-term 
breeding and survival performance of seabirds (Tavecchia et al. 2007) and greater site 
fidelity (Bartumeus et al. 2010). 
Fisheries researchers have also called for greater integration of human behavior into 
recreational fisheries analyses (Arlinghaus 2004; Fulton et al. 2011; Post and Parkinson 
2012) and fisher attitudes are becoming increasingly important to management bodies 
when designing regulations (Eggert and Ellegård 2003). Managers should therefore seek to 
balance biological, social and economic objectives for the fishery, which may be conflicting 
(Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009; Koehn and Todd 2012). Regulation support from fishers is 
highly beneficial (Fisher 1997) and can assist in maximising compliance (Kuperan and 
Sutinen 1998; Viteri and Chávez 2007). As even low levels of non-compliance can undermine 
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the effectiveness of the fishery management strategy (Gigliotti and Taylor 1990; Kaplan 
1998), there is a pressing need to assess and predict fisher support for both current and 
alternative regulations (Wilde and Ditton 1999). Since increasing restrictions while 
maintaining high levels of fisher support may not be simultaneously achievable (Powell et al. 
2010), managers should attempt to find regulatory options that promote fisher satisfaction 
while reducing discards and associated post-release mortality.  
5.1.1 Study Aims 
Within the context of these information requirements for designing and 
implementing fishery management regulations, this study investigated the most effective 
size limit regulation for a particular recreational fishery. Specifically, this study aims to help 
determine how to sustain the recreational blue cod fishery in the Marlborough Sounds, New 
Zealand by minimizing the number of discarded fish while simultaneously maximizing fisher 
satisfaction. The research also sought to determine if the number of fish discarded 
significantly influenced regulation agreement and/or compliance. In order to obtain this 
information, three different size limit scenarios were used, one current and two 
alternatives, and evaluated in terms of fish discarded and fisher satisfaction with the 
regulation. Including a control scenario was important as understanding fisher behaviour 
under the current regulations is crucial to properly evaluating alterative regulations (Rettig 
et al. 1989). 
Although the literature shows that fisher attitudes can be influenced by the extent to 
which a regulation affects their fishing habits (Pita et al. 2013; Thomas et al. 2014b; Wilde 
and Ditton 1999), the effect of discards on both fishing satisfaction and regulation 
agreement is largely unstudied. Two studies in the United States found that being forced to 
discard an increasing numbers of flounder decreased fisher satisfaction (Bochenek et al. 
2010; Powell et al. 2010), although this was measured in terms of the number of fish kept 
which is not the most important factor in the Sounds (Batstone et al. 2009). However, to-
date no research has been carried out on the potential influence of discards on a fisher’s 
compliance decision or regulation agreement.  
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5.1.2 Study Fishery 
As blue cod are protogynous hermaphrodites (Carbines 1998a; Ministry of Fisheries 
2008c) the maximum size limit was introduced leave large male blue cod in the population 
in order to suppress a sex-change in the large female fish. As fishers selectively exploit the 
larger fish (Lewin et al. 2006), fishing pressure leads to a decrease in the mean female size 
as well as a sex ratio skewed towards males (Shepherd et al. 2010). This can negatively 
influence the reproductive potential of populations as larger fish have been shown to 
produce more batches of eggs (Crossland 1977; Zeldis and Francis 1998). Therefore effective 
management of blue cod requires measures that protect both sexes (Shepherd et al. 2010).  
 Since the fishery reopened there is a worry among fishers that the number of blue 
cod discarded has increased, mainly from the addition of the maximum size and the small 
(5cm) slot (Moore 2012). For example, during the last 14 trips before the new regulations 
came into effect, one charter boat operator reported an average of 60 blue cod caught with 
49 kept; however, during the first 14 trips under the new regulations, the average catch 
jumped to 358 with 32 kept (Humm 2013). Because of the perceived increase in discards, 
many fishers do not agree with the maximum size limit and believe the slot rule is doing 
more harm than good (Moore 2013; Nicoll 2012a). A non-compliance rate of 40% in 2012 
(Thomas et al. 2014a) may reflect this attitude and raises concerns over the effectiveness of 
the maximum size limit. 
 In an effort to minimize the mortality of discarded blue cod, a “Code of Practice” 
pamphlet by the Ministry of Fisheries (Ministry of Fisheries 2009) suggests ‘best practices’, 
such as holding the fish behind the head to remove hooks. A previous study (Carbines 
1999b) showed that discarded blue cod had an 87% survival rate overall. Hooking location 
was shown to be the most important determinant of mortality and large (6/0) hooks were 
less likely to be lodged in critical locations like the gut or gills.  
In addition to direct mortality due to fishing practices, many fishers have expressed 
concern over the predation of the discarded fish, termed post-release predation mortality 
(Raby et al. 2014), by seabirds and barracouta (Thyrsites atun) (Ministry of Fisheries 2008d). 
The Marlborough Sounds is home to four species of shags (Phalacrocorax spp.) with diets 
consisting mainly of fish (Heather and Roberston 2000). The shag populations appear to be 
limited primarily by access to food resources, in addition to habitat availability (Bell 2012). 
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Fishers have reported both increased predation on the discarded fish by the shags, as well 
as increased intensity and aggressiveness of the birds’ feeding behaviour (Thomas, 
unpublished field notes). 
Given the apparent difficulties in catching two legal-sized blue cod (the current daily 
bag limit), there are increasing calls for the maximum size to be eliminated (Bell 2014a; 
Nicoll 2012a). Alternatively, some fishers feel that a 10cm slot would be acceptable (Baxter 
2012) especially as a 12cm slot was initially proposed by the Blue Cod Management Group 
for the reopening of the fishery (Ministry of Fisheries 2010b).  These fisher suggestions were 
thus used as the two alternative size limits for the current study. Based on conversations 
with fishers during the pilot study and letters to the editor in the local newspaper, we 
expected that more fishers would prefer eliminating the maximum size, than increasing it to 
40cm. 
Both these alternative options should decrease regulatory discards, as a wider range 
of fish sizes would be legally landable. However, it was believed that either increasing or 
eliminating the maximum size would increase the incentive for high-grading which is legal in 
New Zealand (New Zealand Parliament 1986). Currently, there is no incentive to high-grade 
with the 5cm slot, as it appears that most fishers must discard multiple blue cod just to 
meet their daily bag limit of two. But removing the current size limit regulation may lead 
some fishers seeking to maximize the size of the blue cod kept, given the low daily limit of 
two, by discarding fish close to the minimum size.  
5.2 Methods 
It is often unknown how fishers are likely to react to new regulations (Fulton et al. 
2011). For example, the minimum legal size suggested for protecting juvenile fish may be 
extremely unpopular if much of the catch cannot be retained (Stewart 2008). The present 
study examined the amount of blue cod discarded from compliance with the size limit (i.e., 
regulatory discards) within the framework of a scenario approach. Using scenarios allows 
stronger conclusions regarding action intentions of fishers given distinct size regulations. For 
example, is the current size limit the best framework for minimizing the amount of blue 
discarded? If not, what alternative size regulation would best meet this biological goal? 
Realistic scenarios were created to provide fishers with information regarding specific size 
limits. The use of scenarios makes it possible to obtain information on drivers of change, 
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possible outcomes of the current system and identification of potential responses (Peterson 
et al. 2003). Previous research, including in other fisheries, has demonstrated that people 
are able to identify with and understand alternative future options through the use of 
scenarios (Cinner et al. 2011; Karper and Lopes 2014; Shaw et al. 2009).  
 
5.2.1 Participants and design 
The reader is referred to chapter three (section 3.2.2) for information on participant 
recruitment and survey design. This section of the survey was piloted on eight fishers 
several months prior to survey launch. One of the questions from the study in chapter four, 
“I do not agree with the slot rule” was also utilized in this study. Several questions on 
regulation knowledge, as well as questions on fishers’ compliance with the daily and size 
limits were also included. The eight questions comprising this study and described below, 
were placed at the end of the larger online survey as an independent study. A total of 421 
fishers completed this study, with 83% of the respondents being male and 43% living in the 
Marlborough region. Age ranged from 20-77 years (M = 54.08, SD = 12.04, Mdn = 55) and 
local fishing experience was between one and 70 years (M = 27.66, SD = 16.66, Mdn = 25). 
Most fishers (88%) owned a boat and 35% of them owned a holiday home in the 
Marlborough Sounds. 
5.2.2 Measures 
Current fishing practices. The first part of the questionnaire gathered information 
about current fishing practices. Fishers were asked to complete the sentence: “Currently, on 
a normal day’s fishing, I discard an average of ____ (number) blue cod”. The next question 
asked them to specify what percentage of the blue cod discarded was due to: a) the 
minimum size rule, b) the maximum size rule, or c) voluntary.  
 
Scenarios. In the second part of the study participants were presented a scenario 
with distinct information about the size rule for the next blue cod fishing season. We 
created three experimental groups depending on the type of scenario depicted and the 
responding fishers were randomly assigned to one of the three. Scenario 1 (n = 147) 
described no change in circumstances for the next season and served as the control 
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condition. Scenario 2 (n = 133) depicted an increase in the maximum size rule (from 35cm to 
40cm). Scenario 3 (n = 141) depicted a stronger change in circumstance with the elimination 
of the maximum size for blue cod. To illustrate, Scenario 2 was presented to participants as 
follows: 
  
Please take a few minutes to envision what the next blue cod season might be like. 
Imagine that the Ministry of Fisheries has decided to increase the maximum size for 
blue cod from 35cm to 40cm by the next season (starting December 2013). You will 
then be allowed to keep two blue cod as long as they are between 30 and 40cm. 
Considering this scenario please answer the questions below. 
 
Discard intentions. After reading the given scenario, participants were asked to 
indicate their discard intentions with three distinct questions: (a) “On a normal day fishing 
my blue cod discards would be…” (b) “I think my forced discards would be…” and (c) “And I 
think my voluntary discards would be…” Participants rated the questions on a 5-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 1 (much lower) to 5 (much higher). 
Fishing satisfaction. After the intention questions, fishers were presented with three 
questions on fishing satisfaction: 1) “I would enjoy fishing for blue cod under this scenario”, 
2) “The majority of recreational fishers would not be happy with this scenario”, and 3) “This 
scenario would be less frustrating than the current season”. Participants rated the questions 
on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
As Levene’s test for normality was not met for three of the questions (voluntary 
discards, fishing enjoyment and other fishers satisfaction), ANOVA was performed using 
Brown-Forsythe and Gabriel’s test was used for post-hoc analyses due to unequal sample 
sizes in each experimental condition (Field 2009). For the number of discards, some 
respondents answered with a range (e.g., 10-20) or a minimum (e.g., 20+), which were 




5.3.1 Current practices 
Out of the 421 fishers who completed the scenario survey, 415 provided answers for 
the average number of blue cod discarded. These fishers reported discarding an average of 
13 blue cod (Range = 0-100, SD = 12.33, Mdn = 10) on a normal day’s fishing. Of these 
discarded blue cod, fishers stated that 53% were because of the minimum size (SD = 24.84), 
39% (SD = 23.80) because of the maximum size, and 8% voluntarily (SD = 18.23). 
A preliminary analysis was carried out in order to eliminate alternative explanations 
for differences between the three experimental groups. Along with the reported number of 
blue cod discarded, two additional questions (fishing experience and knowledge of the 
suggested best practices) from the larger online survey were selected to examine whether 
the experimental groups differed in important ways. The two additional variables were 
chosen as both would likely influence the condition (and thus mortality) in which the fish 
were discarded, the number caught (Bartholomew and Bohnsack 2005; Cooke and Wilde 
2007; Muoneke and Childress 1994) and recall bias concerning the amount of discards 
(Bochenek et al. 2012). No significant differences were found between the three groups 
regarding average blue cod discards F(2,412) = 2.37, p = .09, Marlborough Sounds fishing 
experience F(2, 418) = 2.501, p = .08, and familiarity with the code of practice F(2, 418) = 
2.86, p = .06. The lack of differences meant we could be more confident that the results 
reported below were the effect of the management scenario manipulations. Due to the high 
level of knowledge of the correct minimum and maximum size limits--89% and 94%, 
respectively--these variables were not utilized to test for between-group differences. 
5.3.2 Discard intentions 
We used Wilcoxon one-sample signed rank tests to determine if medians were 
significantly different than the scale middle point of three (no change). Results showed that 
fishers believed that if the size limit was unchanged for the next season (scenario 1) both 
the overall (Mdn = 3; H(146) = 5.06, p<.001, r = 0.30) and regulatory discards (Mdn = 3; 
H(146) = 5.81, p<.001, r = 0.34) would increase, but voluntary discards would stay the same 
(Mdn = 3; H(146) = -0.77, p=0.44). ANOVA tests revealed a statistically significant main effect 




388.54)=118.81, p<.001, ω2=.36; (2) regulatory discards F(2, 408.32)=152.12, p<.001, 
ω2=.42; and (3) voluntary discards F(2, 373.85)=11.11, p<.001, ω2=.05. Post-hoc tests 
showed that the main effect was driven by differences for overall and regulatory discards 
between scenario 1 and scenarios 2 and 3. Although a similar trend was observed for 
voluntary discards, here the overall effect was due to small differences between all three 
scenarios as no post-hoc tests were significant (Fig. 5.1a).  
Fishers felt that both alternative size regulations would result in fewer discards 
compared with the control condition: (a) fishers believed their overall blue cod discards 
would be lower under both scenario 2 (Mdn = 2; H(132)=-8.53, p<.001, r = -0.53) and 3 (Mdn 
= 2; H(140) = -8.07, p<.001, r=-0.48) compared with the current size limit (Mdn = 3); (b) 
fishers believed their regulatory discards would be lower under both scenario 2 (Mdn = 2; 
H(132) = -8.48, p<.001, r = -0.52) and 3 (Mdn = 2; H(140) = -8.96, p<.001, r = -0.53) compared 
with the current size limit (Mdn = 3); and (c) fishers believed their voluntary discards would 
be lower under both scenario two (Mdn = 3; H(132) = -5.70,  p<.001, r = -0.35) and three 
(Mdn = 3; H(140) = -3.99, p<.001, r = -0.24) compared with the current size limit (Mdn =3) 
5.3.3 Fishing satisfaction 
One-sample signed Wilcoxon signed rank tests were also run for the three questions 
on fishing satisfaction using three (no change) as the midpoint. Fishers reported that with 
no change to the size limit (scenario 1) the next blue cod fishing season would be frustrating 
(Mdn = 2; H(146) = -7.22, p<.001, r=-0.42) and not enjoyable (Mdn = 2; H(146) = -5.78, 
p<.001, r = -0.34). They also disagreed that other fishers would be happy with this scenario 
(Mdn = 2; H(146)=-4.86, p<.001, r = -0.28). Analysis revealed a statistically significant main 
effect of experimental condition on all three fishing satisfaction questions: (1) enjoyment 
F(2, 408.97)=128.95, p<.001, ω2=.38; (2) other fishers’ happiness F(2, 412.18)=33.88, p<.001, 
ω2=.14; and (3) frustration F(2, 415.03)=236.19, p<.001, ω2=.53. However, post-hoc tests 
again showed that the only significant differences were between the two alternative 
scenarios and the control scenario (Fig. 5.1b).    
Compared with the current regulations (Mdn = 2), fishers reported that (a) they 
would enjoy blue cod fishing more under a larger maximum size (Mdn = 4; H(132) = 8.03, 
p<.001, r = 49) or no maximum size (Mdn = 4.0; H(140)=8.70,  p<.001, r = 0.52). They also 
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believed other fishers would be happier with either a larger maximum size (Mdn = 4; H(132) 
= 3.78, p<.001, r = 0.23) or no maximum size (Mdn = 4; H(140) = 4.51, p<.001, r = 0.27) than 
under the current size limit (Mdn = 2). Finally, fishers suggested that either a larger 
maximum size (Mdn = 4; H(132) = 9.02, p<.001, r = 0.55) or no maximum size (Mdn = 4; 




Figure 5.1: Changes in (a) discards and (b) fishing satisfaction levels under three experimental size limit scenarios for 
recreational blue cod fishing in the Marlborough Sounds. 
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5.3.4 Influence of discards 
The influence of discards on fishing enjoyment, agreement with the rule and 
compliance with the size limit were explored for all participants across the three scenarios. 
Spearman’s rank order correlations revealed that overall level of discards was negatively 
associated with fishing enjoyment (-0.54) and frustration (-0.67, p≤.01 for both). Similarly, 
the amount of regulatory discards was negatively associated with fishing enjoyment (-0.56) 
and fishing being less frustrating (-0.70, p≤.01 for both). Fishers who felt the alternative 
scenarios would be more satisfying believed they would discard fewer blue cod. 
The number of blue cod discarded on a normal day’s fishing also influenced fishers’ 
agreement with the size limit regulation, H(4)=16.57, p=.002. r=-0.22. Post-hoc analysis, 
using a Bonferroni correction of p=.005, revealed this was due to a difference between only 
two groups. Fishers who agreed (Mdn=10, mean ranking=171.80) reported discarding more 
blue cod than those who strongly disagreed (Mdn=10, mean ranking=232.78, p=.004, z=-
3.52). A fisher’s compliance with the size limit was also influenced by the average number of 
blue cod discarded, Z(417)=-2.40, p=0.16, r=-.12. Fishers who violated the size limit reported 
having to discard more blue cod (Mdn=10, mean rank=232.71) than fishers who complied 
with the regulation (Mdn=10, mean rank=200.71). 
5.4 Discussion 
A major challenge for fisheries management is deciding which of several alternative 
management scenarios will best ensure the sustainability of the fishery (Hilborn and Walters 
1992). Understanding the likely effect of different regulatory scenarios on fishers’ actions 
(such as effort allocation or fish harvesting decisions) is a vital piece of information (Beard et 
al. 2003; Johnston et al. 2010). This study sought to determine which of three different size-
based regulations (current or two alternatives) would best achieve this goal in the 
Marlborough Sounds recreational blue cod fishery using both biological (e.g., number of 
discards) and social (e.g., fishing satisfaction) criteria. It was expected that the two 
alternative scenarios would be more popular with fishers and decrease regulatory discards. 
However, the alternative scenarios would also increase the incentive to high-grade, which 
would be detrimental to the biological goal of sustaining the fishery. Fishers were asked to 
quantify current discards and the reason (too small, too big or voluntary) in order to provide 
a baseline for the scenarios.  
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Given there were over 9000 recreational fishers in the Marlborough Sounds before 
the 2008 ban (Batstone et al. 2009) the number of blue cod discarded is concerning. It is 
worth noting that studies in other fisheries have found that fishers tended to display recall 
bias and overestimated their discards by 2.2-2.4 times (Bochenek et al. 2012; Sullivan 2003); 
with their negative attitude towards the size limit potentially leading them to exaggerate 
their discards. However, even dividing this study’s mean by 2.4 gives an average of 6.5 blue 
cod discarded per fisher/trip; still potentially concerning given the number of fishers. 
Furthermore, overestimation of discards would be the same across all three conditions as 
there were no significant differences between the groups. Finally, the discard figures from 
the charter boat operator presented in the introduction (Humm 2013) add validity to the 
fishers’ claim that the slot rule is resulting in increased discards. Although the maximum size 
limit was implemented to prevent female blue cod from changing sex by leaving large male 
blue cod in the population, the number of blue cod discarded suggests this aim may not be 
fully achieved. If the majority of the released female blue cod do not survive, then they are 
still being removed from the population and in numbers that are potentially comparable or 
greater than if fishers were allowed to keep blue cod larger than 35cm.  
Although blue cod have a high survival rate overall (Carbines 1999b) the level of 
discards may still be a cause for concern as a fish caught on a hook always endures both a 
physical injury as well as physiological stress (Cooke and Sneddon 2007). Additionally, 
exposure to air is also harmful to all fish and is correlated with the time it takes for 
cardiovascular variables to recover; which is crucial for reducing the risk of predation after 
release (Cooke et al. 2002). The amount of time fish are exposed to air has strongly 
influenced post-release mortality in commercial fisheries (Benoît et al. 2010; Parker et al. 
2003). Compared with only a minimum size limit, the small slot requires more time to 
correctly measure the fish. Either of the alternative regulations offers a greater range of 
acceptable sizes, lowering the average measurement time and decreasing the amount of 
time the fish are exposed to air before being thrown back into the water if required. Injured 
and stressed animals emit chemical cues that attract predators (Dallas et al. 2010; Jenkins et 
al. 2004) although post-release predation is an understudied and underappreciated topic 
(Raby et al. 2014). In the Marlborough Sounds, a 1999 study (Carbines 1999b) did not 
investigate post-release predation with a justification that a prior study (Davidson 1995) 
recorded no attacks on released blue cod. However, there are widespread fisher comments 
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(Thomas, unpublished field notes) on increasing levels of shag predation, a demonstrated 
increase in discards, and links between seabird populations and fishery discards (e.g., 
Furness 2003; Oro et al. 1996). We believe post-release predation of blue cod in the 
Marlborough Sounds is a crucial area for further research.  
Furthermore, despite the complaints regarding the maximum size regulation, fishers 
report that the majority (53%) of the blue cod discards were because of the minimum size of 
30cm. This percentage is worrisome since other studies (Davis and Parker 2004; Powell et al. 
2011) have found that the smaller fish were the most likely to die after release. In fact, the 
discarding of juvenile fish likely contributed to the speed of the Newfoundland cod collapse 
(Myers et al. 1997). Carbines (1999b) found that all blue cod that died in a post-release 
mortality study were gut or gill hooked, using a small hook, and were less than 33cm in 
length. We suggest further research on fishing practices, such as hook size, is needed to help 
evaluate the potential biological effects of the current size limit. 
In light of the concerns raised about the survival of the discarded fish, both 
alternative scenarios appear to offer significant gains in this area. As expected, fishers 
believe that under either alternative scenario their overall and forced discards would 
decrease. This finding is in line with their reporting that 40% of the blue cod discarded are 
because of the maximum size, in addition to previous complaints (Marlborough Express 
2012; Simpson 2014) that the current size limit is too restrictive. The lack of significant 
differences between the two scenarios may be the result of fewer large (>40cm) blue cod in 
the population or reflect reporting bias because keeping this sized cod would be in violation 
of the size limit. With these considerations, we would not expect to see much of a 
difference in regulatory discards between these two scenarios.  
It is unsurprising that a continuation of the current size limit would lead to an un-
enjoyable and frustrating fishing season given the high level of discards as well as the 
negative attitude towards the size limit. It appears that the current size limit is not 
effectively minimising the number of blue cod discarded, nor promoting fisher satisfaction 
or compliance with the regulation. This suggests that a different size limit could have 
significant benefits for both the fishery and fishers. It is therefore encouraging that both 
alternative scenarios would increase fisher satisfaction while simultaneously decreasing 
their frustration with the size limit and fishing experience. Respondents also believe other 
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fishers would be happy under the two alternative size limits proposed, another positive 
finding as chapter four showed the strong influence of social norms in driving compliance 
with the size limit.  
Given fisher comments about the ‘stupidity’ of the maximum size (e.g., Moore 2013), 
it is surprising to find no significant differences in fisher attitudes between increasing the 
maximum size to 40cm and eliminating it altogether. One possible explanation is that under 
either alternative scenario, two factors contributing to the current low level of satisfaction 
would be addressed. Firstly, fishers would be allowed to keep larger (>35cm) blue cod that 
must be thrown back under current regulations. As fishers have no dilemma with discarding 
smaller fish, a requirement in most recreational fisheries (Tetzlaff et al. 2013), the number 
of large fish discarded is likely to have a stronger influence on their fishing satisfaction. 
Previous studies (Petering et al. 1995; Schramm and Dennis 1993) have found that for many 
fishers catching and keeping larger fish is more important than the number of fish kept. 
Being able to legally land large blue cod would also decrease the overall number discarded; 
another influence on fisher satisfaction. Finally, it may be that fishers are not currently 
catching many blue cod over 40cm, so not being allowed to keep fish this size would not be 
a major concern nor significantly influence their satisfaction with that scenario.  
We expected that either increasing or eliminating the maximum size would increase 
voluntary discards, as there would be a greater incentive to high-grade. It is surprising that 
fishers reported the opposite—they felt both alternative scenarios would actually decrease 
their voluntary discards. As mentioned above, this may be due to increased satisfaction in 
being able to legally land a 35-40cm sized blue cod. If most fishers were actually happy with 
this size blue cod, now legally landable, then there would be no reason for them to throw it 
back. Furthermore, if fishers do not expect to catch a large fish, they are more likely to keep 
the smaller ones (Chizinski et al. 2014). However, it is worth noting that satisfaction with the 
size limit is not necessarily static and although fishers may initially be satisfied with a 40cm 
fish, this may change. After a season or two fishers may no longer be happy with a 40cm 
maximum size, especially as there is no maximum size elsewhere in New Zealand (Ministry 
of Fisheries 2014b). 
In addition, high-grading may be a sensitive behavior, and therefore some fishers 
may not willingly admit to this practice. As there has yet to be any study of high-grading 
behaviour in recreational fisheries, we suggest that this area is one for future research. 
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More information is needed on both the sensitivity and frequency of high-grading in the 
Marlborough Sounds. As the maximum size limit was designed to protect large female blue 
cod, more information on the potential effect of an increased size limit on the sex ratio is 
also needed. A final area of further research would be changes to the quality, quantity or 
timing of reproduction in blue cod, as observed in other species (Schreck 2010; Schreck et 
al. 2001). For example, changes to the timing of ovulation may reduce the effectiveness of 
the current closed season, which is in place to protect the female blue cod during spawning.  
Our results suggest that increasing the maximum size rule to 40cm for blue cod 
fishery in the Marlborough Sounds, and thus doubling the size of the slot from 5cm to 10cm, 
is worth further consideration as fishers believed it would significantly reduce the number 
of fish discarded as well as increase enjoyment with the fishing experience. Fewer discards 
could also decrease regulation non-compliance, as fishers would be able to legally keep 
larger blue cod, and create a more positive attitude towards the size limit, another potential 
driver of non-compliance. For all three social aspects measured, the 40cm scenario did not 
rate better than the option of no maximum size and is strongly preferred to the current 5cm 
slot. This scenario also offers several advantages in relation to biological goals and current 
compliance rates: 1) Fishers felt this scenario would result in a significant decrease in their 
overall discards and 2) a maximum size limit of 40cm would protect the largest fish and go 
towards preventing a skewed sex ratio and boosting the reproductive potential of the 
population. The size composition of fish currently kept outside of the size limit is unknown 
but would include a proportion of blue cod over 40cm, the large males that the maximum 
size was designed to protect. A 10cm slot would also limit the amount of high-grading that 
could occur, a concern of the Ministry (Marlborough Express 2011).  
5.5 Conclusion 
It has been noted (Hilborn and Walters 1992) that fisher motivations and responses 
are among the most critical aspects of resource management and that fisher behaviour can 
counteract otherwise effective management. As a result, there have been calls for greater 
integration of human behavior into recreational fisheries analyses (Arlinghaus 2004; Post 
and Parkinson 2012). This research demonstrates the potential of scenario-based 
experimental studies in providing information that can be used to design regulations that do 
not result in counterproductive fisher responses. The use of alternative scenarios allows for 
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assessment of fisher support for a regulation prior to implementation; decreasing the 
likelihood of introducing a new regulation that is unpopular with fishers and/or results in a 
high level of non-compliance. Fisheries managers worldwide should consider the potential 
benefits of this technique when considering changes to the regulations 
This method also provides a way of determining how fishers may be affected by new 
regulations, minimizing unexpected behavioral results. Specifically our results demonstrate 
that biological and social goals do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive, and that 
regulations most likely to be accepted by the fishers can also contribute towards the 
biological sustainability of the fishery and lower regulation non-compliance. As there are 
increasing calls for greater fisher participation in the management process, this finding 
provides an example of how fisher preferences do not have to contradict regulations 
suggested by the science. In turn this should help encourage fisheries managers to seek 















The overall aim of this thesis was to explore the human dimensions of the current 
management regime of the recreational blue cod fishery in the Marlborough Sounds, New 
Zealand. Specifically, the studies sought to investigate fisher attitudes and behaviours and 
how these relate to non-compliance within the management regime. Links between the 
current top-down management regime and fisher attitudes and behaviour are drawn; often 
noting how a change in management approach (to a more participatory model) could 
potentially address the issues noted and increase voluntary compliance. Four published or 
publication-oriented studies offer a methodological and/or theoretical contribution to the 
overall aim. Each study has been presented in stand-alone format, but they are all 
connected through three cross-cutting themes: (1) the value of researching fisher attitudes 
and behaviour, (2) rethinking the current top-down management regime, and (3) the need 
for targeted behavioural interventions in response to non-compliance. 
The thesis is multidisciplinary in nature, drawing on disciplines such as psychology, 
natural resource management and the human dimensions of, sociology, compliance theory, 
and fisheries management to meet the aims of each study, and it is hoped that the results 
will help guide future research on the subject, not just in New Zealand, but worldwide. The 
research undertaken is in response to the increased calls for more research on the human-
dimensions aspects of fisheries (Hall-Arber et al. 2009). More broadly, this research 
contributes to the global literature on the necessity of using human behaviour, rather than 
solely biological data, in natural resource management (Balmford and Cowling 2006; Schultz 
2011). Alongside a growing interest in the human dimensions aspect of fisheries research 
has come the recognition that fishers are not one homogeneous group but are 
heterogeneous with different knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour (Hunt et al. 2013). These 
differences present additional challenges for a participatory management strategy, as 
multiple approaches will be needed to address the varied concerns, priorities and influences 
amongst the fishers.  
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to first review the key findings of the 
studies and how they contributed to global literature gaps on this subject. The research was 
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designed to supplement the biological research available to the Ministry of Fisheries and, if 
desired, assist with a forthcoming review of the regulations. To this end the reader is 
reminded of the specific policy recommendations that arose from each study. In 2009 the 
Ministry of Fisheries released their long-term strategic direction and goal in a document 
entitled “Fisheries 2030: New Zealanders maximising benefits from the use of fisheries 
within environmental limits” (Ministry of Fisheries 2009). Relevant goals, strategies and 
principles from this document are included throughout this concluding chapter to 
demonstrate that many of the policy recommendations are aligned with the Ministry’s own 
goals. 
After this review, I present new data obtained during a short presentation of the 
thesis results to fishers. Following this, the four studies are brought together and the three 
important cross cutting themes are further explored. I then offer some personal reflections 
on the research and data collection process. Although this research represents an important 
step in a transition towards a more participatory management process, it has also 
highlighted areas of further research that would be needed to help ensure the success of 
the management regime. To conclude this thesis, I provide several thoughts on the 
importance of the issue and consider what the future holds for this popular fishery.  
6.1 Objectives, major contributions and policy recommendations 
 Each of the four studies made different contributions towards the overall thesis aim 
while also addressing specific knowledge gaps within the literature. The following section 
summarizes the key findings, contributions and policy recommendations of each individual 
study. 
Objective one:  Explore how factors such as fishing experience, region of residency, effect of 
regulations on fishing habits and participation in the management process influence fisher 
knowledge of and satisfaction with regulations. 
Chapter two (published as Thomas et al., 2014b) addressed this first objective using 
an intercept survey of 311 fishers and focused on the transit rule (i.e., if in the Marlborough 
Sounds all blue cod in fishers’ possession must meet specific size and catch limits) and the 
filleting rule (i.e., blue cod not be filleted at sea), as both regulations are unique to the 
Marlborough Sounds recreational blue cod fishery. Ten questions were used to assess 
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fishers’ knowledge of and agreement with these two regulations and their participation in 
the management regime. Seven potential influences on fishers’ overall satisfaction were 
also explored: residency, local fishing experience, regulation influence on fishing practices, 
satisfaction with the fishery, agreement with the two regulations, and perceptions on 
participation in the management process.  
Residency, local fishing experience, regulation influence on fishing practices, and 
agreement with the transit rule all demonstrated significant effects on overall satisfaction. 
Locally resident and more inexperienced fishers were more likely to be satisfied with the 
regulations as were fishers who did not report a large influence on their fishing habits and 
agreed with the transit rule. Agreement with the two specific rules studied were opposite, 
with the majority disagreeing with the transit rule but agreeing with the filleting rule. 
Overall knowledge of the two regulations researched was high but a greater awareness of 
the filleting rule reinforces cautions (Sullivan 2002) that more complex rules are likely to 
result in lower levels of knowledge. Region of residency has previously been shown to 
positively affect regulation knowledge (Page and Radomski 2006; Schill and Kline 1995) but 
this study found it did not increase knowledge of the transit rule.  
On the subject of participation, only half of the fishers had heard of the Blue Cod 
Management Group (BCMG), currently the only official forum for fisher participation, and it 
did not affect their overall satisfaction with the regulations. Involvement in the decision-
making process is a component of successful fisheries (e.g., Jentoft et al. 1998) and the 
ongoing acrimonious relationships between fishers and managers are often linked to 
disempowerment of local stakeholders (Bavington 2002); suggesting this is an area of 
concern for the fishery.  
Although there have been several studies examining recreational fisher attitudes and 
knowledge (Brouwer et al. 1997; Page and Radomski 2006; Pierce and Tomcko 1998; Powell 
et al. 2010; Sauer et al. 1997), the majority of research has been in commercial fisheries 
(Foster and Vincent 2010; Pita et al. 2013; Richardson et al. 2005). Assessing the potential 
effect of a regulation on fishing habits could assist fisheries management in designing 
regulations that are more widely accepted. Understanding not only how fishers view the 
regulations, but also what influences those attitudes, provides useful information in 
designing widely accepted regulations. As attitude towards a regulation can influence 
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behaviour (Ajzen 1991), this knowledge could help minimize regulation non-compliance. 
Addressing the reasons for fisher attitudes can also assist in minimizing non-compliance by 
allowing for more targeted behavioural interventions. 
The results from this study lead to two key policy recommendations. First, the low 
level of knowledge surrounding the BCMG and its role demonstrate the need for more 
familiarity among fishers. As this group is currently the only official form of fisher 
participation, increasing awareness of the BCMG’s existence and role could benefit the 
legitimacy of the management regime. Second, a re-evaluation of the governance structure 
is suggested. The current level of participation does not appear to be satisfactory for the 
majority of fishers given the negative attitudes and unprompted comments. Pita et al. 
(2010) caution that participation alone is not enough and that the nature of participation 
can have significant influences. In the Marlborough Sounds, fisher comments supported this 
view, as many believed previous efforts to include them in the process had been “token” 
and the outcomes were “pre-determined”. The study’s findings suggest that effective 
participation is an ongoing process that does not stop with regulation implementation.   
Furthermore, effective participation needs to take into account the differences in 
fisher knowledge of and agreement with the regulations. Until recently, the BCMG was 
composed entirely of fishers from the Marlborough/Nelson region. The lack of members 
from another region, especially Wellington or Canterbury, could be problematic. There have 
even been complaints that Nelson was over-represented on the committee, meaning that 
these fishers did not view the one official forum for participation as representative. 
Similarly, the committee has been composed of more experienced fishers. The results of the 
study demonstrate that regulation agreement can be strongly influenced by fishing 
experience; so managers would benefit from considering when including fishers in the 
management process. 
 
6.1.2. Objective two: Compare the effectiveness of the randomised response technique, 
item count technique and direct questioning in estimating non-compliance with the 




There is a growing call for more accurate information on illegal resource use 
(Wellsmith 2011), particularly on the extent of use (Smith et al. 1989). Better information on 
resource use is necessary since a resource management strategy based on only best 
estimates of use is not guaranteed to be sustainable (Milner-Gulland et al. 2010). Objective 
two, recently published in Biological Conservation (Thomas et al. 2014a), addressed this 
issue through an online survey of 320 fishers, detailed in chapter three. The three 
regulations examined were the daily and size limits for blue cod and the nearby Long Island 
Marine Reserve. Compliance with each regulation was asked using direct questioning (DQ) 
and two indirect techniques: Item Count (ICT) and Randomized Response (RRT). 
 The first key result was that no one method provided the highest (and most 
accurate) estimate of non-compliance for all three different of the regulations studied. For 
the daily limit and marine reserve there was no difference between the three methods, but 
for the size limit RRT provided a significantly higher estimate than both ICT and DQ. The 
higher estimate from RRT (versus DQ) was consistent with most of the literature on this 
subject (e.g., Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b; Solomon et al. 2007). Conversely, a lower 
estimate for ICT than for RRT was contrary to a previous study (Coutts and Jann 2011). Also 
opposite to previous findings (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010b; Lavender and Anderson 2009) 
was that direct questioning provided a higher estimate than ICT for the size limit.  
Of the three regulations studied, the largest number (42%) of fishers violated the 
size limit in 2012; although it is likely to still be an underestimate as some people will not 
answer honestly under any method (van der Heijden et al. 2000). As even low levels (i.e., 
10%) of non-compliance can undermine the effectiveness of a regulation (Gigliotti and 
Taylor 1990; Sethi and Hilborn 2008), this percentage is concerning. Given limited budgets 
for natural resource management, identifying the most frequently violated regulations is a 
crucial first step in addressing regulation non-compliance. Based on the estimates from this 
study, addressing non-compliance with the size limit should be prioritized. Conversely, the 
lack of fishing within the marine reserve is a very positive result as blue cod eggs and larvae 
can be dispersed by the strong currents and tides in the Marlborough Sounds (Henderson 
2009). Large female blue cod living within the marine reserve boundary have the potential 
to contribute to the overall blue cod population in the Sounds. 
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 The main contributions of this study were methodological. First, the version of ICT 
used, previously tested only once (Droitcour et al. 1991), cut the associated standard error 
in half making it more comparable to that of RRT. Second, the current study was also the 
first to test the paired-alternative version of RRT against ICT. Two previous online studies 
(Coutts and Jann 2011; Holbrook and Krosnick 2010b) used a different version of RRT that 
led to negative estimates; something that was not possible using the paired-alternative 
format. Finally, the two previous comparison studies (Coutts and Jann 2011; Wimbush and 
Dalton 1997) used different sample populations. In using the same sample population for 
this study, any potential confounding factors were eliminated so that the observed 
differences are in fact due to the different technique. However, it should be noted that the 
question order did not vary between respondents, meaning order effects are possible. 
Nonetheless, I believe the use of a single sample population to compare the three methods 
is important. 
 Within the wider literature on estimating sensitive behaviour, this study also 
addresses a gap on the influence of factors such as data collection method, method version, 
behaviour subject and sensitivity (Tsuchiya et al. 2007). The results show that the most 
effective technique for estimating non-compliance depends on several factors including 
question sensitivity, frequency of the behaviour and survey mode. In fact, an indirect 
technique will not always be needed as direct questioning may suffice. Even if an indirect 
method is needed, similar considerations should be made to determine whether RRT or ICT 
would provide the highest estimates. Although the divergent findings of previous studies 
have hinted at no one technique being the most effective in all situations, this study is 
perhaps the first to conclusively support this suggestion. 
 On a more practical level, the results have value for not just fisheries managers, but 
also natural resource managers worldwide. Accurately estimating regulation non-
compliance is a difficult challenge for managers and this study offers insights into how they 
might obtain this data. In the face of conflicting results between studies, knowledge of how 
to choose the best/most appropriate method is important. Consideration of variables such 
as survey mode and question sensitivity can aid natural resource managers in choosing the 
method that will maximize honest answering. The finding that an indirect method is not 
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always needed is especially important as direct questioning is the most straightforward 
method and has the lowest standard error. 
 
6.1.3. Objective three: Test alternative models of drivers of non-compliance with the daily 
and size limits and identify the largest influences on a fisher’s compliance behaviour.  
 Sufficient resources to enforce regulations are often limited (Keane et al. 2008), 
making it critical to increase voluntary compliance (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Stern 2008). 
In order to effectively address non-compliance this way, fishery managers need to 
understand the drivers behind rule-breaking behaviour (Gavin et al. 2009). The study 
detailed in chapter four is in response to this pressing need to understand compliance 
behaviour (Fenichel et al. 2013; Hunt et al. 2013) especially in recreational fisheries where 
there has been almost no research on this subject. Structural equation modeling was used 
to test seven alternative models that included 16 factors from disciplines including fisheries, 
psychology and natural resource management. The models included a pro-environmental 
behaviour from a meta-analysis (Bamberg and Möser 2007), the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen 1991), an instrumental model of compliance (Becker 1968), and a model of 
four normative factors affecting the legitimacy of the management regime (Tyler 1990).  
 The major finding was that under the best-fitting model for both regulations, social 
norms have the largest influence on a fisher’s decision to comply. Even though social norms 
have been found to have some influence in commercial fisheries (Jagers et al. 2012; Kuperan 
and Sutinen 1998), economic drivers are usually more important (e.g., Hatcher and Gordon 
2005; Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003). In addition to the injunctive social norm usually 
considered, this research also included the descriptive social norm; another strong 
behavioural influence (Cialdini 2007; Cialdini et al. 1990). The relative contribution of the 
two types of norms differed; descriptive social norms were more important for the daily 
limit but injunctive social norms had a stronger influence on compliance with the size limit. 
Increasing enforcement efforts would not be the most effective strategy for this 
fishery and instead the focus could be on influencing the social norms through targeted 
behavioural interventions. The low levels of agreement for many of the factors (for both 
regulations) suggest the overall legitimacy of the management regime may be weak, 
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negatively influencing the social norms. If this is true then a typical (Hønneland 1999; 
Nielsen 2003) response of increasing the reliance on instrumental factors could have 
negative consequences. Instead of lowering non-compliance, it could increase the already-
strained relationship between the Ministry and fishers, potentially leading to stronger 
and/or more prevalent negative attitudes and more frequent violations—a so-called vicious 
circle (Jentoft and Mikalsen 2004). 
 Although there is extensive literature on compliance in fisheries (Hatcher et al. 2000; 
Hønneland 1998; King and Sutinen 2010; Sutinen et al. 1990), the majority is descriptive. To 
my knowledge, the current study is the first to utilize structural equation modeling to test 
alternative models against each other. An advantage of this method is being able to 
compare multiple models for fit and explanatory power to determine which one best 
explains the behaviour in question. It also allows easy identification of the significant 
behavioural drivers and their relative importance, including both direct and indirect effects. 
SEM provides a more robust approach to understanding compliance behaviour than looking 
at potential drivers individually. As with the previous objective, not only fisheries managers 
but natural resource managers worldwide could benefit from this method.   
Additionally, the role of recreational fisheries in the world’s fishing crisis (Cooke and 
Cowx 2004) is becoming more widely recognized. Yet outside of the current study the only 
driver of non-compliance formally tested is outside a commercial or artisanal fishery is 
knowledge of the regulations. Given the low influence of economic factors for recreational 
fishers, understanding why fishers break the rules is crucial for successful management of 
these fisheries.  
 As previously alluded to, the main policy recommendation is to increase voluntary 
compliance with the regulations, primarily through the use behavioural interventions 
targeting the two social norms. A shift in the management strategy from one biologically 
based, with little consideration of fisher attitudes towards a more inclusive and 
participatory strategy could help accomplish this goal. Given the large area of the 
Marlborough Sounds and large numbers of fishers, complete reliance on enforcement is not 
feasible, making this policy recommendation both practical and financially sound. 
Furthermore, the Ministry has also noted optimizing the level of voluntary compliance as 
one of the actions to reach their objective of “ensuring fisheries management system 
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integrity” (Ministry of Fisheries 2009, p. 10). Increasing the legitimacy of the management 
regime should in turn influence social norms as fishers are less likely to approve of 
regulation violations if the management regime is regarded as legitimate (Tyler 1990). 
 
6.1.4. Objective four: Evaluate the potential for improving compliance with the size limit 
through minimizing discards and maximising fisher satisfaction.  
 The effectiveness of length-based limits is dependent on any discarded fish surviving, 
recovering quickly and not experiencing long-term sub-lethal impairments (Broadhurst et al. 
2005; Muoneke and Childress 1994; Waters and Huntsman 1986). In the Marlborough 
Sounds, the introduction of the maximum size has significantly increased the number of 
discarded blue cod (Humm 2013; Moore 2012) leading to growing fisher frustration and calls 
to either raise or eliminate the maximum size. However, fishers may also voluntarily discard 
a fish to maximise the size of their catch, called ‘high-grading’ (Kristofersson and Rickertsen 
2009). A section of the online survey sought to evaluate changes to discards using a 
scenario-based approach (chapter five, under review in ICES Journal of Marine Science). 
 Responding fishers were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups 
that each described a different scenario for the size limit: (1) no change in the regulations 
for the next season (the control condition), (2) an increase in the maximum size limit (from 
35cm to 40cm) and (3) the elimination of the maximum size for blue cod. The influence of 
the amount of discards on fisher’s satisfaction within these scenarios, as well as on 
regulation agreement and compliance, was also explored. 
Fishers reported discarding 10 blue cod on a normal fishing trip, 53% because of the 
minimum size, 39% because of the maximum size and 8% voluntarily. Regardless of gear 
type and handling practices, a caught fish is subject to some stress and injury (Cooke and 
Sneddon 2007). Similarly, exposure to air is harmful to fish, influencing post-release 
mortality (Benoît et al. 2010) and recovery time crucial to reducing the risk of post-release 
predation (Cooke et al. 2002). Shag predation on the discarded blue cod appears to be 
increasing in frequency and intensity (Thomas, unpublished field notes) and studies in 
commercial fisheries (Blaber and Wassenberg 1989; Votier et al. 2004) have shown that 
seabirds often modify their feeding habits and diets to exploit this easy source of food 
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allowing greater breeding success and increased populations (Arcos and Oro 2002; Furness 
et al. 2007; Tavecchia et al. 2007).  
 Predicting how fishers are likely to behave under new regulations is normally not 
known and is an important area of enquiry (Fulton et al. 2011; Hunt et al. 2013). Scenario 
results showed there was no statistically significant difference in satisfaction with the fishing 
between a larger slot and no maximum size. Fishers also reported that both alternative 
scenarios would significantly lower their discards and be less frustrating compared with the 
current size limit. As a regulation’s effect on fishing habits can influence both a fisher’s 
attitude (Thomas et al. 2014b) and compliance (Sutinen et al. 1990), these are positive 
findings. The discarding of blue cod was also found to have a significant effect on three 
other important factors. For the three scenarios combined, the number of discards 
negatively influenced satisfaction with the fishing. Higher levels of satisfaction corresponded 
to a lower number of discards, consistent with a previous study (Thomas et al. 2014b; Wilde 
and Ditton 1999) showing that fisher support for a regulation is strongly based on how it 
affects their fishing experience. Fishers’ agreement with the size limit was also influenced by 
the amount of blue cod they had to discard. Finally, the level of discards directly influenced 
slot rule compliance as fishers who had violated the rule were found to have a significantly 
higher amount of discards. Therefore in addition to minimizing the potential for post-
release mortality and predation, decreasing the number of blue cod discarded would also 
have several positive social influences on the sustainability of the fishery. 
 Even though catch-and-release mortality in recreational fisheries has been well 
researched (Bartholomew and Bohnsack 2005; Muoneke and Childress 1994), the influence 
of discard levels is largely unknown. A previous study (Bochenek et al. 2010) found that 
being forced to discard greater numbers of fish negatively influenced fisher satisfaction, 
although satisfaction was measured as the number of fish landed. The amount and size of 
blue cod kept is not the most important outcome in the Marlborough Sounds (Batstone et 
al. 2009) and the main fisher complaint has been over the number discarded (Thomas et al. 
2014b). However, the correlation between discards and regulation compliance has not 
previously explored. Our finding that fishers who broke the slot rule discarded greater 
numbers of blue cod has important implications for the successful management of the 
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fishery as enhancing voluntary compliance is crucial to establishing a legitimate 
management regime that does not rely on enforcement.  
Even though the study fishery is the only one in New Zealand to have a maximum 
size, slot length limits are used in other countries including Australia (Koehn and Todd 2012) 
and the United States (Page and Radomski 2006). The results of the current study suggest 
managers exercise caution when setting length limits to ensure they are not too restrictive. 
 Although biological concerns need to be taken into account, forcing fishers to discard 
too many fish may end up undermining the regulation aims. However, it is worth noting that 
the high level of fisher support for an increased maximum size demonstrates that social 
considerations do not necessarily have to conflict with the regulations suggested by the 
biological data. The finding also backs up previous calls in the thesis for increased fisher 
participation in the management process. 
Based on the results of this study, the Ministry could consider increasing the 
maximum size for blue cod to 40cm. The current level of discards may not be sustainable, 
especially given the lack of information on post-release predation and fisher practices such 
as hook size and type used. The high level of discards is also partly responsible for negative 
attitudes towards the regulation itself and fishing enjoyment. In turn, these are likely to be 
encouraging non-compliance, potentially undermining the effectiveness of the regulation. 
As a 10cm slot would result in higher levels of fishing satisfaction and regulation agreement 
through lower levels of discards (a biological concern) and provide less incentive to high-
grade than no maximum size. A larger slot would also still leave large male blue cod to 
suppress female sex change. Taking a more adaptive management approach and listening to 
fisher feedback could also improve the overall relationship between the Ministry and 
fishers. Notably it would also meet two stated actions (Ministry of Fisheries 2009) to 
“optimize the level of voluntary compliance” (p. 10), “review fisheries laws and regulations 
with a view to reducing compliance costs and improving effectiveness” (p. 8) and apply a 
“precautionary approach” (p. 12). 
6.2 Presentation of Results 
 The literature (e.g., Cho and Trent 2006; Torrance 2012) cautions that reliance on 
only a single method of data interpretation will not allow the most comprehensive or valid 
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account of the issue under study. Stakeholder engagement is an important method of 
overcoming this limitation (Christ, 2009; Mertens et al. 2010), and member 
checks/respondent validation is a common approach. Under this process research 
participants have a chance to verify the accuracy and explanation of the data and offer 
reactions, ensuring interpretations are a “fair and reasonable reflection” (Torrance 2012, 
p.4). Lincoln and Guda (1985) have argued this technique is the most important one in 
terms of establishing credibility of the results. The chance to provide feedback and 
involvement in the dissemination of findings can also benefit the stakeholders themselves 
by affecting their knowledge and behaviour (Phillipson et al. 2012). My positionality as a 
non-Marlborough resident and non-fishing scientist also underlines the importance of this 
step. 
Therefore in June of 2014 I returned to the Marlborough Sounds to present the 
results of my research to the fishers. The presentation was advertised via flyers around 
Picton and Havelock, emails to fishers previously interviewed and the local fishing club. The 
region’s newspaper also ran two articles: the first provided a few ‘interesting’ results and 
mentioned a presentation would be held in the upcoming weeks, and a second short one 
announced the date, venue and time. An overview of the results of all four studies was 
presented although the focus was on practical (e.g., the number of blue cod discarded) 
instead of methodological (e.g., the effectiveness of the three different methods for 
estimating non-compliance) contributions. These subjects were more likely to be of interest 
to the fishers and also allowed them to provide feedback. 
Unfortunately, turnout was extremely low with only seven people attending, 
including one married couple. Attendees were asked to fill out a short survey at the end of 
the presentation (Appendix 11) to provide feedback on the perceived usefulness of the 
research and their priorities going forward. There were four questions answered on a 5-
point Likert-type scale (anchored by 1=strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree), four open 
ended questions on the results, and an opportunity for final comments. The couple had 
similar views so filled out one questionnaire between them, giving a total of six completed 
questionnaires. Despite this low number and the probable bias in attendance, the answers 
still provide useful information for the next stage of this research (i.e., a report for the 
Ministry of Fisheries). 
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 Overall, fishers (n=6) were very happy there was research into what they thought of 
the rules (Mdn = 5, range = 4 to 5), strongly agreed the research was important (Mdn = 5, 
range = 4-5) and found the presentation informative (Mdn = 4.5, range = 4-5). However, 
they disagreed that the Ministry would take any of the results into consideration (Mdn = 2, 
range = 1-3). On the question of which regulation they would most liked changed, all fishers 
(n=6) answered the size limit. Four attendees also believed the size limit was the most 
important regulation to change, although one fisher answered the transit rule. Another 
question asked what three results they would most like to be communicated to the 
Ministry. The responses were mixed overall, but three of the fishers wanted the maximum 
size limit removed and one wanted it changed to 30-40cm (in response to the results of 
chapter five). Similarly, three fishers wanted an increased minimum size and two gave an 
answer relating to greater use of the research and fisher’s knowledge.  
 Attendees were also asked what they thought the most interesting result was from 
the presentation. Although one fisher said there was nothing new learned, three answers 
concerned non-compliance (e.g., high level for the daily limit), one mentioned that the data 
support anecdotal knowledge about the ratio of discarded blue to those kept and the final 
answer was that many fishers would find a larger slot acceptable. Finally, there was a 
question on which result they thought was the most important. Two of the comments were 
on the high level of discards and another that the BCMG was not necessarily a public 
interface. Two fishers took away opposite messages from the results on fisher preference 
regarding the size limit scenarios (chapter five): one attendee answered “the fact that in a 
short time so many people have accepted the slot rule and would retain it in a modified 
version” and the other answered “agreement to change slot rule to maximum size only”. 
Finally, comments on the last question were “good job”, “appreciate scientific and impartial 
input”, “thoroughly researched and well-presented”, “local knowledge has validity and slot 
rule useless, “the cod fishery in the Sounds is completely stuffed”, and “more information 
(from the Ministry) to the public on the actual results of the surveys”. 
6.3 Cross-cutting themes 
Throughout the discussion on the contribution and policy implications (Table 6.1) of 
the four studies that comprise the thesis, three themes show up throughout the different 
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studies: (1) value of researching fisher attitudes and behaviour, (2) the current top-down 
management strategy should be rethought and (3) the need for targeted behavioural 
interventions in response to non-compliance. Studies have called for a greater integration of 
human behaviour into recreational fisheries analysis (Fulton et al. 2011; Larkin 1978; Post 
and Parkinson 2012) and together the three themes reaffirm this need. A human 
dimensions approach to fisheries management could minimize regulation non-compliance 
and help ensure the sustainability of the fishery. 
Table 6.1: Summary of policy recommendations for the Marlborough Sounds recreational blue cod fishery. 
 
Policy recommendation Study Ministerial  
Increase awareness of Blue Cod 
Management Group and their role 
 Study one 
(6.1.1), chapter 
two 
Objective 11, Build sector 
leadership: “Improve 
communication across the sector” 
(p. 10). 





Principle, Best available 
information: “Decisions need to be 
made on the best available and 
credible biological, social and 
cultural information from a range 
of sources” (p. 12). 
Prioritize addressing non-





Objective 5: “Ensure sustainability 
of fish stocks” (p. 9). 
Increase voluntary compliance  Study three 
(6.1.3), chapter 
four 
Objective 14: Ensure management 
system integrity: “Action=optimise 
the level of voluntary compliance 
with fisheries laws and 
standards…” (p. 10). 
Behavioural interventions to 
target both injunctive and 




Principle, Effective management 
and services:  “Use least cost-policy 
tools to achieve objectives where 
intervention is necessary and 
ensure services are delivered 
efficiently” (p. 12). 
Consider increasing the maximum 




Objective 2, Cost-effective 
management and services: 
“Action=Review fisheries laws and 
regulations with a view to reducing 
compliance costs and improving 
effectiveness” (p.8). 
 
The associated study and relevant principle or objective from the Ministry of Fisheries’ report “Fisheries 2030”,         
are also included 
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6.3.1 The value of researching fisher attitudes and behaviour 
The thesis results demonstrate how a greater understanding of fisher attitudes and 
behaviour can significantly assist with an effective management regime and lower non-
compliance; an important area of study (Fulton et al. 2011; Hunt et al. 2013). These 
potential benefits were first apparent in chapter two where the intercept survey showed 
how fisher attitudes varied between groups of fishers, depending on experience and area of 
residency (Thomas et al. 2014b). The results also reinforced a growing realization (Hunt et 
al. 2013; Oh et al. 2005) that fishers are not a homogenous group. Nonetheless, 
management strategies are often aimed at the ‘average fisher’ who, in reality, may not 
exist. In evaluating potential regulation changes, fishery managers should aim for 
comprehensive consultation across a broad range of fishers. The use of scenarios can 
provide an opportunity to learn how the proposed changes could affect the fishing 
experience for the different groups of fishers. Even though one group of fishers may be 
accepting of a proposed regulation, another group may be negatively influenced, such as 
not being able to catch their daily limit. Poor consideration of these differences may create 
feelings of resentment towards the management, which can lead to regulation non-
compliance (Robbins et al. 2006). 
 Fishers’ rule-breaking behaviour is important to understand, as it is the leading cause 
of management failures (Boonstra and Bach Dang 2010), but difficult to research due to its 
potential sensitivity. However, knowing the extent of regulation compliance can assist 
fisheries managers in evaluating the effectiveness of a regulation, as high levels of violations 
may be indicative of a lack of fisher support and/or suggest practical difficulties in complying 
with the regulation (Hønneland 1999). Understanding fishers’ attitudes may provide 
information useful to determining the most effective approach to estimating non-
compliance. For example, chapter three (Thomas et al. 2014a) demonstrated that behaviour 
frequency and sensitivity should be considered in method selection. Instead of assuming 
rule-breaking behaviour is sensitive for all regulations, greater insight into fisher attitudes 
may show that assumption to be invalid. For example, non-compliance with one or more 
regulations may be an everyday topic of discussion among many fishers. Knowing this a 
researcher may decide that direct questioning, which has the smallest standard error, is the 
most appropriate method to estimate non-compliance. 
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Without taking into account the reasons behind fishers’ rule-breaking behaviour the 
response to non-compliance would consist of strengthening enforcement efforts and/or 
increasing penalties. Given the large area of the Marlborough Sounds it is not financially or 
practically feasible to regularly patrol the entire fishery. Increased intercepts at the marinas 
would also not be fully effective as fishers with holiday homes do not have to return to 
marinas at the end of the day. However, even if it was possible to increase deterrence 
efforts to a much higher level, it is unlikely to significantly lower non-compliance. The best 
fitting compliance models (chapter four) revealed that even if factors such as probability of 
detection and the penalty if convicted had a significant influence on a fisher’s compliance 
decision, the effect was minimal. If enforcement efforts were increased without addressing 
the normative reasons behind the violations, especially social norms, there would be a 
potentially minimal change at a high cost. But in order to increase voluntary compliance, a 
strategic action for the Ministry (Ministry of Fisheries 2009), fisher attitudes and behaviour 
must first be known.  
Fisher behaviour under new regulations is a large source of uncertainty (Fulton et al. 
2011) but is vital as it can determine the effectiveness of the regulation. Investigation into 
fisher attitudes towards the regulations and the influences can provide insight into these 
information requirements. Importantly, it can also limit the amount of assumptions made, 
something that fisheries managers should reduce (Enck and Decker 1997). The influence of 
the amount of discards on fishing satisfaction, regulation agreement and compliance 
demonstrates the value of human dimensions research. Reducing the number of discarded 
fish is important for the fishery in biological terms, but the potential to increase fisher 
satisfaction at the same time makes re-evaluation of the size limit even more critical. Even 
though it would be hypothesized that fishers do not like having to throw back fish, it is 
significant that this behaviour significantly influenced their agreement and compliance with 
the size limit.  
Research into fisher attitude and behaviour can lead to a greater understanding of 
why fishers may agree or disagree with a regulation. If it is known prior to regulation 
implementation that an increase in discards is likely to lead to lower levels of support and 
compliance, alternatives can be sought. Rather than presupposing a regulation will work 
and/or have fisher support, it would be more beneficial to utilize human dimensions 
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research to test this assumption. Once a management regime is in place, information on 
fisher attitudes and behaviour is still necessary to fully evaluate the success of the 
regulations. Even though the biological goals may be met, negative fisher attitudes may 
reveal a lack of support. In the long-term the odds of a successful management strategy are 
greatly increased if the fishers are satisfied. 
  
6.3.2 The current top-down management regime should be rethought 
The literature warns that a management regime that relies on biology whilst 
neglecting the human dimensions risks failure (Granek et al. 2008; Jentoft and McCay 1995; 
McGoodwin 2006). In the introduction to the thesis it was noted that fisheries researchers 
now contend that fisher participation is a necessary component of the management process 
(Hilborn 2007a, b; Jentoft 2000; Jentoft et al. 1998; Kaplan and McCay 2004), especially in 
way that the fishers perceive as meaningful (Plinkerton 1989). There is also a need for 
greater engagement, transparency and research into fisher behaviour that can undermine 
regulation effectiveness (Fulton et al. 2011). So far the management strategy for the 
Marlborough Sounds recreational blue cod fishery has been top-down and biologically 
focused, but the consequences of that approach were unknown prior to the research 
conducted for this thesis. The results of the thesis demonstrate high levels of non-
compliance, especially with the size limit, and low levels of satisfaction and fisher-perceived 
participation. As the prospects for successful management increase if user groups influence 
the design of rules and management procedures (Robbins et al. 2006) a shift in the current 
management regime would be beneficial. The negative attitudes also suggest that, for the 
Marlborough Sounds recreational blue cod fishery, the Ministry may not be meeting their 
governance condition of public trust in the “effectiveness and integrity” of the management 
(Ministry of Fisheries 2009, p. 6). 
 How do fishers react to a regulatory regime they perceive is not in their best 
interest? According to Hirschman (1975) there are two potential responses to this question: 
(1) “exit”,  resulting in regulation non-compliance, and (2) “voice”,  where stakeholders carry 
their frustrations to a public forum. Overall the present thesis provides evidence for both 
types of response. First, this thesis has provided evidence of high rates of regulation non-
compliance (Thomas et al. 2014a). Second and under the other strategy, fishers seek to 
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influence the management process by gaining support for their criticisms, either publicly 
(e.g., newspapers) or directly to the managers or courts (Jentoft 2000). The current 
management strategy has been a focus and the subject of regular letters-to-the-editor in 
regional newspapers since 2011 (when the fishery reopened). Fishers have used the latter to 
air their complaints with the regulations, the lack of participation and consideration of fisher 
feedback. 
The intercept survey detailed in chapter two found that half of the fishers were not 
even aware of the one official medium for fisher participation (i.e., the BCMG). 
Furthermore, many of the fishers that had heard of the group only knew the name and were 
unclear as to the BCMG’s purpose. Numerous fishers used the survey as an opportunity to 
express their frustrations with the regulations and their lack of perceived effectiveness 
(which was included on the online survey). A common lament was that in complying with 
the size limit more damage was actually being done to the fishery, compared with non-
compliance. Feedback to the Ministry on this subject has been ongoing but a review of the 
regulation has been continually pushed back (Bell 2014b), reflecting the Ministry’s 
conflicting view on the size limit’s effectiveness. 
In addition to the high rates of non-compliance with the two main blue cod 
regulations (i.e., daily and size limits for blue cod), chapter three also demonstrated a lack of 
fishing in the community established Long Island Marine Reserve. As non-compliance in this 
area would be relatively easy with large potential gains, the acceptance of the marine 
reserve suggests that participation in the process is likely to be a key factor. Additionally, the 
study on the drivers of non-compliance (chapter four) showed that social norms, rather than 
instrumental factors, are the largest influence on a fisher’s compliance behaviour with the 
size and daily limits. Fishers are more likely to comply with regulations implemented by a 
legitimate management regime (Tyler 1990), and should be provided with a greater role in 
the process to facilitate voluntary compliance. During semi-structured interviews, one fisher 
mentioned that non-compliance occurs for this reason, that regulation violations are a way 
to send a message to the Ministry (Thomas, unpublished field notes).  
Not all forms of representation will be viewed as legitimate (Jentoft 2000) and the 
nature of fisher involvement is also important (Pita et al. 2010), as nominal participation is 
unlikely to suffice. Furthermore, for a participatory strategy to be truly effective fisher 
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participation should be continual (Thomas et al. 2014b). In the case of the study fishery, it 
appears that efforts to include fishers (although perceived as token and minimal by many 
fishers) largely stopped after the introduction of the new regulations. Instead the Ministry 
has repeatedly expressed their commitment to managing on the basis of scientific 
information on the biological aspect of the fishery (Moore 2012) and has paid little attention 
to fisher feedback and the human dimensions of the fishery.  
Fishers’ knowledge appears to be largely ignored under the current management 
strategy, further limiting their participation. In fact, the reluctance of the Ministry to listen 
to fisher feedback was the most frequent complaint throughout the course of this research. 
Fishers’ ecological knowledge can offer valuable information to complement, extend, refine 
or initiate collection of scientific data (Carr 2004; Jentoft et al. 1998; Johannes et al. 2000). 
In ignoring fishers’ knowledge, the government risks further alienating these stakeholders. 
As a result the potential effectiveness of a regulation can be lowered, undermining the 
legitimacy of the management regime.  
Involving fishers and listening to their feedback can decrease non-compliance (e.g., 
Jentoft and McCay 1995) so fisheries managers would do well to utilise this information 
(Mackinson et al. 2011). The Ministry carries out biological surveys every three years but 
fishers could provide valuable information about the state of the fishery between those 
reports, potentially through community science; or “the interaction between conventional 
(university/agency/industry) and community-based scientific knowledge system used in a 
particular place to discover, map, model, or measure changes in species number and/or 
behaviour” (Carr 2004 p.843). For example, fishers have a better idea of how many blue cod 
are being discarded because of the size limit, as well as the fate of these fish. Regular fishers 
could also provide feedback on the relative abundance of both juvenile and large (above 
40cm) blue cod, both key areas of concern for the ongoing sustainability of the fishery. In 
addition to providing scientific data, fisher involvement in community science can also 
repair relationships with and rebuild trust in the management and scientists (Carr 2004). 
Given the current level of distrust towards the Ministry and frustration over their apparent 
reluctance consider fisher feedback on the regulations, this would be an important benefit 
to increased fisher participation. 
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Differences between the institutional scientific knowledge and fisher’s ecological 
knowledge can be a source of conflict and when that institutional knowledge is used as the 
basis for a regulation the potential for non-compliance increases. For example, some of the 
fishers interviewed admitted to violating the size limit as they felt it was harming the fishery 
by continually throwing back fish in order to catch two within the slot. They did not want to 
break the rule but could not reconcile the discards with the future of the fishery. One fisher 
highlights this issue when suggesting the new regulations ‘have made criminals out of them 
(fishers)’. As the Ministry defines “best available information” as “decisions need to be 
based on the best available and credible biological, economic, social and cultural 
information from a range of sources” (Ministry of Fisheries 2009, p. 12) I believe there is 
already a case for greater inclusion of fisher knowledge. 
What might greater fisher participation in the management process look like? With 
the Blue Cod Management Group, there is already an established forum for fisher 
involvement. However, the group appears to have minimal power and influence; and is 
more token participation than truly involved. The final decisions are still made by the 
Ministry, with recommendations by a working group composed of scientists. Looking at 
figure 6.1, it appears that the Marlborough Sounds recreational blue cod fishery falls 
somewhere between instructive and consultative, possibly more towards instructive for 
reasons discussed above. Instead, I believe the fishery should be co-managed; thereby 
giving fishers a true voice in the management process. Regulation non-compliance may even 
decrease with greater fisher involvement and allowing the fishers to actually make final 
decisions lessens the chance of implementing an unpopular regulation. 
 
Figure 6.1: Spectrum of fisheries management arrangements 
 
( 
From Sen and Nielsen (1996) 
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The fishers to sit on the Blue Cod Management group should also be chosen carefully 
to provide a greater diversity in representation as this thesis has demonstrated that fishers 
are not always a homogenous group. Public consultation could also be improved to reach 
more fishers. For example, upcoming consultations on potential changes to the regulations 
is limited to two meetings in the Marlborough region. Along with co-management, 
consultation should also include non-resident fishers, especially those in Wellington and 
Christchurch. 
6.3.3 The need for targeted behavioural interventions in response to non-compliance 
Effectively addressing the problem of non-compliance in a fishery is an important 
challenge for fisheries managers. But the scale and numerous drivers make it a daunting 
task that requires time and money, which are often lacking. As a result, essential questions 
about non-compliance with conservation rules remain unanswered. For example, Robbins et 
al. (2009) posed the following questions: “who, within and across diverse rural communities, 
is most likely to ‘poach’ resources? How do local management norms shape the intensity 
and nature of the illicit extraction from the nearby conservation zones? What form of 
governance would rule-breakers prefer? In the absence of answers to these basic questions 
and without knowing who rule breakers are and what they do, it is difficult to imagine or 
develop management schemes that are either sustainable or just” (p. 560). In order to 
minimize regulation violations, targeted behavioural interventions are needed. Otherwise 
the traditional approach of stricter rules and increased enforcement bring about the ‘vicious 
circle’ (Jentoft and Mikalsen 2004) previously mentioned and fails to actually address the 
causes of non-compliance. 
 But needing targeted behavioural interventions brings about further questions. How 
are priorities for management actions determined? Who should be targeted in these 
interventions? Which regulations are not currently effective? Section 6.3.1 discussed the 
valuable contribution from a better understanding of the human dimensions of the fishery. 
The design and implementation of effective behavioural interventions is dependent on 
knowledge of fisher attitudes and behaviour. But the diversity in fisher knowledge and 
attitudes displayed in chapter two highlights the need for such interventions to target 
specific groups of fishers. For example, knowledge of the transit rule was not consistent 
among fishers as more experienced fishers had greater knowledge of the rules. Given this 
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finding, blanket efforts to improve regulation awareness would not be the most effective 
strategy. Instead, finding a way to target less experienced fishers would provide maximum 
benefits for increasing knowledge.  
The extent of non-compliance with a regulation can provide data on which 
regulations need the most attention and should potentially be reviewed. In the absence of 
that information managers can only estimate which regulation has the most violations 
based on sources such as field intercepts or logbooks (in the case of commercial fisheries) 
which may not be accurate (Gavin et al. 2009). Other, more accurate methods of estimating 
regulation non-compliance are needed, as increasing enforcement over the entire fishery is 
not possible or advisable given the importance of normative factors in driving regulation 
non-compliance. High levels of non-compliance also suggest where research into the drivers 
of non-compliance would be beneficial. 
There is substantial research detailing the drivers of non-compliance in different 
fisheries worldwide but the results are significantly varied. For example, in Swedish fisheries 
moral and social norms were the largest driver of compliance (Jagers et al. 2012) but in 
Danish fisheries instrumental factors such as potential economic gains and the probability of 
detection were the most important influences (Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003). Even though 
the largest driver of compliance with both the daily and size limits was social norms, the 
relative influence of the two types of social norms differed. Injunctive and social norms 
address two different aspects of social acceptance, what others think and what others do, 
and are best addressed in different ways. For example, injunctive social norms are best 
addressed when an individual’s self-regulating capacity is high (Jacobson et al. 2011). 
Furthermore the influences on the social norm are not necessarily consistent between 
regulations. The best fitting model for the size limit showed an influence of problem 
awareness on social norms, but for the daily limit model there were no influencing variables. 
The factors influencing the legitimacy of the management regime (which is believed to 
affect social norms) are also likely to vary in importance. Looking at the median factor 
scores, the effectiveness of the size limit was perceived to be significantly lower than that 
for the daily limit. 
Without researching the human dimensions there are “too many proposed solutions 
and not enough practical answers for improving management” (Fulton et al. 2011). So in the 
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absence of this information for a specific fishery, assumptions will be made and/or efforts 
will rely on enforcement. There is a high likelihood these interventions may not be effective, 
wasting both time and money while undermining the health of the fishery. Furthermore, 
targeted behavioural interventions could assist the Ministry in meeting one of their overall 
objectives: “cost-effective management and services” (Ministry of Fisheries 2009 p. 8) which 
includes the use of “least cost policy tools” (p. 12). Therefore the drivers of non-compliance 
need to be modelled to determine which factors have largest influence. Under this 
approach managers can also identify the characteristics of violators, making it easier to 
determine the target groups for the interventions.  
Once greater information on fisher attitudes and behaviour is known, behavioural 
interventions can be designed using that knowledge. Specifically, it seems such research can 
provide answers to important questions when designing behavioural interventions: who 
(what group of fishers needs to be targeted), what (what behaviour needs to be changed), 
why (how does the behavioural change benefit the fishery) and how (what type of 
intervention would be most effective). Answering these questions allows targeted 
behavioural interventions to be designed and implemented, effectively addressing the issue. 
Without knowing this information, management strategies to address non-compliance are 
likely to be only marginally effective. 
6.4 Reflections on research 
 In writing this conclusion and reflecting on the process and results of the past few 
years, several important thoughts are worth noting. The first reflection came up towards the 
beginning of this entire process, my role as an outsider and scientist. When I first visited the 
Marlborough Sounds I attended a meeting of the Marlborough Sounds Recreational Fishing 
Association to discuss my proposed research and ask for volunteers to interview. Yet I was 
only allowed to say a few words before being asked to leave the room while they discussed 
my request. Although a few fishers agreed to talk with me, the overall atmosphere was one 
of distrust (what did I know about this issue and how was I going to use the data?). Previous 
scientific studies almost always resulted in stricter regulations, including the ban, so why 
would my research be any different? There was also the occasional fisher who believed I 
was working for the Ministry and not as a true independent researcher. Getting the fishers 
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to trust me (and thus my work) took time, multiple visits and finally seeing the questions I 
was asking.  
When it became clear to fishers that I was genuinely interested in their thoughts and 
asked about subjects important to them, I finally overcame their scepticism. Although, it 
should be noted that even after carrying out data collection, publication of multiple articles 
in newspapers, newsletters and magazines, and a presentation on the results, some fishers 
are still distrustful and questioning of the results. Other researchers (Jacobsen and others 
2012) have noted this quandary; that fishers are likely to associate scientists with 
management efforts and regulation formation even when their research is independent. 
Notably, this scepticism was not limited to the fishers. When I approached the Ministry to 
discuss my research, I was once again met with distrust over my methods and background. 
As a social scientist, most of the methods and approaches employed in the research were 
new to the Ministry and outside the domain of their staff of fisheries biologists. 
 My role as an objective scientist has also caused dilemmas throughout this process. 
Yet as I analysed the data and continued writing up the results, I realized that the 
management strategy did not have to be a choice between listening to fishers and their 
concerns, or ensuring the recovery and sustainability of the blue cod population. Greater 
fisher involvement in the management process could benefit the fishery in many ways, 
including maximising regulation compliance, key to ensuring the success of the current 
management regime. But convincing the Ministry of the benefits of this management 
strategy change is likely to still be a difficult task. 
 Although I previously noted how pleased most fishers were that this research was 
being carried out, I was also surprised at the level of apathy and disillusionment shown by 
many fishers. When I invited fishers to take part in the online survey the most common 
reason for declining was that they felt it was no use and would not make a difference. These 
fishers felt the Ministry would not take any notice of the results, despite being carried out 
by an independent researcher. Even some of the fishers who provided emails commented 
that it would not change the situation. However, many of these fishers felt just as strongly 
about the regulations as fishers who did participate. I believe this apathy is by itself an 
important finding as it reflects the continued lack of fisher involvement and the Ministry’s 
refusals to consider fisher feedback. Turnout at the meeting I organized to present my 
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research was also extremely low, as previously noted. If fishers are often apathetic towards 
change it presents a challenge for their concerns to be heard. Greater participation in the 
management process would help address this issue as fishers would be more likely to feel 
they had a voice and their feedback could actually influence regulation design. Feedback on 
the presentation also reflected this feeling, as even fishers invested enough in the issue to 
attend the meeting did not believe the Ministry would consider the results. At the same 
time, it is also worth noting that the empirical studies were successful in terms of sample 
size, suggesting that despite this apathy many fishers were willing to voice their views. As 
several fishers stated, “it can’t hurt”. 
6.5 Further research 
 The four studies that comprise this thesis offer important and useful information 
concerning the human dimensions of the Marlborough Sounds recreational blue cod fishery 
and also illuminate areas for further research. The first two areas of study are perhaps the 
most straightforward and follow on from the concerns raised by objective four (chapter five) 
over the number of blue cod currently discarded. Although it may be true that blue cod 
have a very high survival rate if a large, barbless hook is used, the Ministry does not 
currently have that information. Given that the use of small hooks significantly increased the 
likelihood of mortality in small blue cod (Carbines 1999b), making an assumption on this 
area of fisher behaviour seems imprudent. Further research to test this assumption is also 
merited since 53% of the blue cod currently discarded are less than 30cm, and Carbines 
(1999) considered ‘small’ blue cod to be those under 33cm. Similarly, the other study on 
blue cod post-release mortality (Davidson 1995) that showed no post-release predation is 
almost ten years old and the amount of blue cod discarded has substantially increased since 
that time (Humm 2013). Furthermore, the scientific literature has documented links 
between discards and increasing seabird populations (e.g., Oro et al. 2004).  
Moreover, there has yet to be any research into seabirds’ consumption of discards in 
recreational fisheries. As post-release mortality, whether from hooking injuries or 
predation, is the largest source of fishing mortality (Davis 2002), carrying out research on 
these two topics would allow the Ministry to have a more accurate estimate of fishing 
mortality and is in line with their principle of following a precautionary approach: “Particular 
care will be taken to ensure environmental sustainability where information is uncertain, 
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unreliable or inadequate” (Ministry of Fisheries, 2009, p. 12). Specifically, a community 
science project would be a beneficial approach to obtaining these data given the lack of 
institutional information and high public interest. As the blue cod population has still not 
recovered (Bell 2014b), accurate and current information on the population is vital for 
sustainable management.  
 A second area that would benefit from future research is differences in fisher 
attitudes towards retaining undersized and oversized blue cod, as they are not likely to be 
the same. Minimum size restrictions are one of the most commonly used management 
strategies both worldwide (Radomski et al. 2001) and in New Zealand (Ministry of Fisheries 
2014b), but the maximum size is unique to the blue cod fishery in this country. During 
conversations with fishers, there were suggestions to lower the minimum size but many 
fishers mentioned that a 33cm minimum size would be preferable. Three presentation 
attendees mentioned this issue, although their preferred minimum size varied. Having to 
discard juvenile fish is something that fishers understand and agree with, resulting in 
negative social norms on this issue. In contrast, fishers are less likely to agree with throwing 
back a large fish especially as many are unclear on why the maximum size was 
implemented. The only socially acceptable reason for a fisher to keep an undersized blue 
cod is likely to be if it were fatally injured. But the drivers of non-compliance with the 
maximum size are likely to be more complex, even though primarily driven by social norms. 
It would also be worthwhile to explore what percentage of the 30% of non-compliance with 
the size limit is oversized blue cod. Once that was established, a similar approach to 
objective three could be used to differentiate the drivers of non-compliance between 
undersized and oversized blue cod. These findings would then allow for more targeted 
behavioural interventions. 
 The results of all four studies suggest a need to re-evaluate the size limit, particularly 
the maximum size, and the presentation feedback confirms the importance of this issue. 
Although chapter five demonstrates strong support for a 30-40cm slot, further consultation 
and research should be undertaken around this issue prior to change. The prevalence and 
sensitivity of high-grading among fishers would be an important part of this study. If fishers 
high-grade too often under the 10cm slot, it would negate some of the discard reductions 
from the larger slot. As the maximum size limit is unique within New Zealand, there are 
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likely to be fishers who will disagree with the maximum size even if modified. Part of this 
research could include education on the reason for the maximum size to test if greater 
knowledge influenced their support for the size limit. It may be that many fishers currently 
opposed to any maximum size would be more supportive if they were aware of the benefits 
to the fishery (leaving large males in the population so large females do not change sex). As 
the first study (Thomas et al. 2014b) demonstrated that fishers are not a homogenous 
group, extensive consultation, via multiple modes, would be advised to ensure 
representation of the different groups.  
 A final area for future research would be evaluation of potential adaptive 
management approaches to behaviour change. Specifically, this approach could be used for 
testing potential interventions to influence social norms, the largest driver of non-
compliance with both the daily and size limits. Prior research has suggested that descriptive 
norm interventions are most effective when targeted to different groups. As fisher attitudes 
and behaviours differ between groups based on factors such as experience and residency, 
the social norm influences may also differ. Regardless, further investigation of the reasons 
behind fisher attitudes will help design effective interventions. The Bamberg and Möser 
(2007) model used in the drivers of non-compliance suggests that problem awareness and 
internal attribution influence social norms and the four variables used to measure 
legitimacy (i.e., outcome fairness and effectiveness, participation and meaningful rule) are 
also likely to influence the social norm as well. For example, if a regulation is not viewed as 
fair, the injunctive social norm may not confer social sanctions on fishers breaking that rule.  
A recent meta-review (Abrahamse and Steg 2013) found that another form of social 
influence, block leaders, was a more effective approach then social norms. Given the 
strained relationship between the Ministry and the fishers, this method of using 
stakeholders to convey information could be extremely effective when coupled with 
interventions targeting social norms. In order to help maximise the effectiveness of social 
norm interventions, Social Network Analysis would be extremely useful as it seeks to 
understand networks, their participants and the relationships between them (Scott 1988). 
Although frequently used in the social sciences (Luke 2005) natural resource managers are 
only recently realizing Social Network Analysis’ potential. Results from carrying out this 
analysis, including how fishers get specific information and from whom, would allow more 
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targeted behavioural interventions to change the social norm through the use of existing 
social networks.  
6.6 Study limitations 
One limitation that applies to all studies is the small sample size. Although initially 
disappointed in the number of responses to both the intercept and online surveys, reading 
journal articles on other studies showed that the sample size was comparable (or even 
larger) to other studies in the area. Despite this, 300-400 fishers are only a small proportion 
of the estimated 9000 fishers in 2008 (Batstone et al. 2009). Even though this number has 
probably decreased as a result of the ban and current strict regulations, the adjusted 
estimate would still be many times higher than my sample size. However, the results are still 
representative of the different groups of fishers and the methodological and theoretical 
contributions are not diminished. As this research was mainly self-funded and carried out 
without the help of any assistants, a significantly larger sample size would have been 
difficult. But these constraints did influence the data collection method for the intercept 
survey, which was also the initial source of emails for the online survey. Data collection was 
concentrated at the three marinas in the region and a nearby recreational area (Waikawa 
Bay) but boat ramps in other parts of the Marlborough Sounds were not sampled. Although 
the subsequent articles in newspapers and fishing magazines, as well as word-of-mouth and 
emails, provided an opportunity to participate in the online survey, these fishers may have 
been under-represented in the intercept survey. 
As previously noted, fishers who believed the research would not make a difference 
to the Ministry were less likely to offer their email address, and also take the online survey. 
This group of fishers is likely to be under-represented in the final sample but the extent of 
this bias is unknown. It has been established that fishers with greatest investment greater 
psychological, social and monetary investments in the fishery are likely to voice the 
strongest opinions in response to management changes (Bryan 2000). Therefore, although it 
is likely that fishers who were satisfied with the regulations were less likely to take the 
survey, this group appears to be a minority based on the intercept surveys, which did not 
have this potential response bias. A greater inclusion of this group would therefore not 
significantly alter the findings.  
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A response bias may have also influenced the number of respondents who 
completed the final study (chapter five) as the more invested or frustrated fishers would 
have been the most likely to take the time to get that far along in the survey. As a result, 
there is the potential that fisher satisfaction with an unchanged size limit may be 
underestimated; although again the intercept survey suggests this concern is small. Finally, 
two reported studies (chapters three and four) were based on the same sample of fishers. 
Although the scenario study was presented independently and used a between-group 
experimental design, it would have been better to gather data from two independent 
samples of fishers.  
The length of the survey was also a main limitation with the response rate and small 
sample size. Because the online survey was quite long, it meant the response rate continued 
to decrease as more questions were answered. In recognition of this concern, the question 
order was carefully selected. After the initial questions on blue cod fishing in the 
Marlborough Sounds, the methodological questions for chapter three (estimating non-
compliance) were presented next. The use of both indirect techniques required a large 
sample size to counteract the large variances under both methods.  Next, the three ‘blocks’ 
of questions for the study on drivers of non-compliance (all regulations, daily limit then size 
limit) were given. Within each ‘block,’ there were several lots of seven to eight questions on 
the drivers and the question order was randomized. However, the order of the blocks was 
not randomized so there is the potential for order effects, especially on the statements 
concerning drivers of compliance with the size limit.  
Chapter five’s study on size limit scenarios was last as preliminary calculations had 
shown that a large sample size was not necessary to demonstrate potential differences 
between groups. Furthermore, this study was the most practical and also of the most 
interest to fishers given the frustration over the size limit. It was rationalized that the high 
level of fisher interest in the size limit and resulting discards would encourage respondents 
to continue on with the survey, even though they had already answered quite a few 
questions. But once again, there is the potential for order effects as fishers responses could 
have been influenced by previous answers. Nonetheless, I believe these effects to be 
minimal given the strong feelings on the size limit regulation.  
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Using different sample populations for the different studies would have addressed 
the sample size problem and minimized potential order effects for the later questions and 
studies. Multiple samples may have also increased representation of less interested/more 
satisfied fishers and lower that potential bias. 
6.7 Final thoughts 
The introductory chapter of this thesis provided evidence of a crisis in the world’s 
fisheries with most species overfished (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations 2012); but only recently has the recreational fishing sector been acknowledged as a 
threat to fish stocks. This practice, which is growing in popularity (Arlinghaus and Cooke 
2009; Coleman et al. 2004), shares many of the same effects as commercial fisheries 
including: environmental degradation, altered ecosystems, evolutionary changes through 
selective fishing pressure, stock collapse and a problem of discards and by-catch (Cooke and 
Cowx 2004). The most prevalent reason behind these management failures, in both 
commercial and recreational fisheries, has been the continued reliance on a top-down 
management approach (Froese and Proelß 2010; Nussman et al. 2005). But natural resource 
management is undergoing a change in perspective with greater recognition that the social 
and ecological aspects of fisheries are linked (Berkes 2010). In order to reverse the trend of 
fisheries management failures, a new approach is therefore needed; one that ensures a 
more participatory process with strong consideration of the human dimensions in addition 
to the biological (and economic) aspects. 
The value of understanding fisher attitudes and behaviour, especially as they relate 
to non-compliance, has been stressed throughout the four studies comprising this thesis. 
Human dimensions research should not be disregarded nor fishers’ responses to regulations 
viewed as externalities. Study results demonstrate how this information can actually 
improve the effectiveness of the management regime and that it ‘must’ be included to 
maximize effectiveness. Information on the heterogeneity in fisher attitudes and their 
influences can assist in designing regulations that are accepted by a majority of fishers and 
help create a legitimate management regime. This approach is even necessary to utilize 
targeted behavioural interventions to address the issue of non-compliance, at least without 
wasting time or money. 
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Unfortunately, the most recent biological data, although not fully released, lends 
credence to fisher concerns over the consequences of the increased discards from the slot 
rule. The data show there are fewer blue cod than the 2010 survey (Beentjes and Carbines 
2012) but these blue cod are heavier (Bell 2014b); suggesting high rates of mortality 
amongst smaller fish. As stated by Finlayson and McCay (1998) “when the accumulation of 
perceived failures significantly exceeds the perceived utility of management, the legitimacy 
and conceptual coherence of that management institution are weakened to the point where 
they are vulnerable to challenge and open to fundamental change” (p. 311). It appears that 
the Marlborough Sounds recreational blue cod fishery is currently at such a tipping point, 
making it an opportune time for a shift to a more inclusive management regime.  
I also wish to note that this thesis does not represent the end of this research. In 
accordance with the desire for the results to be considered by the Ministry a report 
summarizing the main findings with reference to both the scientific literature, as well as the 
Ministry’s noted objectives and actions, will be produced in advance of a meeting and 
potential presentation on the research. A second report will also be created for 
dissemination to interested fishers to continue the process of stakeholder engagement. It is 
my hope that this research will assist the Ministry in recognizing the value of a transition to 
a more participatory management strategy. As the existing literature on the human 
dimensions of fisheries is not being fully utilized (Arlinghaus et al. 2008; Hunt et al. 2013) 
this study demonstrates multiple benefits, for all stakeholders, to ending this information 
exclusion. This chapter has also shown how many of the suggestions from this thesis are 
aligned with the Ministry’s own goal of using the fishery “in a manner that provides the 
greatest overall economic, social, and cultural benefit” (Ministry of Fisheries 2009, p. 5). As 
the legitimacy of a management regime is not static (Jentoft 2000) it is not too late for these 
changes to happen and avoid another ban on recreational blue cod fishing. Many of the 
fishers are passionate about the health of the fishery and spoke of wanting to ensure their 
children and grandchildren are able to go fishing in the Marlborough Sounds. Sadly, at this 
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Appendix 1: Marlborough Sounds Blue Cod 
Management Timeline 
Year Blue Cod Management Event 
      Minimum Legal Size: 30cm                   Daily Bag Limit: 20 
1986      Minimum Legal Size: 30cm                   Daily Bag Limit: 12 
1993      Minimum Legal Size: 33cm                   Daily Bag Limit: 10 
1994      Minimum Legal Size: 28cm                   Daily Bag Limit: 6 
2003     Minimum Legal Size: 30cm                    Daily Bag Limit: 3 
NIWA data shows the Sounds blue cod population declined 50% 
between 1995-1996 and 2001. 
March 
2008 
Late 2007 NIWA data shows 57% decline of juvenile blue cod since 
2004. The Ministry of Fisheries opens consultation on a variety of 
measures aimed at halting the blue cod population decline.  
April  
2008 
Over 300 recreational fishers attend two public meetings organised by 
the Marlborough Recreational Fishers’ Association. The Ministry 
receives over 1000 submissions on the initial position paper. 
3 July 
2008 
The Minister of Fisheries announces the closure of the Marlborough 




Four year blue cod ban begins. 
May  
2009 
The Blue Cod Management Group is formed with the task of drafting a 
proposed management plan for the Marlborough Sounds blue cod 




The Blue Cod Management Group’s draft plan for managing the Sounds 




The Minister of Fisheries  announces new regulations in advance of 
the re-opening of the Sounds blue cod fishery: 
 The season is restricted to eight months (20 December to 31 
August),  
 MLS of 30 cm and a new maximum legal size of 35cm 
 Daily Bag Limit of 2 with a maximum accumulation of two.  
April 
2011 
Marlborough Sounds blue cod fishery re-opens, 18 months ahead of 
schedule. 
June 2014 Despite the frustrations of fishers, the Minister of Fisheries announces 
there will be no review of the regulations until results of a 2014 stock 
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8.5 Semi-structured interviews 





Information Sheet: Semi-Structured Interview 
 
Researcher: Alyssa Thomas from the School of Geography, Environment and 
Earth Sciences at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.  
 
I am a PhD candidate in Environmental Studies at the above institution.  In order 
to achieve this degree I am conducting research that will lead to a thesis. 
The purpose of this study is to understand compliance behaviour among 
recreational fishers in New Zealand. There are there parts to this study: 1) 
testing the effectiveness of two indirect (and anonymous) questioning methods 
on obtaining higher (and presumably more accurate) estimates of non 
compliance 2) Understanding what factors are the strongest influences on a 
fisher’s decision to comply with a specific fishing regulation and 3) Looking at 
compliance with suggested best practices as well as discard rates under different 
scenarios. 
 
As part of my research I would like to interview you to discuss your thoughts on 
this topic. This interview will remain anonymous unless you sign a consent form 
and agree to be quoted. Quotes from the interview may be used in my final thesis 
and papers published in academic journals or presentations at academic 
conferences. Before publication I will provide you with a copy of the transcript of 
the quotes and obtain your permission to use them.  
 
If you have additional questions about any aspect of the research please contact 
me at: Alyssa Thomas, Department of Geography, Environment and Earth 
Sciences.  Victoria University of Wellington. PO Box 600, Wellington, New 
Zealand; 04 463 5233 ext. 8619. Alternatively you may contact my supervisor, Dr 
Taciano Milfont, Department of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington. PO 
Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand. A summary of the research (once available) 








Consent to participate in research: Semi-Structured Interview 
 
Project: Identifying and Understanding Fishers’ Compliance with Fishing 
Regulations in New Zealand 
 
I agree that I have been provided with and understand the explanation of this 
research and its goals. In addition I have been given the chance to mention any 
concerns or ask any questions related to the project, and the answers have been 
satisfactory. Furthermore, I may leave this research at any time before data 
collection & analyses have finished; or change my mind about inclusion of my 
information. I may do so without providing any reason and there will be no 
penalty if I decide to do one of the above. 
 
Before any work related to this research is published I will have the opportunity 
to check the interview transcript to verify any quotes attributed to me. The 
information from this interview will not be used for any other purpose or 
released to anyone else without express written consent. 
 
Check the box and initial below if: 
 You consent to information and/or opinions that I have given being credited to me in 

















8.6 Information sheet for pilot study 
 
Researcher: Alyssa Thomas from the School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences at 
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.  
I am a PhD candidate in Environmental Studies at the above institution.  In order to achieve this 
degree I am conducting research that will lead to a thesis. The purpose of this study is to understand 
compliance behaviour among recreational fishers in New Zealand. There are there parts to this 
study: 1) testing the effectiveness of two indirect (and anonymous) questioning methods on 
obtaining higher (and presumably more accurate) estimates of non-compliance 2) Understanding 
what factors are the strongest influences on a fisher’s decision to comply with a specific fishing 
regulation and 3) Looking at compliance with suggested best practices, such as hook size. 
Victoria University requires ethics approval for any research project involving human participants.   
If you agree to participate you will be asked a series of questions on the regulations that you are 
supposed to follow while fishing in this area. You will also be asked to complete a series of questions 
concerning your compliance with these same regulations. Both Randomised Response (RRT) and 
Item Count (ICT) are strictly anonymous and I have no way of knowing what your answer is. 
For RRT you will be asked to flip a coin and remembering the outcome without telling anyone. Next 
you will randomly select 1 of 2 questions from an envelope, again not telling anyone. One card will 
ask you about the coin toss “When you flipped the coin did you get tails?” and the other card is a 
question about fishing in the area. To answer you simply circle yes or no on the survey form. At no 
point should you reveal which question you answered. To make sure you understand this method 
and why your answer remains anonymous we can do a practice one first with the roles reversed. 
For ICT you will be given two lists of common behaviors. For each list you need to report only the 
total number of these practices that you have done in the past year. It is important to not make any 
marks or checks next to the practices that apply, only write the total number from each list. We can 
also do a practice one of this method, if you would like.  
The entire survey should last around 15 minutes. Participation is completely voluntary. The overall 
survey, as well as every section, is completely anonymous and confidential. There is no penalty for 
not participating or for withdrawing from participation at any stage. At no time will your name will 
never be asked for or recorded. The results of the study will form the basis of my thesis, and copies 
will be given to the School of Geography Environment and Earth Sciences at Victoria, Victoria 
University Library, and possibly also published in academic journals. 
If you have additional questions about any aspect of the research please contact me at: Alyssa 
Thomas, Department of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences. Victoria University of 
Wellington. PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand; 04 463 5233 ext. 8619. Alternatively you may 
contact my supervisor, Dr Taciano Milfont, School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington. 
PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand.  
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8.8 Intercept survey 
 
  
Marlborough Sounds Blue Cod Survey 2013 
 
1. Overall, how would you rate your level of satisfaction with the blue cod regulations 
for the Marlborough Sounds? 
(very dissatisfied) 1.   2.   3.   4.   5.  (very satisfied) 
 
2. How much do the blue cod regulations influence your decision on how often to go 
fishing in the Marlborough Sounds? 
(no influence) 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  (strong influence) 
 
3. Please rate your satisfaction with fishing for blue cod in the Marlborough Sounds in 
2012 
(very dissatisfied) 1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   (very satisfied) 
 
4. Please rate your satisfaction with fishing for blue cod in the Marlborough Sounds in 
2011 
(very dissatisfied) 1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   (very satisfied) 
 
5a. If you go fishing in the Cook Strait are you allowed to bring back more than two 
blue cod per person/day? 1.  Yes  2.  No 3.  Don’t know 
  5b. And do you agree with this? 1.  Yes  2.  No 
 
6a. Is filleting of blue cod at sea allowed? 1.  Yes  2.  No  3.  Don’t know 
  6b. And do you agree with this? 1.  Yes  2.  No 
 
7a. Have you heard of the Blue Cod Management Group before? 1.  Yes  2.  No 
  7b. If yes, what do you think the group’s purpose is and/or what have they done in 
the past? 
     
 
 
8. How many years have you been fishing in the Marlborough Sounds? ________ 
 
9. Finally, in which of the following areas do you live? 
1.  Northland 
2.  Auckland 
3.  Waikato 
4.  Bay of Plenty 
5.  Gisborne 
6.  Hawke’s Bay 
7.  Taranaki 
8.  Manawatu-Wanganui 
9.  Wellington-Wairarapa 
10.  Tasman 
11.  Nelson 
12.  Marlborough 
13.  West Coast 
14.  Canterbury 
15.  Otago 
16.  Southland 
17.  Overseas 
 
Gender Estimated Age 




8.9 Measures used to predict compliance with blue cod fishing regulations 
 
Construct       Items 
1. Meaningful Rule  1. There is valid science behind the 
blue cod regulations* 
2. It is wrong to have to throw back a 
fish that is severely injured 
3. MFish has the right to impose 
regulations governing blue cod 
fishing* 
4. It is difficult to respect the blue cod 
regulations 
 
2. Involvement in decision-making 
process  
1. Recreational fishers were 
adequately involved in forming the 
blue cod regulations 
2. Recreational fishers were well-
represented in developing the blue 
cod management plans 
3. My views were well-represented in 
developing the blue cod 
management plans 
4. MFish did not listen to recreational 
fishers when developing the blue 
cod management plans* 
3. Problem Awareness  1. The blue cod population was 
declining before the ban 
2. It was necessary to do something 
about the overfishing of blue cod in 
the Sounds 
3. The Sounds blue cod population  
needs to be carefully managed 
4. The number of recreational fishers 
in the Marlborough Sounds has 
been increasing  
4. Attribution  1. My fishing practices did not 
contribute to the need for the blue 
cod regulations* 
2. Going fishing in the Sounds puts 
pressure on the blue cod population 
3. The blue cod regulations were 




4. By following proper handling 
practices, my fishing does not harm 
the blue cod population* (deleted) 
5. Probability of Detection  1. On a normal fishing trip I do not 
expect to see a MFish boat* 
2. Enforcement by MFish is too 
focused on holiday periods* 
(deleted) 
3. Enforcement by MFish is frequent 
enough to deter most fishers from 
violating the blue cod regulations 
4. If you were to take more than the 
daily limit of blue cod, what would 
you consider to be the overall 
chance of being caught? 
6. Probability of Conviction 1. If caught keeping more than the 
daily limit how likely is it that you 
would be penalised? 
7. Knowledge of Rules  1. I have been informed of the daily 
limit (size limit) for blue cod 
2. I have easy access to information 
about the daily limit for blue cod 
3. It is easy to understand what is 
required by the daily limit for blue 
cod 
8. Penalty if Convicted  1. Potential penalties are strict enough 
to deter most recreational fishers 
form exceeding the daily limit for 
blue cod 
2. I do not exceed the daily limit for 
blue cod because of the potential 
penalty 
3. The penalty for taking more than 
the daily limit for blue cod is a 
concern to me 
9. Outcome Fairness  1. Marlborough-based recreational 
fishers are unfairly impacted by the 
daily limit* 
2. The daily limit for blue cod has 
affected my fishing habits more 
than other people’s habits* (deleted 
for size limit) 
3. Daily limits for blue cod are fairly 
applied to everyone 
4. The daily limit for blue cod has a fair 




10. Outcome Effectiveness  1. The daily limit is effective in leaving 
enough blue cod for the future 
2. High levels of dissatisfaction among 
recreational fishers result from the 
daily limit for blue cod* (deleted for 
size limit) 
3. Blue cod fish stocks are effectively 
conserved by the daily limit 
4. A daily limit is not an effective way 
to manage the blue cod population* 
11. Descriptive Social Norm  1. The majority of recreational fishers 
normally comply with the daily limit 
for blue cod* 
2. Among recreational fishers I know, 
most sometimes keep more than 
the daily limit for blue cod 
3. It is common practice among 
recreational fishers to sometimes 
keep more than the daily limit for 
blue cod 
12. Injunctive Social Norm  1. If I kept more than the daily limit of 
blue cod my reputation as a fisher 
would be harmed 
2. Doing what other recreational 
fishers think I should do regarding 
the daily limit for blue cod is 
important to me 
3. Other recreational fishers would 
disapprove if I kept more than the 
daily limit for blue cod 
4. People that are important to me, 
like my friends and family, would 
not disapprove if I took more than 
the daily limit for blue cod* 
13. Guilt  1. I would not feel guilty taking 
more than the daily limit of blue 
cod* 
2. I would feel guilty for taking 
more than my fair share if I 
exceeded the daily limit for blue 
cod 
3. I would have a bad conscience if 
I exceeded the daily limit of blue 
cod 
4. I would not feel guilty exceeding 
the daily limit for blue cod since 
I am not the only one* 
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14. Perceived Behavioural Control  1. It is easy for me to comply with 
the daily limit for blue cod 
2. On a normal fishing trip I would 
have trouble complying with the 
daily limit for blue cod* 
3. I am confident in my control to 
not exceed the daily limit for 
blue cod 
4. It is entirely up to me to not go 
over the daily limit for blue cod 
(deleted for both daily and size 
limits) 
15. Attitude  1. I do not agree with the daily 
limit for blue cod 
2. My fishing experience is made 
less enjoyable by complying with 
the daily limit for blue cod 
3. I do not think it is wrong to take 
more than the daily limit of blue 
cod* (deleted for size limit) 
4. I would not like exceeding the 
daily limit for blue cod* (deleted 
for daily limit) 
16. Moral Norm  1. Complying with the daily limit 
for blue cod is the “right thing to 
do” 
2. It is the moral thing to comply 
with the daily limit for blue cod 
3. Regardless of what other fishers 
think, I do not feel I should 
comply with the daily limit for 
blue cod 
4. Following my own values means 
I feel obligated to not exceed 
the daily limit for blue cod 















8.10 Confirmatory Factor Analysis results 
                      (chapter four) 
8.10.1 Fit indices for measures used to predict compliance: all regulations 
 
Note. N = 320. χ2/df = the ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; 90%CI = 90 percent confidence interval; SRMR = 
standardized root mean square residual; CFI = comparative fit index.  
1: Item 4 (.18) removed, anchored on Item 3 and Item 2 fixed at 0.60                                                                                                                                                                        
2: Item 2 (.05) removed, anchored on Item 3 and Item 1 fixed at 0.61 
 
 
  Model Fit   Descriptive statistics 
Model χ2 df χ2/df 
RMSEA 
(90%CI) 
SRMR CFI   M SD 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Meaningful 2.65 2 1.33 .03 (.00-.12) .02 1  3.25 0.80 .63 
Involvement 0.70 2 0.35 .00 (.00-.08) .01 1  2.27 0.83 .80 
Awareness 1.37 2 0.69 .00 (.00-.10) .01 1  3.82 0.72 .70 
Attribution1 0.51 1 0.51 .00 (.00-.13) .01 1  2.83 0.84 .60 
Detection2 0.02 1 0.02 .00 (.00-.08) .003 1  2.80 0.68 .67 
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8.10.2 Fit indices for measures used to predict compliance: daily limit 
 
 Model Fit   Descriptive statistics 
Model χ2 df χ2/df 
RMSEA 
(90%CI) 
SRMR CFI   M SD 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Knowledge 2.72 1 2.72 .07(.00-.18) .03 .99  4.06 .63 .67 
Penalty1 3.16 1 3.16 .08(.00-.19) .04 .96  3.44 .78 .49 
Fairness 8.43 2 4.22 .10(.038-.18) .03 .98  2.96 .88 .73 
Effectiveness 2.58 2 1.29 .03(.00-.12) .02 1   3.01 .81 .70 
Descriptive2 3.62 1 3.62 .09(.00-.20) .03 .99  3.53 .75 .78 
Injunctive 0.91 2 0.46 .00(.00-.09) .01 1  3.63 .63 .54 
Guilt 12.74 2 6.37 .13(.07-.20) .03 .98  4.02 .75 .85 
PBC3 4.05 1 4.05 .10(.01-.21) .03 .98  3.90 .76 .64 
Attitude4 4.62 1 4.62 .11(.03-.21) .04 .96  3.30 .84 .56 
Moral Norm 0.97 2 0.49 .00(.00-.09) .01 1  4.17 .61 .79 
Note. N = 320. χ2/df = the ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; 90%CI = 90 percent confidence interval; SRMR = 
standardized root mean square residual; CFI = comparative fit index. 
1: Anchored on Item 3 and Item 2 fixed at 0.53  
2: Anchored on Item 2 and Item 3 fixed at 0.74  
3: Item 4 (0.22) removed, anchored on Item 1 and Item 2 fixed at 0.65  





8.10.3 Fit indices for measures used to predict compliance: size limit 
 
 Model Fit   Descriptive statistics 
Model χ2 df χ2/df 
RMSEA 
(90%CI) 
SRMR CFI   M SD 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Knowledge 3.0 1 3.0 .08(.00-.19) .02 .99  4.03 .63 .72 
Penalty1 0.1 1 0.1 .00(.11-.19) .003 1  3.47 .65 .32 
Fairness2 3.81 1 3.81 .09(.00-.12) .03 .99  2.72 .96 .74 
Effectiveness3 2.67 1 2.67 .07(.00-.18) .02 .99  2.60 .99 .70 
Descriptive4 1.77 1 1.77 .05(.00-.17) .02 1.0  3.44 .73 .74 
Injunctive 2.65 2 1.32 .03(.00-.12) .02 1.0  3.50 .67 .64 
Guilt 1.35 2 0.67 .00(.00-1.0) .01 1  3.8 .79 .80 
PBC5 2.67 1 2.67 .07(.00-.18) .02 .99  3.69 .85 .77 
Attitude6 0.64 1 0.64 .00(.00-.14) .02 1  2.71 .82 .49 
Moral Norm 3.08 2 1.54 .04(.00-.13) .01 1.0  3.93 .69 .82 
Note. N = 320. χ2/df = the ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; 90%CI = 90 percent confidence interval; SRMR = 
standardized root mean square residual; CFI = comparative fit index.  
1: Anchored on Item 3 and Item 1 fixed at 0.19  
2: Item 4 (0.40) removed, anchored on Item 3 and Item 2 fixed at 0.67  
3: Item 4 (0.42) removed, anchored on Item 3 and Item 2 fixed at 0.78  
4: Anchored on Item 2  
5: Item 1 (0.12) removed, anchored on Item 3 and Item 4 fixed at 0.75 






















Thank you for taking the time to attend tonight’s presentation. I would appreciate you answering 
a few quick questions to help me evaluate the usefulness of my research results. 
 
1) What was the most interesting result you heard tonight? 
 
 




3) After hearing the results, which of the five rules (daily limit, size limit, transit rule, filleting 
rule, closed season): 
a. Do you most want to see changed? 
b. Do you think is the most important one to change? 
   














5)  Any other comments or feedback? 
 












I am happy that there was research into what the fishers think about the rules  1   2   3   4   5 
The research presented is important 1   2   3   4   5 
The presentation was informative 1   2   3   4   5 
I believe the Ministry will take some of the results into consideration   1   2   3   4   5 
176 
 
8.12 Online Survey 
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Survey Introduction
Kia Ora,
Thank you so much for agreeing to participate in this survey on blue cod fishing in the Marlborough Sounds.  It is
being carried out by Alyssa Thomas, a PhD student at Victoria University of Wellington. Ethics approval has been




-Your views are important to me and all answers will be kept strictly confidential.
-None of the responses can be directly attributed to you and are therefore anonymous.  
-Some of the questions will be a bit repetitive as I am interested in your views on the same aspect (e.g. fairness) of
different blue cod rules. I would appreciate your understanding of this and still taking the time to answer each
question thoughtfully. 
 
To answer a question: Most questions have a round button to click. Select the button that best describes your
answer to each question. Sometimes you may need to type your answer in the space provided. 
 
If you forget to answer a question or miss part of question, a message reminding you that the question needs to be
answered will appear. If this happens, you need to complete your answer to continue with the survey. Sometimes
you will need to scroll across or down the page to see all of the possible answers.
To go to the next question: Once you have finished answering the question, click the >> button at the bottom of the
screen.
 
To change an answer: For questions with a single choice, click on a different button. To change an answer for a
previous question, click on the << button at the bottom of the screen.
   
Completing the survey at a later time: You can leave the survey and come back and finish it later (that day or
another day). Simply click on the link again and you will be taken to where you left off--all previous answers will be
saved.
 
Please continue if you will take the time to carefully read each question and answer truthfully. The survey has
been designed to provide a good level of detail on your views which will make for a stronger result.
Fishing in the Marlborough Sounds
What are the top three species of fish you normally target while fishing in the Marlborough Sounds? To select a
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The daily limit for blue cod in the Marlborough Sounds (during the open season)  is ___ (number) per person?
To keep a blue cod it must be at least  __cm in length
The maximum size for a blue cod to be kept is
Next are four statements concerning your fishing experience and habits. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements using the 5-point
scale below.




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
I am an experienced fisher   
I know the other fishers in the
Marlborough Sounds well   
It is important to be able to
continue fishing in the
Marlborough Sounds
  
I am familiar with the
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In 2012 did you go fishing in the Queen Charlotte Sound? If you did not go fishing the Sounds in 2012 please
answer this question for the most recent year you did go fishing, including 2013.
RRT instructions
On the following pages you will be asked a number of questions about blue cod fishing in the Marlborough
Sounds. 
While I understand that questions on fishing practices may be sensitive, honest information is crucial if the results
of this study are to help improve your fishing experience. The questions are asked in a way that guarantees your
privacy, in addition to the anonymous and confidential nature of the entire survey.
 
While these questions specifically ask about 2012, if you did not go fishing in the Sounds in 2012 please answer
them for the most recent year you have been fishing in the Marlborough Sounds (including 2013).
 
In order to keep your answer a secret, you will be randomly asked one of two possible questions: either 1) about
the results of a coin toss or 2) about fishing in the Marlborough Sounds. 
 
There is no way anyone can know either the results of the coin toss or which question you answered. This means
you can be completely honest with your answers.
 
Before we start with the questions, please start by going to the below website (it will open in a new tab)
and flipping the coin once.  Please remember what side it lands on. Then come back to this survey.
http://www.coin.co.nz/coin-tosser.htm
RRT 1
Is the coin showing heads?
While fishing in the Marlborough Sounds in 2012 did you keep a blue cod that was less than 30cm or more than
35cm in length?
Now please answer the above question by selecting yes or no.
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Once again please go to the below website and flip the coin once. Please remember what side it lands on. 
 
After flipping the coin, come back to this survey. You will then be asked one of two questions, either 1) the results




Is the coin showing heads?
While fishing in the Marlborough Sounds in 2012 did you keep more than 2 blue cod per person in a day?
Now please answer the above question by selecting yes or no.
RRT 3
One final time please go to the below website and toss the coin once. Please remember what side it lands on.
When done flipping the coin please return to this survey.
Once again you will be randomly asked one of two questions, either 1) the results of the coin toss or 2) a third
question on fishing in the Marlborough Sounds
http://www.coin.co.nz/coin-tosser.htm
Is the coin showing heads?
Did you go fishing in the Long Island Marine Reserve in 2012?
Now please answer the above question by selecting yes or no
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Below are a number of fishing related activities that you may have done in 2012. Please carefuly read the
individual activities and note, in your head, how many you have done at least once. Even if you have done that
activity more than once it only counts as '1'. The activities apply to all locations unless otherwise specified.
If you did not go fishing in the Marlborough Sounds in 2012, please answer the questions for the most recent year
(including 2013) you went fishing in the Sounds.
 
When you are done, please answer at the bottom of each list only the TOTAL NUMBER of activities that you have
done for each list.
 
The specific items that you have done will remain unknown and your reponse will also remain anonymous and
confidential so please answer honestly.
 
List 1
-Took time off work to go fishing
-Entered a fishing competition
-Stayed at a bach while on a fishing trip
-Went freshwater fishing
 
Total number of activities you have done from List 1:
List 2
-Shared your catch with someone
-Was a member of a fishing club
-Kept a blue cod less than 30cm or more than 35cm in length while in the Marlborough Sounds
-Watched a fishing show on TV
-Caught a trophy fish
 
 
Total number of activities you have done from List 2:
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-Went fishing from a private vessel
-Went fishing overseas
-Visited the Ministry of Fisheries website
-Taught someone else how to fish
 
 
Total number of activities you have done from List 3:
List 4
-Bought bait from a store
-Kept more than 2 blue cod per person in a day (during the open season in the Marlborough Sounds)
-Purchased a boat
-Visited a fishing-related website other than the Ministry of Fisheries
-Went on a fishing weekend
 
 
Total number of activities you have done from List 4:
List 5
-Read about fishing in a magazine or newspaper
-Attended a public meeting about fishing
-Went line fishing from shore
-Wrote an opinion piece on fishing
 
 
Total number of activities you have done from List 5:
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-Purchased new fishing equipment other than a boat
-Went on a fishing charter
-Took your kids or relatives fishing
-Fished in the Long Island Marine Reserve
-Did not catch any fish in a day
 
Total number of activities you have done from List 6:
ICT 2
Below are a number of fishing related activities that you may have done in 2012. Please carefuly read the
individual activities and note, in your head, how many you have done at least once. Even if you have done that
activity more than once it only counts as '1'. The activities apply to all locations unless otherwise specified.
If you did not go fishing in the Marlborough Sounds in 2012, please answer the questions for the most recent year
(including 2013) you went fishing in the Sounds.
 
When you are done, please answer at the bottom of each list only the TOTAL NUMBER of activities that you have
done for each list.
 
The specific items that you have done will remain unknown and your reponse will also remain anonymous and
confidential so please answer honestly.
List 1
-Took time off work to go fishing
-Entered a fishing competition
-Kept a blue cod less than 30cm or more than 35cm in length while in the Marlborough Sounds




Total number of activities you have done from List 1:
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-Shared your catch with someone
-Was a member of a fishing club
-Watched a fishing show on TV
-Caught a trophy fish
 
 
Total number of activities you have done from List 2:
List 3
-Went fishing from a private vessel
-Kept more than 2 blue cod per person in a day (during the open season in the Marlborough Sounds)
-Went fishing overseas
-Visited the Ministry of Fisheries website
-Taught someone else how to fish
 
Total number of activities you have done from List 3:
List 4:
-Bought bait from a store
-Purhased a boat
-Visited a fishing-related website other than the Ministry of Fisheries
-Went on a fishing weekend
 
 
Total number of activities you have done from List 4:
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-Read about fishing in a magazine or newspaper
-Attended a public meeting about fishing
-Went line fishing from shore
-Fished in the Long Island Marine Reserve
-Wrote an opinion piece on fishing
 
 
Total number of activities you have done from List 5:
List 6
-Purchased new fishing equipment other than a boat
-Went on a fishing charter
-Took your kids or relatives fishing
-Did not catch any fish in a day
 
 
Total number of activities you have done from List 6:
Method evaluation
Did you answer the previous questions for a year besides 2012?
Thank you for answering those questions. Now I would like to know your opinion on the two methods used for the
previous questions.
The next set of statements refer to the first method: you flip a coin and then randomly answer one of two questions
(either the result of the coin toss or fishing in the Marlborough Sounds)
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nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
I understood why my answer
would not be known
  
I felt comfortable answering
honestly
  
I found this method confusing   
I believed my privacy was
protected with this method   
And now please think about the other method where you had a list of activities and were instructed to provide a
total number done




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
I understood why my answer
would not be known   
I felt comfortable answering
honestly   
I found this method confusing   
I believed my privacy was
protected with this method   
Blue Cod Regulations
Blue cod in particular are subject to strict regulation by the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish). The current management
plan regulates the size (the slot rule) and number (daily limit) of blue cod that recreational fishers may keep, closes
the Sounds for several months a year and restricts fishers coming back from the Cook Strait. 
 
The following statements ask about the development of the blue cod regulations and your experiences with
MFish.
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements using the 5-point
scale below.




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
MFish has the right to impose
regulations governing blue cod
fishing
  
It is difficult to respect the blue
cod regulations   
Enforcement by MFish is
frequent enough to deter most
fishers from violating the blue
cod regulations
  
Going fishing in the Sounds
puts pressure on the blue cod
population
  
The Sounds blue cod
population needs to be
carefully managed
  
4/11/13 10:00 PMQualtrics Survey Software
Page 11 of 25https://vuw.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview&T=12iMhN
My views were well-
represented in developing the
blue cod management plans
  
Recreational fishers were
adequately involved in forming
the blue cod regulations
  




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
My fishing practices did not
contribute to the need for the
blue cod regulations
  
It is wrong to have to throw
back a fish that is severely
injured
  
MFish did not listen to
recreational fishers when
developing the blue cod
management plans
  
By following proper handling
practices my fishing does not
harm the blue cod population
  
The blue cod regulations were
needed because of recreational
fishers
  
The number of recreational
fishers in the Sounds has been
increasing
  
It was necessary to do
something about the
overfishing of blue cod in the
Sounds
  




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
Recreational fishers were well-
represented in developing the
blue cod management plans
  
There is valid science behind
the blue cod regulations   
Enforcement by MFish is too
focused on holiday periods   
The blue cod population was
declining before the ban   
On a normal fishing trip I do not
expect to see a MFish boat   
Daily Limit
Now, please think a minute to think about the daily limit for blue cod in the Marlborough Sounds.
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements using the 5-point
scale displayed.
 
Your knowledge of the daily limit for blue cod and the risks involved in disregarding it
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nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
Potential penalties are strict
enough to deter most
recreational fishers from
exceeding the daily limit for
blue cod
  
I have easy access to
information about the daily limit
for blue cod
  
The penalty for taking more
than the daily limit for blue cod
is a concern to me
  
I do not exceed the daily limit
for blue cod because of the
potential penalty
  
I have been informed of the
daily limit for blue cod   
It is easy to understand what is
required by the daily limit for
blue cod
  
The effectiveness and fairness of the daily limit for blue cod




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
A daily limit is not an effective




recreational fishers are unfairly
impacted by the daily limit for
blue cod
  
The daily limit for blue cod has
affected my fishing habits more
than other people's habits
  
Blue cod fish stocks are
effectively conserved by the
daily limit
  
Daily limits for blue cod are
fairly applied to everyone   
High levels of dis-satisfaction
among recreational fishers
result from the daily limit for
blue cod
  
The daily limit for blue cod has
a fair and equitable impact on
recreational fishers
  
The daily limit is effective in
leaving enough blue cod for the
future
  
The behaviour and attitude of other fishers in regards to the daily limit for blue cod
4/11/13 10:00 PMQualtrics Survey Software
Page 13 of 25https://vuw.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview&T=12iMhN




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
People that are important to me,
like my family and friends, would
not disapprove if I took more
than the daily limit for blue cod
  
Doing what other recreational
fishers think I should do
regarding the daily limit for blue
cod is important to me
  
Among recreational fishers that I
know, most sometimes keep
more than the daily limit for blue
cod
  
It is common practice among
recreational fishers to
sometimes exceed the daily limit
for blue cod
  
Other recreational fishers would
disapprove if I kept more than
the daily limit for blue cod
  
The majority of recreational
fishers normally comply with the
daily limit for blue cod
  
If I kept more than the daily limit
of blue cod my reputation as a
fisher would be harmed
  
Your attitude towards the daily limit for blue cod




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
It is easy to comply with the
daily limit for blue cod   
Following my own values
means I feel obligated to not
exceed the daily limit for blue
cod
  
I would not feel guilty taking
more than the daily limit of blue
cod
  
I would feel guilty for taking
more than my 'fair share' if I
exceeded the daily limit for blue
cod
  
It is the moral thing to comply
with the daily limit for blue cod   
I do not agree with the daily
limit for blue cod   




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
I would have a bad conscience
if I exceeded the daily limit of
blue cod
  
It is entirely up to me to not go
over the daily limit for blue cod   
I do not think it is wrong to take
more than the daily limit of blue
cod
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small fine ($500 or under)
large fine (over $500)
I would not like exceeding the
daily limit for blue cod   
I would not feel guilty
exceeding the daily limit of blue
cod since I am not the only one
  
Regardless of what other
fishers think, I do not feel I
should comply with the daily
limit for blue cod
  




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
On a normal fishing trip I would
have trouble complying with the
daily limit for blue cod
  
I am confident in my control to
not exceed the daily limit for
blue cod
  
Complying with the daily limit
for blue cod is the 'right thing' to
do
  
My fishing experience is made
less enjoyable by complying
with the daily limit for blue cod
  
If you were to take more than the daily limit of blue cod, what would you consider to be the overall chance of being
caught?
If caught keeping more than the daily limit of blue cod, how likely is it that you would be penalised?
What penalty would you expect for exceeding the daily limit for blue cod?
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loss of boat
fine and loss of boat
don't know
Considering the specific groups of fishers below, please answer the question: how many fishers in each group do
you think normally comply with the daily limit for blue cod?










or less) None Don't know
Residents of the greater
Marlborough Region   
Permanent Sounds residents   
Bach owners   
Visitors   
Slot Rule
Next, please take a minute to think about the size limitations for blue cod in the Marlborough Sounds, the so-called
'slot rule'.
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements using the
displayed 5-point scale.
Your knowledge of the slot rule and the risks involved with keeping blue cod outside the allowed slot. 




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
Potential penalties are strict
enough to deter most
recreational fishers from not
following the slot rule
  
The penalty for breaking the
slot rule is a concern to me   
I have easy access to
information about the slot rule   
I do not keep blue cod outside
of the slot because of the
potential penalty
  
I have been informed of the
minimum and maximum sizes
for blue cod
  
It is easy to understand what is
required by the slot rule   
The effectiveness and fairness of the slot rule
Strongly Neither Agree
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   Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
Marlborough recreational
fishers are unfairly impacted by
the slot rule
  
The slot rule is effective in
leaving high numbers of large
blue cod
  
The size limits for blue cod are
fairly applied to everyone   
The slot rule is effective in
leaving large numbers of
juvenile blue cod
  
There is a fair and equitable
impact on recreational fishers
from the slot rule
  
A slot rule is not an effective
way to manage the blue cod
population
  
The slot rule has affected my
fishing habits more than others'
habits
  
High levels of dis-satisfaction
among recreational fishers
result from the slot rule
  
The behaviour and attitude of other fishers towards the slot rule




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
The majority of recreational




would disapprove if I kept blue
cod outside of the slot
  
If I kept oversized or
undersized blue cod my
reputation as a fisher would be
harmed
  
Among recreational fishers that
I know, most do not break the
slot rule
  
It is common practice among
recreational fishers to
occasionally disregard the slot
rule
  
People that are important to
me, like my family and friends,
would not disapprove if I took
undersized or oversized blue
cod
  
Doing what other recreational
fishers think I should do
regarding the slot rule is
important to me
  
Your attitude towards the slot rule
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very high
fairly high




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
I do not agree with the slot rule   
I would have a bad conscience
if I kept undersized or
oversized blue cod
  
It is entirely up to me to not
keep blue cod outside of the
slot
  
I would not feel guilty keeping
blue cod outside the allowed
range
  
I would feel guilty for taking
more than 'my fair share' if I
disregarded the slot rule
  
It is easy for me to comply with
the slot rule   




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
It is the moral thing to comply
with the slot rule   
On a normal fishing trip I would
have trouble complying with the
slot rule
  
Regardless of what other
fishers think, I do not feel I
should comply with the slot rule
  
I do not think it is wrong to keep
blue cod that are outside the
slot
  
Complying with the slot is the
'right thing' to do   
I would not like keeping
undersized or oversized blue
cod
  




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
My fishing experience is made
less enjoyable by complying
with the slot rule
  
I am confident in my control to
keep only blue cod that are
within the slot
  
I would not feel guilty breaking
the slot rule since I am not the
only one
  
Following my own values
means I feel obligated to follow
the slot rule
  
If you were to keep blue cod outside of the allowed size range, what would you consider to be the overall chance
of being caught?
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small fine ($500 or less)
large fine (over $500)
loss of boat
fine and loss of boat
don't know
If caught keeping undersized or oversized blue cod, how likely is it that you would be penalised?
What penalty would you expect for keeping undersized or oversized blue cod?
Considering the specific groups of fishers below, please answer the question: how many fishers in each group do
you think normally follow the slot rule?










or less) None Don't know
Residents of the greater
Marlborough region   
Permanent Sounds residents   
Bach owners   
Visitors   
Scenario Intro
This final set of questions goes into more detail about the blue cod that are being put back because of the slot rule.
This seems to be the biggest source of frustration for most fishers, hence the additional questions. 
These blue cod will be returned to the water (discarded) because they are either 1) outside the allowed side range
(forced discards) or 2) returned in the hope of catching a larger, but still legal-sized fish (voluntary discards).
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Extremely familiar-I know all of the suggestions
Very famililar--I know most of the suggestions
Somewhat familar-I have heard of it and know the general ideas
Not very familar-I have heard of it but don't know the details
Not at all familar-I have never heard of it
Currently, on a normal day fishing, I discard an average of ____ (number)  blue cod
Thinking of these discarded blue cod, what percentage is
Blue Cod Discarding
As you may be aware, the Blue Cod Management Group has suggested best practices for fishers to follow while
fishing for blue cod. These practices are suggested in order to minimise the mortality of any fish that are returned
to the water.
 
The following statements ask about your knowledge of these suggestions.
How familiar are you with the Code of Practice for best handling of blue cod?
Now please think about the effectiveness of some of the practices suggested by the code







Wearing wet gloves or using a
wet rag when handling fish   
Using size 6/0 hooks or larger
when fishing for blue cod   
Holding the fish behind the
head to take out the hook   
Pinching or removing the barb
of hooks   
Minimizing the time a caught
fish is out of the water
  
The line is cut if the fish is gut
Because of the minimum size? 0
Because of the maximum size? 0
Voluntary? 0
Total 0
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or gill-hooked   
The fish is not placed on a hot
or dry surface to be measured   
And how often do you follow these suggested best practices?
   Never Sometimes Most of the time Always Unsure
I wear wet gloves or use a wet
rag when handling caught fish   
I do not pinch or remove the
barb of hooks   
When fishing for blue cod I use
size 6/0 hooks or larger   
If the fish is gut or gill-hooked I
cut the line   
The length of time a caught fish
is out of the water is minimized   
I told the fish behind the head
to extract hooks   
I put the fish on a hot, dry
surface for measuring   
Now considering the specific groups of fishers below, please answer the question: How many of the fishers do you
think are aware of the Blue Cod Management Group suggested best practices?










or less) None Don't know
Year round residents of the
Marlborough Area   
Permanent Sounds residents   
Bach owners   
Visitors   
And how many fishers in each group do you think normally follow most of the suggestions:













Year round residents of the Marlborough
Area   
Permanent Sounds residents   
Bach owners   
Visitors   
Scenario 1: No change
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Now please take a minute to envision what the next blue cod season (starting 20 December 2013) might be like.
 
Imagine the current regulations will be unchanged by the next season.
As a recreational fisher you are allowed to keep two blue cod/ per person a day, as long as they are between 30
and 35cm.
 
Considering this scenario please answer the questions below: 
Thinking about the blue cod you personally discard...
   Much Lower Lower About the Same Higher Much Higher
On a normal day fishing my
blue cod discards would be...   
I think my forced discards
would be...   
And I think my voluntary
discards would be...   
And thinking about the scenario...




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
I would enjoy fishing for blue
cod under this scenario   
The majority of recreational
fishers would not be happy with
this scenario
  
This scenario would be less
frustrating than the current
season
  
Scenario 2: Larger Slot
Now please take a minute to envision what the next blue cod season (starting 20 December 2013) might be like.
 
Imagine that the Ministry of Fisheries has decided to increase the maximum size for blue cod from 35cm to 40cm
for the next season. You will then be allowed to keep two blue cod/per person a day, as long as they are between
30 and 40cm.
 
Considering this scenario please answer the questions below: 
Thinking about the blue cod you personally discard...
   Much Lower Lower About the Same Higher Much Higher
On a normal day fishing my
blue cod discards would be...   
I think my forced discards
would be...   
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And I think my voluntary
discards would be...
  
And thinking about the scenario...




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
I would enjoy fishing for blue
cod under this scenario   
The majority of recreational
fishers would not be happy with
this scenario
  
This scenario would be less
frustrating than the current
season
  
Scenario 3: No Slot
Now please take a minute to envision what the next blue cod season (starting 20 December 2013) might be like.
 
Imagine that the Ministry of Fisheries has decided to eliminate the maximum size for blue cod for the next season.
You will then be allowed to keep two blue cod/person a day as long as they are a minimum of 30cm.
 
Considering this scenario please answer the questions below: 
Thinking about the blue cod you personally discard...
   Much Lower Lower About the Same Higher Much Higher
On a normal day fishing my
blue cod discards would be...   
I think my forced discards
would be...   
And I think my voluntary
discards would be...   
And thinking about the scenario...




nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
I would enjoy fishing for blue
cod under this scenario   
The majority of recreational
fishers would not be happy with
this scenario
  
This scenario would be less
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While fishing in the Marlborough Sounds in 2012 did you keep a blue cod that was less than 30cm or more than
35cm in length?
While fishing in the Marlborough Sounds in 2012 did you keep more than 2 blue cod per person in a day?
In 2012 did you go fishing in the Long Island Marine Reserve?
Is there anything else regarding blue cod fishing in the Marlborough Sounds you would like to comment on?
Socio-economic questions
Now just a few final background questions.
What is your gender?
What is your age? (years)
Number of years fishing?
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Number of years fishing in the Marlborough Sounds?
Do you own a boat?
What is the type and length of the boat?
What type of motor does your boat have and what is the horsepower?
In which of the following areas do you live?
4/11/13 10:00 PMQualtrics Survey Software




Fifth or sixth form qualification
High school qualification
Vocational qualification










Do you own a bach in the Sounds?
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
What was your total income before taxes last year?
